

Address before a joint session of the  
Congress on the Persian Gulf crisis and the  
federal budget deficit.

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# Powers and Principalities

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### The American with Disabilities Act Conspiracy

The American with Disabilities Act was not the social security disability retirement act, and the timing of the enactment of the legislation by **President** George HW Bush on July 26, 1990 was an “inclusion” fraud and conspiracy with me specifically in mind, my postal hiring (orientation) had been scheduled approximately at least two months prior to my starting date of July 30, 1990. George HW Bush was Congressman from Texas, Ambassador to China, Central Intelligence director, and Vice president of the United States for eight years and President for four years.

The invasion into Kuwait on **August 2, 1990** was an intentional scheme act. Jury duty beginning January 14, 1991 was an extension of the scheme, with Saddam Hussein’s deadline to withdraw troops from Kuwait being on January 16, 1991 and the declaration of **Desert Storm, a name chosen from the bible.....Daniel chapter 11. The 9/11/90 New World Order speech** was the first speech I watched the president make as a new Federal employee. A five point speech.

The directions and recommendation to fill out an EEO after the Waco, Texas siege that ended April 19, 1993, had begun was a continuation with the War crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The timing of proposed resolutions and nominations and resolution passage and confirmations, with the presumed foresight of those involved of the conclusions of the motions. The breakup of the Soviet Union after desert storm with the series of breakaway republics appears to have been intentional. Dissolving the Soviet Union over the Soviet Afghanistan War. The Christmas day coup in Russia was also not a coincidence, as I originally had thought.

In 1993 the Desert storm aftermath intervention, including the **Somalia** and **Bosnian** intervention began..

### Prosecuting crimes against me and war crimes without me

1993 Don’t ask, don’t tell, surgeon General on tobacco(1964, 1982?,1993) and masturbation, Brady, Oslo Accord, Gay bomb (2006?) and the Gay ban (1981), H4 virus, Weapons in space.

The implications of a miracle translation book of the bible to criminals and the furthered support of **CRIMINAL GLOBAL RELIGIOUS BASED POLICY ERROR**. Star Wars, the Middle East, Africa, sexuality,

military science and technology. Commandeering and control.

Policies based over me specifically or in principle- the six-day war, Sirhan Sirhan,

....Reclassification of crimes on me, the orchestration program and continuing the crimes..

The timing of stopping the Florida recount in 2001 was with my going to make inquiry into my case complaint. Gore versus Bush the ensuing case.

The 2001 mad shoe bomber's plane diversion from Miami to Boston, MA, the Kennedy state. Kennedy I believe was a major proponent of the American with disabilities Act. John Kerry (Sen. Massachusetts) presumably was to be presumed a champion of relevant causes. John Kerry, the former presidential candidates of 2004.

Compound the situation, in February 2002, I called the police and told them I needed to be removed from my home.....Consequently the Bush administration opened up Guantanamo bay prison (radical agent provocateur fundamentalist Muslims). The fifth anniversary of the opening of Guantanamo Bay in 2007 was when I began to question and realize the relevancy of the timing. 2002 was also the formation of the International Criminal court (ICC).

Military prosecutions of crimes related to me, either individually or in principle were prosecuted in the War in Afghanistan and the War in Iraq presumably.

Diversionsary religious cults, and whatever. Black water and the purple 5 on the five dollar bill are symbolic. Attempting to make me the miracle fall guy for their doings. The then newly widely used spelling of Osama as Usama [USA], Al gorah, Torah Borah, Kabul, Swait Valley, Lahore(Pakistan).

Jurisdictionally I was not a **UN member** or **military** personnel or a **foreigner** or a **cosmic clearance** bearer. The issues without me are a crime, a fraud and a sin.

The slight difference of doing something for a person and actually doing it, is fraud or theft (formally known as conversion fraud).

...Books don't make earthquakes, stone hail, famine, drought or pestilence, etc. Requisite participation and knowledge also makes the fears unreasonable. My beliefs goals and understanding, also.

I would have to be a radical fundamentalist Muslim terrorist Christian economist politician sinner according to the collective issues. The multi religion, and cult **agent provocateurs** and covert is the false fulfillment of alleged concerns. UFO religions, Some Christian denominations, polygamy and child abuse cults, radical fundamentalist Muslims are governments' doings not mine.

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**August 3, 2012** Posted by **archmichaelangelo** | **1990, Desert storm, Desert Storm conspiracy, Dissolution of the USSR, Genocide, George Bush 41st, George H.W. Bush, Hired under Conspiracy, Kurdish, Legislative acts, National Security Council, NATO / OTAN, orchestrated movements, Propaganda, Sanctions, Soviet-Afghanistan War, The New World Order, The Soviet Afghanistan war, Timeline, UN, Uncategorized, World rulers** | **ADA, ADA Signing Ceremony - July 26, Fraud, psychiatric fraud** | **Leave a comment**

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**The New World Order 09/11/90**

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# Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit

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## **Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit** (1990)

by *George H. W. Bush*



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A **Speech** by George H. W. Bush, President of the U.S.A. Given to a joint session of the United States Congress, Washington D.C. on 11 September 1990.

Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit George H. W. Bush

1990

Mr. President, Mr. Speaker, members of the Congress, distinguished guests, fellow Americans, thank very much for that warm welcome. We gather tonight, witness to events in the Persian Gulf as significant as they are tragic. In the early morning hours of August 2, following negotiations and promises by Iraq's dictator Saddam Hussein not to use force, a powerful Iraqi Army invaded its trusting and much weaker neighbor, Kuwait. Within three days, 120,000 Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait and moved south to threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then that I decided to act to check that aggression.

At this moment, our brave servicemen and women stand watch in that distant desert and on distant seas, side by side with the forces of more than 20 other distant nations.

They are some of the finest men and women of the United States of America. And they're doing one terrific job.

These valiant Americans were ready at a moment's notice to leave their spouses and their children, to serve on the front line halfway around the world. They remind us who keeps America strong. They do.

In the trying circumstances of the gulf, the morale of our servicemen and women is excellent. In the face of danger, they are brave, they're well-trained and dedicated.

A soldier, Pfc. Wade Merritt of Knoxville, Tennessee, now stationed in Saudi Arabia, wrote his parents of his worries, his love of family, and his hope for peace. But Wade also wrote: "I am proud of my country and its firm stance against inhumane aggression. I am proud of my Army and its men. . . . I am proud to serve my country."

Let me just say, Wade, America is proud of you and is grateful to every soldier, sailor, Marine and airman serving the cause of peace in the Persian Gulf.

I also want to thank the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General [Colin L.] Powell, the Chiefs, here tonight, our commander in the Persian Gulf, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, and the men and women of the Department of Defense. What a magnificent job you all are doing and thank you very very much.

I wish I could say their work is done. But we all know it's not.

So if ever there was a time to put country before self and patriotism before party, the time is now. And let me thank all Americans, especially those in this chamber tonight, for your support for our armed forces and for their mission.

That support will be even more important in the days to come.

So tonight, I want to talk to you about what's at stake—what we must do together to defend civilized values around the world and maintain our economic strength at home.

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### [\[edit\]](#) U.S. Objectives in Persian Gulf

Our objectives in the Persian Gulf are clear, our goals defined and familiar:

Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait completely, immediately and without condition.

Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored.

The security and stability of the Persian Gulf must be assured.

And American citizens abroad must be protected.

These goals are not ours alone. They've been endorsed by the U.N. Security Council five times in as many weeks. Most countries share our concern for principle, and many have a stake in the stability of the Persian Gulf. This is not, as Saddam Hussein would have it, the United States against Iraq. It is Iraq against the world.

As you know, I've just returned from a very productive meeting with Soviet President [*Mikhail*] Gorbachev, and I am pleased that we are working together to build a new relationship. In Helsinki, our joint statement affirmed to the world our shared resolve to counter Iraq's threat to peace. Let me quote: "We are united in the belief that Iraq's aggression must not be tolerated. No peaceful international order is possible if larger states can devour their smaller neighbors."

Clearly, no longer can a dictator count on East-West confrontation to stymie concerted United Nations action against aggression.

A new partnership of nations has begun, and we stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective—a **new world order**—can emerge: A new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, east and west, north and south, can prosper and live in harmony.

A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, while a thousand wars raged across the span of human endeavor, and today that new world is struggling to be born. A world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.

This is the vision that I shared with President Gorbachev in Helsinki. He and the other leaders from Europe, the gulf and around the world understand that how we manage this crisis today could shape the future for generations to come.

## [[edit](#)] 'The Test We Face Is Great'

The test we face is great and so are the stakes. This is the first assault on the new world that we seek, the first test of our mettle. Had we not responded to this first provocation with clarity of purpose; if we do not continue to demonstrate our determination, it would be a signal to actual and potential despots around the world.

America and the world must defend common vital interests. And we will.

America and the world must support the rule of law. And we will.

America and the world must stand up to aggression. And we will.

And one thing more: in the pursuit of these goals, America will not be intimidated.

Vital issues of principle are at stake. Saddam Hussein is literally trying to wipe a country off the face of the Earth.

We do not exaggerate. Nor do we exaggerate when we say: Saddam Hussein will fail.

Vital economic interests are at risk as well. Iraq itself controls some 10 percent of the world's proven oil reserves. Iraq plus Kuwait controls twice that. An Iraq permitted to swallow Kuwait would have the economic and military power, as well as the arrogance, to intimidate and coerce its neighbors—neighbors who control the lion's share of the world's remaining oil reserves. We cannot permit a resource so vital to be dominated by one so ruthless. And we won't.

Recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power. We will stand by our friends. One way or another, the leader of Iraq must learn this fundamental truth.

From the outset, acting hand-in-hand with others, we've sought to fashion the broadest possible international response to Iraq's aggression. The level of world cooperation and condemnation of Iraq is unprecedented.

Armed forces from countries spanning four continents are there at the request of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to deter and, if need be, to defend against attack. Muslims and non-Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs, soldiers from many nations, stand shoulder-to-shoulder, resolute against Saddam Hussein's ambitions.

And we can now point to five United Nations Security Council resolutions that condemn Iraq's aggression. They call for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government and categorically reject Iraq's cynical and self-serving attempt to annex Kuwait.

Finally, the United Nations has demanded the release of all foreign nationals held hostage against their will and in contravention of international law. It's a mockery of human decency to call these people "guests." They are hostages, and the whole world knows it.

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, a dependable ally, said it all: "We do not bargain over hostages. We will not stoop to the level of using human beings as bargaining [*chips*]. Ever."

## [[edit](#)] 'Our Hearts Go Out to the Hostages'

Of course, of course, our hearts go out to the hostages, to their families. But our policy cannot change. And it will not change. America and the world will not be blackmailed by this ruthless policy.

We're now in sight of a United Nations that performs as envisioned by its founders. We owe much to the outstanding leadership of Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. The United Nations is backing up its words with action. The Security Council has imposed mandatory economic sanctions on Iraq, designed to force Iraq to relinquish the spoils of its illegal conquest. The Security Council has also taken the decisive step of authorizing the use of all

means necessary to ensure compliance with these sanctions.

Together with our friends and allies, ships of the United States Navy are today patrolling Mideast waters, and they've already intercepted more than 700 ships to enforce the sanctions. Three regional leaders I spoke with just yesterday told me that these sanctions are working. Iraq is feeling the heat.

We continue to hope that Iraq's leaders will recalculate just what their aggression has cost them. They are cut off from world trade, unable to sell their oil, and only a tiny fraction of goods gets through.

The communique with President Gorbachev made mention of what happens when the embargo is so effective that children of Iraq literally need milk, or the sick truly need medicine. Then, under strict international supervision that guarantees the proper destination, then—food will be permitted.

At home, the material cost of our leadership can be steep. And that's why Secretary of State [*James A.*] Baker and Treasury Secretary [*Nicholas F.*] Brady have met with many world leaders to underscore that the burden of this collective effort must be shared. We're prepared to do our share and more to help carry that load; we insist that others do their share as well.

The response of most of our friends and allies has been good. To help defray costs, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the U.A.E., the United Arab Emirates have pledged to provide our deployed troops with all the food and fuel they need. Generous assistance will also be provided to stalwart front-line nations, such as Turkey and Egypt.

And I'm also heartened to report that this international response extends to the neediest victims of this conflict—those refugees. For our part, we have contributed \$ 28 million for relief efforts. This is but a portion of what is needed. I commend, in particular, Saudi Arabia, Japan and several European nations who have joined us in this purely humanitarian effort.

## [[edit](#)] 'Let No One Even Contemplate Profiteering'

There's an energy-related cost to be borne as well. Oil-producing nations are already replacing lost Iraqi and Kuwaiti output. More than half of what was lost has been made up, and we're getting superb cooperation. If producers, including the United States, continue steps to expand oil and gas production, we can stabilize prices and guarantee against hardship. Additionally, we and several of our allies always have the option to extract oil from our strategic petroleum reserves, if conditions warrant. As I've pointed out before, conservation efforts are essential to keep our energy needs as low as possible. We must then take advantage of our energy sources across the board: coal, natural gas, hydro and nuclear. Our failure, our failure to do these things has made us more dependent on foreign oil than ever before. And finally, let no one even contemplate profiteering from this crisis. We will not have it.

I cannot predict just how long it'll take to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. Sanctions will take time to have their full intended effect. We will continue to review all options with our allies, but let it be clear: We will not let

this aggression stand.

Our interest, our involvement in the gulf, is not transitory. It pre-dated Saddam Hussein's aggression and will survive it. Long after all our troops come home, and we all hope it's soon, very soon, there will be a lasting role for the United States in assisting the nations of the Persian Gulf. Our role then is to deter future aggression. Our role is to help our friends in their own self-defense. And something else: to curb the proliferation of chemical, biological, ballistic missile and, above all, nuclear technologies.

And let me also make clear that the United States has no quarrel with the Iraqi people. Our quarrel is with Iraq's dictator and with his aggression. Iraq will not be permitted to annex Kuwait. And that's not a threat. It's not a boast. That's just the way it's going to be.

## [[edit](#)] Addressing the Federal Deficit

Our ability to function effectively as a great power abroad depends on how we conduct ourselves at home. Our economy, our armed forces, our energy dependence and our cohesion all determine whether we can help our friends and stand up to our foes.

For America to lead, America must remain strong and vital. Our world leadership and domestic strength are mutual and reinforcing; a woven piece, as strongly bound as Old Glory.

To revitalize our leadership—our leadership capacity, we must address our budget deficit—not after Election Day, or next year, but now.

Higher oil prices slow our growth, and higher defense costs would only make our fiscal deficit problem worse. That deficit was already greater than it should have been—a projected \$ 232 billion for the coming year. It must—it will—be reduced.

To my friends in Congress, together we must act this very month—before the next fiscal year begins on October 1 — to get America's economic house in order. The Gulf situation helps us realize we are more economically vulnerable than we ever should be. Americans must never again enter any crisis—economic or military—with an excessive dependence on foreign oil and an excessive burden of federal debt.

Most Americans are sick and tired of endless battles in the Congress and between the branches over budget matters. And it's high time we pulled together — and get the job done right. It is up to us to straighten this out.

## [[edit](#)] Four-Part Budget Agenda

The job has four basic parts.

First: The Congress should, this month, within a budget agreement, enact growth-oriented tax measures—to help avoid recession in the short term; and to increase savings, investment, productivity and competitiveness for the longer term. These measures include extending incentives for research and

experimentation; expanding the use of IRAs for new homeowners; establishing tax-deferred family savings accounts; creating incentives for the creation of enterprise zones and initiatives to encourage more domestic drilling; and, yes, reducing the tax rate on capital gains.

And second: The Congress should, this month, enact a prudent multi-year defense program—one that reflects not only the improvement in East-West relations, but our broader responsibilities to deal with the continuing risks of outlaw action and regional conflict. Even with our obligations in the gulf, a sound defense budget can have some reduction in real terms, and we are prepared to accept that. But to go beyond such levels, where cutting defense would threaten our vital margin of safety, is something I will never accept.

The world is still dangerous, and surely that is now clear. Stability is not secure. American interests are far-reaching. Interdependence has increased. The consequences of regional instability can be global. This is no time to risk America's capacity to protect her vital interests.

Third: The Congress should, this month, enact measures to increase domestic energy production and energy conservation—in order to reduce dependence on foreign oil. These measure should include my proposals to increase incentives for domestic oil and gas exploration, fuel-switching, and to accelerate the development of Alaskan energy resources, without damage to wildlife.

As you know, when the oil embargo was imposed in the early 1970s, the United States imported almost 6 million barrels of oil per day. This year, before the Iraqi invasion, U.S. imports had risen to nearly 8 million barrels per day. We had moved in the wrong direction. Now we must act to correct that trend.

Fourth: The Congress should, this month, enact a five-year program to reduce the projected debt and deficits by \$ 500 billion — that is, by half a trillion dollars. If, with the Congress, we can develop a satisfactory program by the end of the month, we can avoid the axe of “sequester”—deep across-the-board cuts that would threaten our military capacity and risk substantial domestic disruption.

## [[edit](#)] Requirements of Fiscal Agreement

I want to be able to tell the American people we have truly solved the deficit problem. For me to do that, a budget agreement must meet these tests:

It must include the measures I've recommended to increase economic growth and reduce dependence on foreign oil.

It must be fair. All should contribute, but the burden should not be excessive for any one group of programs or people.

It must address the growth of government's hidden liabilities.

It must reform the budget process, and further, it must be real.

I urge Congress to provide a comprehensive five-year deficit reduction program to me as a complete legislative package—with measures to assure that

it can be fully enforced. America is tired of phony deficit reduction, or promise-now, save-later plans. Enough is enough. It is time for a program that is credible and real.

Finally, to the extent that the deficit-reduction program includes new revenue measures, it must avoid any measure that would threaten economic growth or turn us back toward the days of punishing income tax rates. That is one path we should not head down again.

I have been pleased with recent progress, although it has not always seemed so smooth. But now it is time to produce.

I hope we can work out a responsible plan. But with or without agreement from the budget summit, I ask both houses of the Congress to allow a straight up-or-down vote on a complete \$ 500 billion deficit-reduction package—not later than September 28.

If the Congress cannot get me a budget, then Americans will have to face a tough, mandated sequester.

I am hopeful—in fact, I am confident—the Congress will do what it should. And I can assure you that we in the executive branch will do our part.

In the final analysis, our ability to meet our responsibilities abroad depends upon political will and consensus at home. It's never easy in democracies, for we govern only with the consent of the governed. And although free people in a free society are bound to have their differences, Americans traditionally come together in times of adversity and challenge.

Once again, Americans have stepped forward to share a tearful goodbye with their families before leaving for a strange and distant shore. At this very moment, they serve together with Arabs, Europeans, Asians and Africans in defense of principle and the dream of a **new world order**. That is why they sweat and toil in the sand and the heat and the sun.

If they can come together under such adversity; if old adversaries like the Soviet Union and the United States can work in common cause, then surely we who are so fortunate to be in this great chamber—Democrats, Republicans, liberals, conservatives—can come together to fulfill our responsibilities here.

Thank you. Good night. And God bless the United States of America.

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## Invasion of Kuwait

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# Invasion of Kuwait

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### Invasion of Kuwait

Part of the [Gulf War](#)

**Date** 2–4 August 1990

**Location** [Kuwait](#)

Iraqi victory

**Result**

- [Iraqi-backed government installed](#)
- [Beginning of the Kuwaiti resistance movement](#)<sup>[1]</sup>

### Belligerents

 [Kuwait](#)

Supported By:  [United Nations](#)

-  [United States](#)
-  [United Kingdom](#)
-  [France](#)
-  [Canada](#)
-  [South Korea](#)
-  [Italy](#)

[Iraq](#)

## Commanders and leaders



**Saddam Hussein**



**Jaber III**



**Ali Hassan al-Majid**

## Strength

100,000+ <sup>[2]</sup><sup>[3]</sup>

16,000<sup>[4]</sup>

## Casualties and losses

37+ aircraft (est.).  
Other losses N/A

20 aircraft lost,  
200 **KIA**, <sup>[5]</sup>  
600 **POWs**<sup>[6]</sup>

**[show]**

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## Gulf War

### Invasion of Kuwait

- **Kuwaiti Bridges**
- **Dasman Palace**
- **Failaka**

### Coalition intervention

- **Ad-Dawrah**
- **Qurah**
- **Maradim**
- **Khafji**
- **Bubiyan**
- **Wadi Al-Batin**

### Air campaign

- **Air to Air combat**
- **“Package Q” Air Strike**

### Liberation of Kuwait

- **Order of battle**
- **67 Easting**
- **73 Easting**
- **Al Busayyah**
- **Phase Line Bullet**
- **Medina Ridge**
- **Highway of Death**
- **Jalibah**
- **Norfolk**

### Post-ceasefire

- **Rumaila**
- **Safwan**

The **Invasion of Kuwait**, also known as the **Iraq-Kuwait War**, was a major

conflict between the **Republic of Iraq** and the **State of Kuwait**, which resulted in the seven-month long **Iraqi** occupation of **Kuwait**, which subsequently led to direct **military intervention** by **United States**-led forces in the **Gulf War**.

In 1990, Iraq accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi **petroleum** through **slant drilling**, although some<sup>[*who?*]</sup> Iraqi sources indicated **Saddam Hussein**'s decision to attack Kuwait was made only a few months before the actual invasion.<sup>[7]</sup>

Some<sup>[*who?*]</sup> feel there were several reasons for the Iraqi move, including Iraq's inability to pay more than \$80 billion that had been borrowed to finance the **Iran-Iraq war** and Kuwaiti overproduction of petroleum which kept revenues down for Iraq.<sup>[8]</sup> The invasion started on August 2, 1990, and within two days of intense combat, most of the **Kuwaiti Armed Forces** were either overrun by the **Iraqi Republican Guard** or escaped to neighboring **Saudi Arabia** and **Bahrain**. The state of Kuwait was annexed, and Hussein announced in a few days that it was the 19th province of Iraq.

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## [edit] Causes of the conflict

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Kuwait was a close ally of Iraq during the **Iraq-Iran war** and functioned as the country's major port once **Basra** was shut down by the fighting.<sup>[9]</sup> However, after the war ended, the friendly relations between the two neighbouring **Arab** countries turned sour for several economic and diplomatic reasons that culminated in an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

## [edit] Dispute over the financial debt

Kuwait had heavily funded the eight-year-long Iraqi war against Iran. Kuwait's large-scale economic assistance to Iraq often triggered hostile Iranian actions against it. Iran repeatedly targeted Kuwaiti oil tankers in 1984 and fired weapons at Kuwaiti security personnel stationed on **Bubiyan** island in 1988.<sup>[10]</sup>

By the time the Iran-Iraq war ended, Iraq was not in a financial position to repay the US\$14 billion it borrowed from Kuwait to finance its war and requested Kuwait to forgive the debt.<sup>[5]</sup> Iraq argued that the war had prevented

the rise of **Persian** influence in the **Arab World**. However, Kuwait's reluctance to pardon the debt created strains in the relationship between the two Arab countries. During late 1989, several official meetings were held between the Kuwaiti and Iraqi leaders but they were unable to break the deadlock between the two.


## [edit] Economic warfare and slant drilling

In 1988, Iraq's then Oil Minister, Issam al-Chalabi, stressed a further reduction in the crude oil production quota of **OPEC** members so as to end the **1980s oil glut**.<sup>[11]</sup> Chalabi argued that higher oil prices would help Iraq increase its revenues and pay back its US\$60 billion debt.<sup>[11]</sup> However, given its large **downstream petroleum industry**, Kuwait was less concerned about the prices of **crude oil** and in 1989, Kuwait requested OPEC to increase the country's total oil production ceiling by 50% to 1.35 million bpd.<sup>[12]</sup> Throughout much of the 1980s, Kuwait's oil production was considerably above its mandatory OPEC quota and this had prevented a further increase in crude oil prices.<sup>[12]</sup> A lack of consensus among OPEC members undermined Iraq's efforts to end the oil glut and consequently prevented the recovery of its war-crippled economy.<sup>[13]</sup> According to former Iraqi Foreign Minister **Tariq Aziz**, "every US\$1 drop in the price of a barrel of oil caused a US\$1 billion drop in Iraq's annual revenues triggering an acute financial crisis in Baghdad."<sup>[9]</sup> It was estimated that between 1985 and 1989, Iraq lost US\$14 billion a year due to Kuwait's oil price strategy.<sup>[14]</sup> Kuwait's refusal to decrease its oil production was viewed by Iraq as an act of aggression against it.

The increasingly tense relations between Iraq and Kuwait were further aggravated when Iraq alleged that Kuwait was **slant-drilling** across the **international border** into Iraq's **Rumaila field**. The dispute over Rumaila field started in 1960 when an **Arab League** declaration marked the Iraq-Kuwait border 2 miles north of the southern-most tip of the Rumaila field.<sup>[15]</sup> During the Iran–Iraq War, Iraqi oil drilling operations in Rumaila declined while Kuwait's operations increased. In 1989, Iraq accused Kuwait of using "advanced drilling techniques" to exploit oil from its share of the Rumaila field. Iraq estimated that US\$2.4 billion worth of Iraqi oil was "stolen" by Kuwait and demanded compensation.<sup>[16]</sup> Kuwait dismissed the accusations as a false Iraqi ploy to justify military action against it. Several foreign firms working in the Rumaila field also dismissed Iraq's slant-drilling claims as a "smokescreen to disguise Iraq's more ambitious intentions".<sup>[15]</sup>

On July 25, 1990, only a few days before the Iraqi invasion, OPEC officials said that Kuwait and the **United Arab Emirates** had agreed to a proposal to limit daily oil output to 1.5 million barrels, thus potentially settling differences over oil policy between Kuwait and Iraq.<sup>[17]</sup> At the time of the settlement, more than 100,000 Iraqi troops were deployed along Iraq-Kuwait border and American officials expressed little indication of decline in tensions despite the OPEC settlement.<sup>[18]</sup>

## [[edit](#)] Iraqi hegemonic claims



The **Basra Vilayet** of the **Ottoman Empire** in 1897. Following the **Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913**, Kuwait was established as an autonomous *kaza* of the Ottoman Empire and a *de facto* protectorate of the **British Empire**.

Many westerners believed that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was largely motivated by its desire to take control over the latter's vast oil reserves. The Iraqi government justified its invasion by claiming that Kuwait was a natural part of Iraq carved off as a result of British imperialism.<sup>[19]</sup> After signing the **Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1913**, the **United Kingdom** split Kuwait from the Ottoman territories into a separate *sheikhdom*. The Iraqi government also argued that the Kuwaiti Emir was a highly unpopular figure among the Kuwaiti populace. By overthrowing the Emir, Iraq claimed that it granted Kuwaitis greater economic and political freedom.<sup>[5]</sup>

Kuwait had been loosely under the authority of the Ottoman vilâyet of **Basra**, and although its ruling dynasty, the al-Sabah family, had concluded a protectorate agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for its foreign affairs to Britain, it did not make any attempt to secede from the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, its borders with the rest of Basra province were never clearly defined or mutually agreed. Furthermore, Iraq alleged that the British High Commissioner “drew lines that deliberately constricted Iraq's access to the oceans so that any future Iraqi government would be in no position to threaten Britain's domination of the **Persian Gulf**“.<sup>[16]</sup>

## [[edit](#)] Diplomatic row

Post Iran–Iraq War and dispute over Rumaila oilfield, the diplomatic relations between Iraq and Kuwait deteriorated dramatically, triggering several heated exchanges between Iraqi and Kuwaiti diplomats during various regional and **Gulf Cooperation Council** summits.

## [[edit](#)] Iraqi-American relations

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April Glaspie's first meeting with Saddam Hussein

On July 25, 1990, the U.S. **Ambassador** in Iraq, **April Glaspie**, asked the Iraqi high command to explain the military preparations in progress, including the massing of Iraqi troops near the border.

The American ambassador declared to her Iraqi interlocutor that Washington, “inspired by the friendship and not by confrontation, does not have an opinion” on the disagreement between Kuwait and Iraq, stating “we have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts.”

She also let Saddam Hussein know that the U.S. did not intend “to start an economic war against Iraq”. These statements may have caused Saddam to believe he had received a diplomatic green light from the United States to invade Kuwait. <sup>[20][21]</sup>

According to Prof. Richard E. Rubenstein, Glaspie was later asked by British journalists why she had said that, her response was “we didn't think he would go that far” meaning invade and annex the whole country. Although no follow-up question was asked, one might assume that what the US government thought in July 1990 was that Saddam Hussein was only interested in pressuring Kuwait into debt forgiveness and to lower oil production. <sup>[22]</sup>

## [edit] The Invasion

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An Iraqi Type 69 tank on display at the site of the **Al-Qurain Martyrdom**.



**Kuwait Air Force** A-4KU Skyhawks



**Kuwaiti** M-84AB Tanks.



A Kuwait **M-84** tank during **Operation Desert Shield** in 1991. Kuwait continues to maintain strong relations with the **coalition of the Gulf War**.

On August 2, 1990 at 2:00 am,<sup>[23]</sup> local time, Iraq launched an invasion of Kuwait with four elite **Iraqi Republican Guard divisions** (1st **Hammurabi Armoured** Division, 2nd al-Medinah al-Munawera Armoured Division, 3rd Tawalkalna ala-Allah **Mechanized Infantry** Division and 6th **Nebuchadnezzar Motorized Infantry** Division) and **Iraqi Army special forces** units equivalent to a full division. The main thrust was conducted by the **commandos** deployed by helicopters and boats to attack **Kuwait City** (see **The Battle of Dasman Palace**), while the other divisions seized the **airports** and two **airbases**.

In support of these units, the Iraqi Army deployed a **squadron** of **Mil Mi-25 helicopter gunships**, several units of **Mi-8** and **Mi-17** transport helicopters, as well as a squadron of **Bell 412** helicopters. The foremost mission of the helicopter units was to transport and support Iraqi commandos into Kuwait City, and subsequently to support the advance of ground troops. The **Iraqi Air Force** (IrAF) had at least two squadrons of **Sukhoi Su-22**, one of **Su-25**, one of **Mirage F1** and two of **MiG-23 fighter-bombers**. The main task of the IrAF was to establish **air superiority** through limited counter-air strikes against two main air bases of **Kuwaiti Air Force**, whose planes consisted mainly of **Mirage F1**'s and Douglas (T)A-4KU **Skyhawks**. Meanwhile, certain targets in the capital of Kuwait City were bombed by Iraqi aircraft.

In spite of months of Iraqi **sabre-rattling**, Kuwait did not have its forces on alert and was caught unaware. The first indication of the Iraqi ground advance was from a **radar**-equipped **aerostat** that detected an Iraqi armour column moving south.<sup>[24]</sup> **Kuwaiti air, ground, and naval forces** resisted, but were vastly outnumbered. In central Kuwait, the 35th Armoured **Brigade** deployed approximately a **battalion** of Chieftain tanks, BMPs, and an Artillery battery against the Iraqis and fought delaying actions near **Al Jahra** (see **The Battle of the Bridges**), west of Kuwait City.<sup>[25]</sup> In the south, the 15th Armoured Brigade moved immediately to evacuate its forces to Saudi Arabia. Of the small **Kuwaiti Navy**, two **missile boats** were able to evade capture or destruction.

**Kuwait Air Force** aircraft were **scrambled**, but approximately 20% were lost or captured. An air battle with the Iraqi helicopter **airborne forces** was fought over Kuwait City, inflicting heavy losses on the Iraqi elite troops, and a few combat sorties were flown against Iraqi ground forces. The remaining 80% were then evacuated to **Saudi Arabia** and **Bahrain**, some aircraft even taking off from the highways adjacent to the bases as the runways were overrun. While these aircraft were not used in support of the subsequent Persian Gulf War, the "Free Kuwait Air Force" assisted Saudi Arabia in patrolling the southern border with **Yemen**, which was considered a threat by the Saudis because of Yemen–Iraq ties.<sup>[5]</sup>

Iraqi troops attacked **Dasman Palace**, the Royal Residence, resulting in the **Battle of Dasman Palace**. The Kuwaiti Emiri Guard, supported by local police and **M-84** tanks managed to repel an Airborne assault by Iraqi Special Forces, but the Palace fell after a landing by Iraqi Marines (Dasman Palace is located on the coast). The Kuwaiti National Guard, as well as additional Emiri Guards arrived, but the palace remained occupied, and Republican Guard tanks rolled into Kuwait City after several hours of heavy fighting.<sup>[26]</sup>

The **Emir of Kuwait, Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah** had already fled into the Saudi desert. His younger **half brother, Sheikh Fahad Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah**, was shot and killed by invading Iraqi forces as he attempted to defend Dasman Palace after which his body was placed in front of a tank and run over, according to an Iraqi soldier who was present and deserted after the assault.<sup>[27]</sup>

Towards the end of the first day of the invasion, only pockets of resistance were left in the country. By August 3, the last military units were desperately fighting delaying actions at choke points and other defensible positions throughout the country until out of ammunition or overrun by Iraqi forces. Ali al-Salim air base of the Kuwaiti Air Force was the only base still unoccupied on August 3, and Kuwaiti Aircraft flew resupply missions from Saudi Arabia throughout the day in an effort to mount a defense. However by nightfall, Ali al-Salim air base had been overrun by Iraqi forces. From then on it was only a matter of time until all units of the Kuwaiti Military were forced to retreat or be overrun.

The last few Kuwaiti Chieftain tanks of the 35th Mechanized Brigade fought until the afternoon of 4 August; left without ammunition and fuel, they were then forced to pull back into Saudi Arabia. This effectively ended military resistance to the Iraqi invasion.

## [edit] Aftermath

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More than 600 Kuwaiti oil wells were set on fire by the Iraqi forces causing massive environmental and economic damage to Kuwait.<sup>[28]</sup>



The oil fires caused were a result of the **scorched earth** policy of **Iraqi military forces** retreating from **Kuwait**



Aerial view of oil wells on fire

After the decisive Iraqi victory, Saddam Hussein installed **Alaa Hussein Ali** as the **Prime Minister** of the “**Provisional Government of Free Kuwait**” and **Ali Hassan al-Majid** as the de facto **governor** of Kuwait.<sup>[29]</sup> The exiled Kuwaiti royal family and other former government officials began an international campaign to persuade other countries to pressure Iraq to vacate Kuwait. The **UN Security Council** passed 12 resolutions demanding immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, but to no avail.<sup>[30]</sup>

Following the events of the Iraq-Kuwait war, about half of the Kuwaiti population,<sup>[31]</sup> including more than 400,000 Kuwaitis and several thousand foreign nationals, fled the country. More than 150,000 **Indian nationals** living in Kuwait were air-lifted by the **Indian** government within a span of a week.<sup>[32]</sup> **Alaa Hussein Ali** was placed as head of a **puppet government** in Kuwait, prior to its brief **annexation** into Iraq.

During the 7 month-long Iraqi occupation, the forces of Saddam Hussein looted Kuwait’s vast wealth and there were also reports of violations of human rights.<sup>[33]</sup> According to some<sup>[who?]</sup> independent organizations, about 600 Kuwaiti nationals were taken to Iraq and haven’t yet been accounted for.<sup>[34]</sup> A 2005 study revealed that the Iraqi occupation had a long-term adverse impact on the health of the Kuwaiti populace.<sup>[35]</sup>

**[edit]** International condemnation and Gulf War

Main articles: **Operation Desert Storm** and **Operation Desert Shield (Gulf War)**



Ground troop movements from February 24–28th 1991 during Operation Desert Storm.



Tanks from 3rd Armored Division during Operation Desert Storm.

After Iraqi forces invaded and annexed Kuwait and **Saddam Hussein** deposed the Emir of Kuwait, **Jaber Al-Sabah**, he installed **Ali Hassan al-Majid** as the new governor of Kuwait.<sup>[36]</sup>

The Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait was unanimously condemned by all major **world powers**. Even countries traditionally considered to be close Iraqi allies, such as **France** and **India**, called for immediate withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait.<sup>[37][38]</sup> Several countries, such as the **USSR** and **China**, placed arms embargo on Iraq.<sup>[37]</sup> **NATO** members were particularly critical of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and by late 1990, the **United States** had issued an ultimatum to Iraq to withdraw its forces from Kuwait by January 15, 1991 or face war.<sup>[18]</sup>

On August 3, 1990, the UN Security Council passed **Resolution 660** condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and demanding that Iraq unconditionally withdraw all forces deployed in Kuwait.<sup>[39]</sup> After a series of failed negotiations between major world powers and Iraq, the **United States-led coalition forces** launched a massive military assault on Iraq and Iraqi forces stationed in Kuwait in mid January 1991. By January 16, Allied aircraft were targeting several Iraqi military sites and the Iraqi Air Force was said to be “decimated”.<sup>[40]</sup> Hostilities continued until late February and on February 25,

Kuwait was officially liberated from Iraq.<sup>[41]</sup> On March 15, 1991, the Emir of Kuwait returned to the country after spending more than 8 months in exile.<sup>[42]</sup> During the Iraqi occupation, about 1,000 Kuwaiti civilians were killed and more than 300,000 residents fled the country.<sup>[43]</sup>

## [edit] Post-Gulf War

In December 2002, Saddam Hussein apologized for the invasion shortly before being deposed in the **2003 invasion of Iraq**.<sup>[44]</sup> Two years later, the Palestinian leadership also apologized for its wartime support of Saddam.<sup>[45]</sup> A long-time ally of Saddam Hussein, in 1990 Yemen's president, **Ali Abdullah Saleh** backed Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait. After Iraq lost the Gulf War, Yemenis were deported en masse from Kuwait by the restored government.

## [edit] See also

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**Iraq portal**



**Kuwait portal**



**Military history portal**

- **Operation Desert Storm**

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responded that they would lower their oil output, but – in essence – all the corresponding Iraqi demands were in vain: Arab countries continued producing more oil than assigned to them by the OPEC, thus lowering the price. The result was that the Iraqi economy experienced increasing problems while attempting to recover from the long war with Iran.”

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
## Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990

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Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990



<b>Full title</b>	An Act to establish a clear and comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the basis of disability
<b>Acronym</b>	ADA
<b>Enacted by the</b>	<b>101st United States Congress</b>
<b>Effective</b>	July 26, 1990
<b>Citations</b>	
<b>Public Law</b>	101-336
<b>Stat.</b>	104 Stat. 327
<b>Codification</b>	
<b>Title(s) amended</b>	42
<b>U.S.C. sections created</b>	12101 et seq.

### Legislative history

- Introduced in the Senate as S.933 by Sen. **Tom Harkin** (D-IA) on May 9,

1989

- **Passed the Senate on** September 7, 1989 (76-8)
- **Passed the House of Representatives on** May 22, 1990 (unanimous voice vote)
- **Reported by the joint conference committee on** July 12, 1990; **agreed to by the House of Representatives on** July 12, 1990 (377 – 28) **and by the Senate on** July 13, 1990 (91-6)
- **Signed into law by President [George H.W. Bush](#) on** July 26, 1990

## Major amendments

### [ADA Amendments Act of 2008](#)

## United States Supreme Court cases

*[Bragdon v. Abbott](#)*

*[Olmstead v. L.C.](#)*

*[Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams](#)*

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The **Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990**<sup>[1][2]</sup> (ADA) is a law that was enacted by the **U.S. Congress** in 1990. It was **signed into law** on July 26, 1990, by **President George H. W. Bush**, and later amended with changes effective January 1, 2009.<sup>[3]</sup>

The ADA is a wide-ranging **civil rights** law that prohibits, under certain circumstances, **discrimination** based on **disability**. It affords similar protections against discrimination to **Americans with disabilities** as the **Civil Rights Act of 1964**,<sup>[4]</sup> which made discrimination based on **race**, **religion**, **sex**, national origin, and other characteristics illegal. Disability is defined by the ADA as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.” The determination of whether any particular condition is considered a disability is made on a case by case basis. Certain specific conditions are excluded as disabilities, such as current substance abuse and visual impairment which is correctable by prescription lenses.

The “original intent” of the law, as co-conceived by Lex Frieden and Mitchell J. Rappaport, was to create civil rights law protections for people with disabilities that would be permanent, would not be able to be reversed or weakened, and would prohibit all discrimination. It was also intended so that Americans with disabilities would be kept in the mainstream in terms of scientific and medical research and developments, especially opening future opportunities in Space exploration to them, as well as public policy changes, healthcare law and policy changes, and civil rights protections and public law changes for Americans with physical, mental and cognitive disabilities. It was intended to be a flexible set of laws that could only be strengthened, not weakened, by future case law.

On September 25, 2008, President **George W. Bush** signed into law the **ADA Amendments Act of 2008** (ADAAA). This was intended to give broader protections for disabled workers and “turn back the clock” on court rulings which Congress deemed too restrictive.<sup>[5]</sup> The ADAAA includes a list of “major

life activities.”

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
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## [edit] Titles of the ADA

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### [edit] Title I – Employment

See *42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117*.



Speech cards used by President George H. W. Bush at the signing ceremony of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) on July 26, 1990.<sup>[1]</sup>

The ADA states that a *covered entity* shall not discriminate against a *qualified individual with a disability*.<sup>[6]</sup> This applies to **job application** procedures, hiring, advancement and discharge of employees, **workers' compensation**, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. *Covered entity* can refer to an **employment agency, labor organization**, or joint **labor-management** committee, and is generally an employer engaged in interstate commerce and having 15 or more workers.<sup>[7]</sup> Discrimination may include, among other things, limiting or classifying a job applicant or employee in an adverse way, denying employment opportunities to people who truly qualify, or not making **reasonable accommodations** to the known physical or mental limitations of disabled employees, not advancing employees with disabilities in the business, and/or not providing needed accommodations in training materials or policies, and the provision of qualified readers or interpreters. Employers can use medical entrance examinations for applicants, after making the job offer, only if *all* applicants (regardless of disability) must take it and it is treated as a confidential **medical record**. *Qualified individuals* do not include any employee or applicant who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs when that usage is the basis for the employer's actions.<sup>[8]</sup>

Part of Title I was found unconstitutional by the **United States Supreme Court** as it pertains to states in the case of *Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett* as violating the **sovereign immunity** rights of the several states as specified by the **Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution**. The provision allowing private suits against states for **money damages** was invalidated.

## [edit] Title II – Public Entities (and public transportation)

See **42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165**.



Access sign

Title II prohibits disability discrimination by all public entities at the local (*i.e.* school district, municipal, city, county) and state level. Public entities must comply with Title II regulations by the **U.S. Department of Justice**. These regulations cover access to all programs and services offered by the entity. Access includes physical access described in the ADA Standards for Accessible Design and programmatic access that might be obstructed by discriminatory policies or procedures of the entity.

Title II applies to public transportation provided by public entities through regulations by the **U.S. Department of Transportation**. It includes the

**National Railroad Passenger Corporation**, along with all other commuter authorities. This section requires the provision of paratransit services by public entities that provide fixed route services.

Title II also applies to all state and local public housing, housing assistance, and housing referrals. The **Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity** is charged with enforcing this provision.

## [edit] Title III – Public Accommodations (and Commercial Facilities)

See **42 U.S.C. §§ 12181–12189**.

Under Title III, no individual may be discriminated against on the basis of disability with regards to the full and equal **enjoyment** of the goods, services, facilities, or accommodations of any place of *public accommodation* by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of *public accommodation*. “Public accommodations” include most places of lodging (such as inns and hotels), recreation, transportation, education, and dining, along with stores, care providers, and places of public displays, among other things.

Under Title III of the ADA, all “new construction” (construction, modification or alterations) after the effective date of the ADA (approximately July 1992) must be fully compliant with the Americans With Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG)<sup>[1]</sup> found in the **Code of Federal Regulations** at 28 C.F.R., Part 36, Appendix “A.”

Title III also has application to existing facilities. One of the definitions of “discrimination” under Title III of the ADA is a “failure to remove” architectural barriers in existing facilities. See **42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)**. This means that even facilities that have not been modified or altered in any way after the ADA was passed still have obligations. The standard is whether “removing barriers” (typically defined as bringing a condition into compliance with the ADAAG) is “readily achievable,” defined as “easily accomplished without much difficulty or expense.”

The statutory definition of “readily achievable” calls for a **balancing test** between the cost of the proposed “fix” and the wherewithal of the business and/or owners of the business. Thus, what might be “readily achievable” for a sophisticated and financially capable corporation might not be readily achievable for a small or local business.

There are exceptions to this title; many private clubs and religious organizations may not be bound by Title III. With regard to historic properties (those properties that are listed or that are eligible for listing in the **National Register of Historic Places**, or properties designated as historic under State or local law), those facilities must still comply with the provisions of Title III of the ADA to the “maximum extent feasible” but if following the usual standards would “threaten to destroy the historic significance of a feature of the building” then

alternative standards may be used. Nonetheless, as **Frank Bowe** predicted when he testified as the lead witness on Title III in the Senate hearings leading up to enactment<sup>[citation needed]</sup>, the fact that Title III calls for accessibility in, and alterations to, thousands of stores, restaurants, hotels, etc., in thousands of communities across the U.S. means that this Title probably has had more effect on the lives of more Americans with disabilities than any other ADA title.<sup>[9]</sup>

On September 15, 2010, the Department of Justice issued revised regulations for implementation of Titles II and III, effective March 15, 2011.<sup>[10]</sup> The rules contain many new requirements for public accommodations, as well as an “element by element safe harbor.”<sup>[11]</sup> Public **Swimming Pool** owners and operators must gear up for compliance with the 2010 Standards for Accessible Design with regard to existing swimming pools, wading pools and spas by January 31, 2013.<sup>[12]</sup> The Department of Justice has published “ADA 2010 Revised Requirements: Accessible Pools – Means of Entry and Exit” which is designed to assist pool owners and operators with understanding the new accessibility requirements, the application of the requirements and the longstanding obligations of pool owners and operators in connection with the new requirements.<sup>[13]</sup>

## [edit] Title IV – Telecommunications

Title IV of the ADA amended the landmark **Communications Act of 1934** primarily by adding section **47 U.S.C. § 225**. This section requires that all telecommunications companies in the U.S. take steps to ensure functionally equivalent services for consumers with disabilities, notably those who are deaf or hard of hearing and those with speech impairments. When Title IV took effect in the early 1990s, it led to installation of public **Teletypewriter** (TTY) machines and other TDDs (**Telecommunications Device for the Deaf**). Title IV also led to creation, in all 50 States and the District of Columbia, of what were then called dual-party relay services and now are known as **Telecommunications Relay Services** (TRS), such as **STS Relay**. Today, many TRS-mediated calls are made over the Internet by consumers who use broadband connections. Some are **Video Relay Service** (VRS) calls, while others are text calls. In either variation, communication assistants translate between the signed/typed words of a consumer and the spoken words of others. In 2006, according to the **Federal Communications Commission** (FCC), VRS calls averaged two million minutes a month.

## [edit] Title V – Miscellaneous Provisions

*See **42 U.S.C. §§ 12201–12213**.*

Title V includes technical provisions. It discusses, for example, the fact that nothing in the ADA amends, overrides or cancels anything in **Section 504**.<sup>[14]</sup> Additionally, Title V includes an anti retaliation or coercion provision. The Technical Assistance Manual for the ADA explains it: “III-3.6000 Retaliation or coercion. Individuals who exercise their rights under the ADA, or assist others

in exercising their rights, are protected from retaliation. The prohibition against retaliation or coercion applies broadly to any individual or entity that seeks to prevent an individual from exercising his or her rights or to retaliate against him or her for having exercised those rights . . . Any form of retaliation or coercion, including threats, intimidation, or interference, is prohibited if it is intended to interfere.

## [edit] Major life activities

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The ADA defines a covered disability as “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a major life activity.” The **Equal Employment Opportunity Commission** (EEOC) was charged with interpreting the 1990 law with regard to discrimination in employment. Its regulations narrowed “substantially limits” to “significantly or severely restricts”.<sup>[*citation needed*]</sup>

In 2008, effective January 1, 2009, the ADAAA broadened the interpretations and added to the ADA examples of “major life activities” including, but not limited to, “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working” as well as the operation of several specified “major bodily functions.”<sup>[5]</sup> The Act overturns a 1999 U.S. Supreme Court case which held that an employee was not disabled if the impairment could be corrected by mitigating measures; it specifically provides that such impairment must be determined without considering such ameliorative measures. Another court restriction overturned is the interpretation that an impairment that substantially limits one major life activity must also limit others to be considered a disability.<sup>[5]</sup>

The ADAAA will undoubtedly lead to broader coverage of impaired employees. The **United States House Committee on Education and Labor** states that the amendment “makes it absolutely clear that the ADA is intended to provide broad coverage to protect anyone who faces discrimination on the basis of disability”.<sup>[15]</sup> Required doctor visits are not to be held against anyone with a disability.<sup>[*citation needed*]</sup>

## [edit] Opposition to the act

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### [edit] Opposition from religious groups

The debate over the Americans with Disabilities Act led some religious groups to take opposite positions.<sup>[16]</sup> Some religious groups, such as the Association of Christian Schools International, opposed the ADA in its original form.<sup>[17]</sup> ACSI opposed the Act primarily because the ADA labeled religious institutions “public accommodations,” and thus would have required churches to make costly structural changes to ensure access for all.<sup>[18]</sup> The cost argument advanced by ACSI and others prevailed in keeping religious institutions from being labeled as “public accommodations,” and thus churches were permitted to remain inaccessible if they choose.

In addition to opposing the ADA on grounds of cost, church groups like the National Association of Evangelicals testified against the ADA's Title I (employment) provisions on grounds of religious liberty. The NAE felt that the regulation of the internal employment of churches was "... an improper intrusion [of] the federal government."<sup>[16]</sup>

## [edit] Opposition from business interests

Many members of the business community opposed the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Testifying before Congress, Greyhound Bus Lines stated that the Act had the potential to "deprive millions of people of affordable intercity public transportation and thousands of rural communities of their only link to the outside world." The US Chamber of Commerce argued that the costs of the ADA would be "enormous" and have "a disastrous impact on many small businesses struggling to survive".<sup>[19]</sup> The National Federation of Independent Businesses, an organization that lobbies for small businesses, called the ADA "a disaster for small business."<sup>[20]</sup> Pro-business conservative commentators joined in opposition, writing that the Americans with Disabilities Act was "an expensive headache to millions" that would not necessarily improve the lives of people with disabilities.<sup>[21]</sup>

## [edit] Quotations

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President Bush signs the Americans with Disabilities Act into law

### Remarks on the Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act (July 26, 1990)



**George H. W. Bush**'s July 26, 1990 Remarks on the Signing of the Americans with Disabilities Act

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On signing the measure, **George H. W. Bush** said:

I know there may have been concerns that the ADA may be too vague or too costly, or may lead endlessly to litigation. But I want to reassure you right now that my administration and the United States Congress have carefully crafted this Act. We've all been determined to ensure that it gives flexibility, particularly in terms of the timetable

of implementation; and we've been committed to containing the costs that may be incurred.... Let the shameful wall of exclusion finally come tumbling down.<sup>[22]</sup>

On the debate of what it means to be disabled, American poet Joan Aleshire stated in the book *Voices From the Edge*:

If the definition of disability is the inability to do the common daily tasks of life—getting out of bed, washing, dressing, eating, going to the bathroom—and working at one's age level in school, I've never really been disabled.<sup>[23]</sup>

About the importance of making employment opportunities inclusive, Shirley Davis, director of global diversity and inclusion at the **Society for Human Resource Management**, said:

People with disabilities represent a critical talent pool that is underserved and underutilized.<sup>[24]</sup>

## [edit] Criticism

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### [edit] Employment

The ADA has been a frequent target of criticism. For example, a common claim is that individuals who are diagnosed with one of the so-called “lesser disabilities” are being “accommodated” when they should not be.<sup>[citation needed]</sup> As one **law review** article pointed out, the perception that the ADA primarily helps **freeloaders** was harshly satirized by *The Onion* in 1998 in the form of an article about the “Americans With No Abilities Act.”<sup>[25]</sup> The fictional Act would have provided “benefits and protection for more than 135 million talentless Americans.”<sup>[26][27]</sup>

On the other hand, court decisions have made necessary “an individualized assessment to prove that an impairment is protected under the ADA. Therefore, the plaintiff must offer evidence that the extent of the limitation caused by the impairment is substantial in terms of his or her own experience;” a medical diagnosis or physician’s declaration of disability is no longer enough.<sup>[28]</sup> Even those who support the intent of the law worry that it might have **unintended consequences**. Among other arguments, supporters hypothesize that the Act creates additional legal risks for employers who then quietly avoid hiring people with disabilities to avoid this risk. And such researchers<sup>[29]</sup> claim to have documented a sharp drop in employment among individuals with a disability after passage of the Act.<sup>[30]</sup> Others believe that the law has been ineffectual.<sup>[31]</sup>

### [edit] “Professional plaintiffs”

The ADA allows private plaintiffs to receive only **injunctive relief** (a court order requiring the public accommodation to remedy violations of the accessibility regulations) and attorneys’ fees, and does not provide monetary

rewards to private plaintiffs who sue non-compliant businesses. Unless a state law, such as the California **Unruh Civil Rights Act**,<sup>[32]</sup> provides for monetary damages to private plaintiffs, persons with disabilities do not obtain direct financial benefits from suing businesses that violate the ADA.

Thus, “professional plaintiffs” are typically found in states that have enacted state laws that allow private individuals to win monetary awards from non-compliant businesses.<sup>[32]</sup> At least one of these plaintiffs in California has been barred by courts from filing lawsuits unless he receives prior court permission.<sup>[32]</sup> The attorneys’ fees provision of Title III does provide incentive for lawyers to specialize and engage in serial ADA litigation, but a disabled plaintiff does not obtain financial reward from attorneys’ fees unless they act as their own attorney, or as mentioned above, a disabled plaintiff resides in a state which provides for minimum compensation and court fees in lawsuits. Moreover, there may be a benefit to these “private attorneys general” who identify and compel the correction of illegal conditions: they may increase the number of public accommodations accessible to persons with disabilities. “Civil rights law depends heavily on private enforcement. Moreover, the inclusion of penalties and damages is the driving force that facilitates voluntary compliance with the ADA.”<sup>[33]</sup> Courts have noted: “As a result, most ADA suits are brought by a small number of private plaintiffs who view themselves as champions of the disabled. For the ADA to yield its promise of equal access for the disabled, it may indeed be necessary and desirable for committed individuals to bring serial litigation advancing the time when public accommodations will be compliant with the ADA.”<sup>[34]</sup>

## [edit] ADA case law

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There have been some notable cases regarding the ADA. For example, two major hotel room marketers (Expedia.com and Hotels.com) with their business presence on the Internet were sued because its customers with disabilities could not reserve hotel rooms through their websites without substantial extra efforts that persons without disabilities were not required to perform.<sup>[35]</sup> These represent a major potential expansion of the ADA in that this, and other similar suits (known as “bricks vs. clicks”), seeks to expand the ADA’s authority to **cyberspace**, where entities may not have actual physical facilities that are required to comply.

### *National Federation of the Blind v. Target Corporation*

This is a case where a major retailer, **Target Corp.**, was sued because their web designers failed to design its website to enable persons with low or no vision to use it.<sup>[36]</sup>

### *Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett*

Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001), was a **United States Supreme Court** case about **Congress’s enforcement powers** under the **Fourteenth Amendment** to the **Constitution**. It decided that

Title I of the **Americans with Disabilities Act** was unconstitutional insofar as it allowed states to be sued by private citizens for **money damages**.

### *Barden v. The City of Sacramento*

Another example, filed in March 1999, claimed that the City of Sacramento failed to comply with the ADA when, while making public street improvements, it did not bring its sidewalks into compliance with the ADA. Certain issues were resolved in Federal Court. One issue, whether sidewalks were covered by the ADA, was appealed to the **9th Circuit Court of Appeals** which ruled that sidewalks were a “program” under ADA and must be made accessible to persons with disabilities. The ruling was later appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which refused to hear the case, letting stand the ruling of the 9th Circuit Court.<sup>[37]</sup>

### *Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd.*

This was a case that was decided by the **United States Supreme Court** in 2005. The defendant argued that as a vessel flying the flag of a foreign nation was exempt from the requirements of the ADA. This argument was accepted by a federal court in Florida and, subsequently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. However, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the lower courts on the basis that Norwegian Cruise Lines was a business headquartered in the United States whose clients were predominantly Americans and, more importantly, operated out of port facilities throughout the United States.

*Olmstead, Commissioner, Georgia Department of Human Resources, et al. v. L. C., by zimring, guardian ad litem and next friend, et al.* (not to be confused with *Olmstead v. United States*, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), a case regarding wiretapping)

This was a case before the **United States Supreme Court** in 1999. The two plaintiffs L.C. and E.W. were institutionalized in Georgia for diagnosed mental retardation and schizophrenia. Clinical assessments by the state determined that the plaintiffs could be appropriately treated in a community setting rather than the state institution. The plaintiffs sued the state of Georgia and the institution for being inappropriately treated and housed in the institutional setting rather than being treated in one of the state’s community based treatment facilities.

The Supreme Court decided under Title II of the ADA that mental illness is a form of disability and therefore covered under the ADA, and that unjustified institutional isolation of a person with a disability is a form of discrimination because it “perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in community life.” The court added that “confinement in an institution severely diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural enrichment.”

Therefore, under Title II no person with a disability can be unjustly excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of services, programs or activities of any public entity.<sup>[38]</sup>

## *Michigan Paralyzed Veterans of America v. The University of Michigan*

This was a case filed before The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan Southern Division on behalf of the Michigan **Paralyzed Veterans of America** against University of Michigan – Michigan Stadium claiming that **Michigan Stadium** violated the **Americans with Disabilities Act** in its \$226-million renovation by failing to add enough seats for disabled fans or accommodate the needs for disabled restrooms, concessions and parking. Additionally, the distribution of the accessible seating was at issue, with nearly all the seats being provided in the end-zone areas. The U.S. Department of Justice assisted in the suit filed by attorney Richard Bernstein of **The Law Offices of Sam Bernstein** in Farmington Hills, Michigan, which was settled in March 2008.<sup>[39]</sup> The settlement required the stadium to add 329 wheelchair seats throughout the stadium by 2010, and an additional 135 accessible seats in clubhouses to go along with the existing 88 wheelchair seats. This case was significant because it set a precedent for the uniform distribution of accessible seating and gave the DOJ the opportunity to clarify previously unclear rules.<sup>[40]</sup> The agreement now is a blueprint for all stadiums and other public facilities regarding accessibility.<sup>[41]</sup>

## *Paralyzed Veterans of America (or “PVA”) v. Ellerbe Becket Architects and Engineers*

One of the first major ADA lawsuits, Paralyzed Veterans of America (or “PVA”) v. Ellerbe Becket Architects and Engineers, Inc., was focused on the wheelchair accessibility of a stadium project that was still in the design Phase, **MCI Center** in Washington, D.C. Previous to this case, which was filed only five years after the ADA was passed, the DOJ was unable or unwilling to provide clarification on the distribution requirements for accessible wheelchair locations in large assembly spaces. While Section 4.33.3 of ADAAG makes reference to lines of sight, no specific reference is made to seeing over standing patrons. The MCI Center, designed by Ellerbe Becket Architects & Engineers, was designed with too few wheelchair and companion seats, and the ones that were included did not provide sight lines that would enable the wheelchair user to view the playing area while the spectators in front of them were standing. This case and another related case established precedent on seat distribution and sight lines issues for ADA enforcement that continues to present day.

## *Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams*

Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, **534 U.S. 184** (2002) was a case in which the Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of the phrase “substantially impairs” as used in the Americans with Disabilities Act. It reversed the decision by the Sixth Court of Appeals to grant a partial **summary judgment** in favor of the respondent, Ella Williams that qualified her inability to perform manual job-related tasks as a disability. The Court held that the “major life activity” definition in evaluating the performance of manual tasks focuses the inquiry on whether Williams was unable to perform a range of tasks central to most people in carrying out the activities of daily living. The issue is not whether Williams was unable to perform her specific job tasks. Therefore, the

determination of whether an impairment rises to the level of a disability is not limited to activities in the workplace solely, but rather to manual tasks in life in general. When the Supreme Court applied this standard, it found that the Court of Appeals had incorrectly determined the presence of a disability because it relied solely on her inability to perform specific manual work tasks which was insufficient in proving the presence of a disability. The Court of Appeals should have taken into account the evidence presented that Williams retained the ability to do personal tasks and household chores, such activities being the nature of tasks most people do in their daily lives, and placed too much emphasis on her job disability. Since the evidence showed that Williams was performing normal daily tasks, it ruled that the Court of Appeals erred when it found Williams to be disabled.<sup>[42][43]</sup> This ruling is now, however, no longer good law—it was invalidated by the ADAAA. In fact, Congress explicitly cited *Toyota v. Williams* in the text of the ADAAA itself as one of its driving influences for passing the ADAAA.

### ***Access Now v. Southwest Airlines***

*Access Now v. Southwest Airlines* was a case where the **District Court** decided that the website of **Southwest Airlines** was not in violation of the Americans with Disability Act because the ADA is concerned with things with a physical existence and thus cannot be applied to cyberspace. Judge **Patricia A. Seitz** found that the “virtual ticket counter” of the website was a virtual construct and hence not a “public place of accommodation.” As such, “To expand the ADA to cover ‘virtual’ spaces would be to create new rights without well-defined standards.”<sup>[44]</sup>

### ***Ouellette v. Viacom International Inc.***

*Ouellette v. Viacom International Inc.* followed in *Access Now*’s footsteps by holding that a mere online presence does not subject a website to the ADA guidelines. Thus Myspace and YouTube were not liable for a dyslexic man’s inability to navigate the site regardless of how impressive the “online theater” is.

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## [edit] See also

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- **Accessibility**
- **Reasonable accommodation**
- **Developmental disability**
- **American Disability rights movement**
- **Office of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity**
- **Casey Martin**
- **Job Accommodation Network** — provides information about rights and responsibilities under the ADA and related legislation.
- **List of disability rights activists** — includes a list of people who helped pass the ADA
- **Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities**
- **List of anti-discrimination acts**
  - **Disability discrimination act**
  - **Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964**
  - **ADA Amendments Act of 2008**
  - **Section 504**
- **ADA Compliance Kit**
- **Individual rights advocate**

## [edit] References

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1. <sup>^</sup> <sup>*a b c*</sup> **Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990**
2. <sup>^</sup> **Pub.L. 101-336**, 104 **Stat.** 327, enacted July 26, 1990, codified at **42 U.S.C. § 12101**
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# Gulf War


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(Redirected from **Desert storm**)

This article is about the war in 1990/91. For other wars of that name, see **Gulf War (disambiguation)**.

“Operation Desert Storm” redirects here. For the video game, see **Operation: Desert Storm (video game)**.

## Persian Gulf War

### Gulf War Photobox.jpg



Clockwise from top: **USAF** aircraft flying over **burning Kuwaiti oil wells**; British troops in **Operation Granby**; Camera view from a **Lockheed AC-130**; **Highway of Death**; **M728 Combat Engineer Vehicle**

**Date** August 2, 1990 – February 28, 1991 (210 days) (Operation Desert Storm officially ended 30 November 1995)<sup>[1]</sup>

**Location** **Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Israel**  
**Coalition**victory

**Result**

- Imposition of **sanctions against Iraq**
- Removal of Iraqi invasion force from Kuwait
- Heavy Iraqi casualties and destruction of Iraqi and Kuwaiti infrastructure

## Belligerents

**Coalition forces:**  **Kuwait**

**United States**

**United Kingdom**

Arab League

- Saudi Arabia
- Egypt
- Syria
- Morocco
- Qatar
- Oman
- United Arab Emirates

France

Denmark<sup>[2]</sup>

Belgium

Pakistan

Iraq

Canada

Australia

New Zealand

Argentina

Spain

Italy

Bangladesh

Niger

Poland

Czechoslovakia

Greece

South Korea

Hungary

Soviet Union<sup>[3]</sup>

*and others*

#### Commanders and leaders

Sheikh Jaber Al-Khaled Al-Sabah

George H. W. Bush

Norman Schwarzkopf

Colin Powell

Calvin Waller

John Major

Patrick Hine

Andrew Wilson

Peter de la Billière

John Chapple

Saddam Hussein

King Fahd

Ali Hassan al-Majid

Prince Abdullah

Salah Aboud Mahmoud

Prince Sultan

Turki Al-Faisal

- [Saleh Al-Muhaya](#)
- [Khalid bin Sultan](#)<sup>[4][5]</sup>
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### Strength

956,600<sup>[6]</sup> 545,000 (100,000 in Kuwait)<sup>[citation needed]</sup>

### Casualties and losses

#### Coalition:

392 killed<sup>[7]</sup>

776 wounded<sup>[8]</sup> 20,000-35,000 killed75,000+ wounded<sup>[8]</sup>

#### Kuwait:

1,200 killed<sup>[citation needed]</sup>

#### Kuwaiti civilian losses:

Over 1,000 killed<sup>[9]</sup>

#### Iraqi civilian losses:

About 3,664 killed<sup>[10]</sup>

#### Other civilian losses:

2 Israeli civilians killed, 230 injured<sup>[11]</sup>

1 Saudi civilian killed, 65 injured<sup>[12]</sup>

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### Recent wars and conflicts in the Persian Gulf

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### Gulf War

The **Persian Gulf War** (August 2, 1990 – February 28, 1991), commonly referred to as simply the **Gulf War**, was a war waged by a **U.N.**-authorized **coalition force** from thirty-four nations led by the United States, against **Iraq** in response to Iraq's **invasion** and **annexation** of the **State of Kuwait**.

This war has also been referred to as **Operation Desert Storm** for the operational name of the military response<sup>[13]</sup> (see section **12.1 Operational Names** below), the **First Gulf War**, **Gulf War I**, or the **Iraq War**,<sup>[14][15][16]</sup> before the term became identified with the 2003 **Iraq War** which is also referred to as Desert Storm.

The **invasion of Kuwait** by **Iraqi troops** that began 2 August 1990 was met with international condemnation, and brought immediate **economic sanctions** against Iraq by members of the **UN Security Council**. U.S. President **George H. W. Bush** deployed American forces to Saudi Arabia, and urged other countries to send their own forces to the scene. An array of nations joined the Coalition. The great majority of the military forces in the coalition were from the United States, with Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom and Egypt as leading contributors, in that order. Around US\$36 billion of the US\$60 billion cost was paid by Saudi Arabia.<sup>[17]</sup>

The war was marked by the beginning of live news on the front lines of the fight, with the primacy of the U.S. network **CNN**.<sup>[18][19]</sup> The war has also earned the nickname *Video Game War* after the daily broadcast images on board the American **bombers** during *Operation Desert Storm*.<sup>[20][21]</sup>

The initial conflict to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait began with an aerial bombardment on 17 January 1991. This was followed by a ground assault on 23 February. This was a decisive victory for the coalition forces, who liberated Kuwait and advanced into Iraqi territory. The coalition ceased their advance, and declared a cease-fire 100 hours after the ground campaign started. Aerial and ground combat was confined to Iraq, Kuwait, and areas on the border of Saudi Arabia. However, Iraq launched **Scud** missiles against coalition military targets in Saudi Arabia and against Israel.

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## [edit] Origins

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Further information: **Iraq-United States relations**

Throughout much of the **Cold War**, Iraq had been an ally of the **Soviet Union**, and there was a history of friction between it and the United States. The U.S. was concerned with Iraq's position on **Israeli–Palestinian** politics, and its disapproval of the nature of the peace between Israel and Egypt.

The United States also disliked Iraqi support for many **Arab** and **Palestinian militant** groups such as **Abu Nidal**, which led to its inclusion on the developing U.S. list of **State Sponsors of Terrorism** on 29 December 1979. The U.S. remained officially neutral after the invasion of **Iran** in 1980, which became the **Iran–Iraq War**, although it assisted Iraq covertly. In March 1982, however, Iran began a successful **counteroffensive** — **Operation Undeniable Victory**, and the United States **increased its support for Iraq** to prevent Iran from forcing a surrender.


In a U.S. bid to open full diplomatic relations with Iraq, the country was removed from the U.S. list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Ostensibly this was because of improvement in the regime's record, although former United States Assistant Secretary of Defense Noel Koch later stated, "No one had any doubts about [the Iraqis'] continued involvement in **terrorism**... The real reason was to help them succeed in the war against Iran."<sup>[22]</sup>

With Iraq's newfound success in the war, and the Iranian rebuff of a peace offer in July, **arms sales to Iraq** reached a record spike in 1982. An obstacle, however, remained to any potential U.S.–Iraqi relationship — Abu Nidal continued to operate with official support in **Baghdad**. When Iraqi President **Saddam Hussein** expelled the group to **Syria** at the United States' request in November 1983, the **Reagan administration** sent **Donald Rumsfeld** to meet President Hussein as a special envoy and to cultivate ties.

## [[edit](#)] Tensions with Kuwait

By the time the **ceasefire with Iran** was signed in August 1988, Iraq was virtually bankrupt, with most of its debt owed to **Saudi Arabia** and **Kuwait**. Iraq pressured both nations to forgive the debts, but they refused. Iraq also accused Kuwait of exceeding its OPEC quotas and driving down the price of oil, thus further hurting the Iraqi economy.

The collapse in oil prices had a catastrophic impact on the Iraqi economy. The Iraqi Government described it as a form of economic warfare, which it claimed was aggravated by Kuwait **slant-drilling** across the border into Iraq's Rumaila oil field.<sup>[23]</sup>



Map of Kuwait

The Iraq-Kuwait dispute also involved Iraqi claims to Kuwait as a territory of Iraq. After gaining independence from the United Kingdom in 1932, the Iraqi government immediately declared that Kuwait was rightfully a territory of Iraq, as it had been an Iraqi territory for centuries until the British creation of Kuwait after **World War I** and thus stated that Kuwait was a British imperialist invention.<sup>[24]</sup> Iraq claimed Kuwait had been a part of the **Ottoman Empire's province of Basra**. Its ruling dynasty, the **al-Sabah family**, had concluded a **protectorate** agreement in 1899 that assigned responsibility for its foreign affairs to **Britain**. Britain drew the border between the two countries, and deliberately tried to limit Iraq's access to the ocean so that any future Iraqi government would be in no position to threaten Britain's domination of the **Persian Gulf**. Iraq refused to accept the border, and did not recognize the Kuwaiti government until 1963.<sup>[25]</sup>

In early July 1990, Iraq complained about Kuwait's behavior, such as not respecting their quota, and openly threatened to take military action. On the 23rd, the **CIA** reported that Iraq had moved 30,000 troops to the Iraq-Kuwait border, and the U.S. naval fleet in the Persian Gulf was placed on alert. On the 25th, Saddam Hussein met with **April Glaspie**, an American ambassador, in Baghdad. According to an Iraqi transcript of that meeting, Glaspie told the Iraqi

delegation,

*“We have no opinion on the Arab-Arab conflicts.”*<sup>[26]</sup>

According to Glaspie’s own account, she stated in reference to the precise border between Kuwait and Iraq,

*“(…) that she had served in Kuwait 20 years before; then, as now, we took no position on these Arab affairs.”*<sup>[27]</sup>


On the 31st, negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait in Jeddah failed violently.

## [[edit](#)] Invasion of Kuwait

Main article: [Invasion of Kuwait](#)



M-84 main battle tanks of the [Kuwaiti Armed Forces](#)



[Kuwait Air Force](#) A-4KU Skyhawks

On 2 August 1990 Iraq launched the invasion by bombing [Kuwait City](#), the Kuwaiti capital. In spite of Iraqi [saber-rattling](#), Kuwait did not have its forces on alert, and was caught unaware. Iraqi commandos infiltrated the Kuwaiti border first to prepare for the major units which began the attack at the stroke of midnight. The Iraqi attack had two prongs, with the primary attack force driving south straight for Kuwait City down the main highway, and a supporting attack entering Kuwait farther west, but then turning and driving due east, cutting off the capital city from the southern half of the country. The commander of a Kuwaiti armored battalion, 35th Armoured [Brigade](#), deployed them against the Iraqi attack and was able to conduct a robust defense ([The Battle of the Bridges](#)), near [Al Jahra](#), west of Kuwait City.<sup>[28]</sup>

[Kuwait Air Force](#) aircraft [scrambled](#) to meet the invading force, but

approximately 20% were lost or captured. An air battle with the Iraqi helicopter **airborne forces** was fought over Kuwait City, inflicting heavy losses on the Iraqi elite troops, and a few combat sorties were flown against Iraqi ground forces.<sup>[29]</sup>

The main Iraqi thrust into Kuwait City was conducted by **commandos** deployed by helicopters and boats to attack the city from the sea, while other divisions seized the **airports** and two **airbases**. The Iraqis **attacked the Dasman Palace**, the Royal Residence of the **Emir of Kuwait, Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah**, which was defended by the Emiri Guard supported with **M-84** tanks. In the process, the Iraqis killed **Fahad Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah**, the Emir of Kuwait's youngest brother.<sup>[30]</sup>

After two days of intense combat, most of the **Kuwaiti Armed Forces** were either overrun by the **Iraqi Republican Guard**, or had escaped to neighboring Saudi Arabia. The emir and key ministers were able to get out and head south along the highway for refuge in Saudi Arabia. Iraqi ground forces consolidated their control on Kuwait City, then headed south and redeployed along the border of Saudi Arabia. After the decisive Iraqi victory, Saddam Hussein initially installed a puppet regime known as the “**Provisional Government of Free Kuwait**” before installing his cousin **Ali Hassan al-Majid** as the **governor** of Kuwait on August 8.<sup>[30]</sup>

## [edit] Pre-emptive Diplomacy

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### [edit] UN resolution

Within hours of the invasion, Kuwaiti and U.S. delegations requested a meeting of the UN Security Council, which passed **Resolution 660**, condemning the invasion and demanding a withdrawal of Iraqi troops. On 3 August the **Arab League** passed its own resolution, which called for a solution to the conflict from within the League, and warned against outside intervention; Iraq, Libya and PLO were the only three nations in the Arab League which opposed a resolution for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.<sup>[31][32]</sup> The Arab nations of Yemen and Jordan—a Western ally which bordered Iraq and relied on the country for economic support—<sup>[33]</sup> also opposed military intervention from non-Arab nations.<sup>[34]</sup> The Arab nation of Sudan also aligned itself with Hussein.<sup>[33]</sup> On 6 August **UN Resolution 661** placed **economic sanctions** on Iraq.

**United Nations Security Council Resolution 665** followed soon after, which authorized a naval blockade to enforce the economic sanctions against Iraq. It said the “use of measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary ... to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation of resolution 661.”<sup>[35]</sup>


### [edit] Iraqi-American diplomacy



President Bush visiting American troops in **Saudi Arabia** on **Thanksgiving Day**, 1990.

From the beginning, U.S. officials insisted on a total Iraqi pullout from Kuwait, without any linkage to other Middle Eastern problems, fearing any concessions would strengthen Iraqi influence in the region for years to come.<sup>[36]</sup>

On 12 August 1990, Saddam Hussein called for compromise via Baghdad radio and the former Iraqi News Agency. Hussein “propose[d] that all cases of occupation, and those cases that have been portrayed as occupation, in the region, be resolved simultaneously [sic]”. Specifically, he called for Israel to withdraw from occupied territories in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, Syria to withdraw from Lebanon, and “mutual withdrawals by Iraq and Iran and arrangement for the situation in Kuwait.” He also called for a replacement of US troops that mobilized in Saudi Arabia in response to the invasion of Kuwait with “an Arab force”, as long as that force did not involve Egypt. Additionally, he requested an “immediate freeze of all boycott and siege decisions” and a general normalization of relations with Iraq.<sup>[37]</sup> From the beginning of the crisis, President Bush was strongly opposed to any “linkage” between the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the Palestinian issue.<sup>[38]</sup>



Saddam Hussein detained several Westerners, with video footage shown on state television

On 23 August Saddam Hussein appeared on state television with Western hostages to whom he had refused exit visas. In the video he asks a young British boy named Stuart Lockwood whether he is getting his milk, and goes on to say,

through his interpreter, “We hope your presence as guests here will not be for too long. Your presence here, and in other places, is meant to prevent the scourge of war.”<sup>[39]</sup>

Another Iraqi proposal communicated in August 1990 was delivered to National Security Advisor **Brent Scowcroft** by an unidentified Iraqi official. The official communicated to the White House that Iraq would “withdraw from Kuwait and allow foreigners to leave” provided that the UN lifted sanctions, allowed “‘guaranteed access’ to the Persian Gulf through the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Warbah”, and allowed Iraq to “gain full control of the Rumailah oil field that extends slightly into Kuwaiti territory”. The proposal also “include[d] offers to negotiate an oil agreement with the United States ‘satisfactory to both nations’ national security interests,’ develop a joint plan ‘to alleviate Iraq’s economical and financial problems’ and ‘jointly work on the stability of the gulf.’”<sup>[40]</sup>

In December 1990, Iraq made a proposal to withdraw from Kuwait provided that their forces were not attacked as they left, and that a consensus was reached regarding the banning of **WMD** in the Palestinian region. The White House rejected the proposal.<sup>[41]</sup> **Yasser Arafat** of the **PLO** expressed that neither he nor Hussein insisted that solving the Israel-Palestine issues should be a precondition to solving the issues in Kuwait, though he did acknowledge a “strong link” between these problems.<sup>[42]</sup>

Ultimately, the US stuck to its hard line position that there would be no negotiations until Iraq withdrew from Kuwait and that they should not grant Iraq concessions, lest they give the impression that Iraq benefited from its military campaign.<sup>[36]</sup> Also, when Secretary of State **James Baker** met with **Tariq Aziz** in Geneva for last minute peace talks in early 1991, Aziz reportedly made no concrete proposals and did not outline any hypothetical Iraqi moves.<sup>[43]</sup>

## [edit] UN Diplomacy

On November 29, 1990 the U.N. passed security council resolution 678 which gave Iraq until 15 January 1991 to withdraw from Kuwait and empowered states to use “all necessary means” to force Iraq out of Kuwait after the deadline.

On 14 January 1991, France proposed that the U.N. Security Council call for “a rapid and massive withdrawal” from Kuwait along with a statement to Iraq that Council members would bring their “active contribution” to a settlement of other problems of the region, “in particular, of the Arab-Israeli conflict and in particular to the Palestinian problem by convening, at an appropriate moment, an international conference” to assure “the security, stability and development of this region of the world.” The French proposal was supported by Belgium (at the moment one of the rotating Security Council members), and Germany, Spain, Italy, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and several non-aligned nations. The U.S., Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, rejected it. American U.N. Ambassador Thomas Pickering stated that the French proposal was

unacceptable, because it went beyond previous U.N. Security Council resolutions on the Iraqi invasion.<sup>[44][45][46]</sup>

## [[edit](#)] Operation Desert Shield

“Operation Desert Shield” redirects here. For the 2006 operation by the Iraqi insurgency, see **Operation Desert Shield (Iraq)**.

One of the main concerns to the West was the significant threat Iraq posed to Saudi Arabia. Following the conquest of Kuwait, the Iraqi army was within easy striking distance of Saudi oil fields. Control of these fields, along with Kuwaiti and Iraqi reserves, would have given Hussein control over the majority of the world’s oil reserves. Iraq also had a number of grievances with Saudi Arabia. The Saudis had lent Iraq some 26 billion dollars during its war with Iran. The Saudis backed Iraq, as they feared the influence of **Shia** Iran’s **Islamic revolution** on its own Shia minority. After the war, Saddam felt he should not have to repay the loans due to the help he had given the Saudis by fighting Iran.



F-15Es parked during Operation Desert Shield.

Soon after his conquest of Kuwait, Hussein began verbally attacking the Saudi **kingdom**. He argued that the U.S.-supported Saudi state was an illegitimate and unworthy guardian of the holy cities of **Mecca** and **Medina**. He combined the language of the **Islamist** groups that had recently fought in **Afghanistan** with the rhetoric Iran had long used to attack the Saudis.<sup>[47]</sup>


Acting on the policy of the **Carter Doctrine**, and out of fear the Iraqi army could launch an invasion of Saudi Arabia, U.S. President George H. W. Bush quickly announced that the U.S. would launch a “wholly defensive” mission to prevent Iraq from invading Saudi Arabia under the codename **Operation Desert Shield**. Operation Desert Shield began on 7 August 1990 when U.S. troops were sent to Saudi Arabia due also to the request of its monarch, **King Fahd**, who had earlier called for U.S. military assistance.<sup>[48]</sup> This “wholly defensive” doctrine was quickly abandoned when, on 8 August, Iraq declared Kuwait to be the 19th province of Iraq and Saddam Hussein named his cousin, Ali Hassan Al-Majid as its military-governor.<sup>[49]</sup>

The **United States Navy** dispatched two naval battle groups built around the **aircraft carriers USS Dwight D. Eisenhower** and **USS Independence** to the Gulf, where they were ready by 8 August. The U.S. also sent the battleships **USS Missouri** and **USS Wisconsin** to the region. A total of 48 U.S. Air Force F-15s

from the **1st Fighter Wing at Langley Air Force Base**, Virginia, landed in Saudi Arabia, and immediately commenced round the clock air patrols of the Saudi–Kuwait–Iraq border areas to discourage further Iraqi military advances. They were joined by 36 F-15 A-Ds from the 36th TFW at Bitburg, Germany. The Bitburg contingent was based at Al Kharj Air Base, approximately 1 hour southeast of Riyadh. The 36th TFW would be responsible for 11 confirmed Iraqi Air Force aircraft shot down during the war. There were also two Air National Guard units stationed at Al Kharj Air Base, the South Carolina Air National Guard (169th Fighter Wing) flew bombing missions with 24 F-16's flying 2,000 combat missions and dropping 4 million pounds of munitions, and the New York Air National Guard 174th Fighter Wing from Syracuse flew 24 F-16's on bombing missions. Military buildup continued from there, eventually reaching 543,000 troops, twice the number used in the **2003 invasion of Iraq**. Much of the material was airlifted or carried to the staging areas via **fast sealift ships**, allowing a quick buildup.

## [[edit](#)] Creating a coalition

A **series of UN Security Council resolutions** and Arab League resolutions were passed regarding the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein's Iraq. One of the most important was **Resolution 678**, passed on 29 November 1990, which gave Iraq a withdrawal deadline until 15 January 1991, and authorized “all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660,” and a diplomatic formulation authorizing the use of force if Iraq failed to comply.<sup>[50]</sup>



**G. Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr.** and President **George H. W. Bush** visit U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia on **Thanksgiving Day**, 1990.


The United States assembled a coalition of forces to join it in opposing Iraq's aggression, consisting of forces from 34 countries: Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, South Korea, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom and the United States itself.<sup>[51]</sup> US Army General **Norman Schwarzkopf** was designated to be the commander of the coalition forces in the Persian Gulf area.

Although they did not contribute any forces, Japan and Germany made financial contributions totaling \$10 billion and \$6.6 billion respectively. U.S.

troops represented 73% of the coalition's 956,600 troops in Iraq.

Many of the coalition forces were reluctant to join. Some felt that the war was an internal Arab affair, or did not want to increase U.S. influence in the Middle East. In the end, however, many nations were persuaded by Iraq's belligerence towards other Arab states, offers of economic aid or debt forgiveness, and threats to withhold aid.<sup>[52]</sup>

## [[edit](#)] Reasons and campaign for intervention



Cheney meets with **Prince Sultan, Minister of Defence and Aviation** in Saudi Arabia to discuss how to handle the **invasion of Kuwait**

The United States and the United Nations gave several public justifications for involvement in the conflict, the most prominent being the Iraqi violation of Kuwaiti territorial integrity. In addition, the United States moved to support its ally Saudi Arabia, whose importance in the region, and as a key supplier of oil, made it of considerable **geopolitical** importance. Shortly after the Iraqi invasion, Secretary of Defense **Dick Cheney** made the first of several visits to Saudi Arabia where **King Fahd** requested US military assistance. During a speech in a special joint session of the U.S. Congress given on 11 September 1990, U.S. President George H. W. Bush summed up the reasons with the following remarks: *"Within three days, 120,000 Iraqi troops with 850 tanks had poured into Kuwait and moved south to threaten Saudi Arabia. It was then that I decided to act to check that aggression."*<sup>[53]</sup>

The Pentagon claimed that satellite photos showing a buildup of Iraqi forces along the border were the source of this information, but this was later shown to be false. A reporter for the *Saint Petersburg Times* acquired commercial satellite images made at the time in question, which showed nothing but empty desert.<sup>[54]</sup>



Gen. **Colin Powell** (left), Gen. **Norman Schwarzkopf, Jr.**, and **Paul Wolfowitz** (right) listen as Secretary of Defense **Dick Cheney** addresses reporters regarding the 1991 Gulf War.

Other justifications for foreign involvement included Iraq's history of **human rights abuses under President Saddam**. Iraq was also known to possess **biological weapons** and **chemical weapons**, which Saddam had used against Iranian troops during the **Iran–Iraq War** and against his own country's **Kurdish** population in the **Al-Anfal Campaign**. Iraq was also known to have a **nuclear weapons** program.

Although there were human rights abuses committed in Kuwait by the invading Iraqi military, the ones best known in the U.S. were inventions of the **public relations** firm hired by the government of Kuwait to influence U.S. opinion in favor of military intervention. Shortly after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the organization **Citizens for a Free Kuwait** was formed in the U.S. It hired the public relations firm **Hill & Knowlton** for about \$11 million, paid by the **Kuwaiti government**.<sup>[55]</sup>

Among many other means of influencing U.S. opinion (distributing books on Iraqi atrocities to U.S. soldiers deployed in the region, 'Free Kuwait' T-shirts and speakers to college campuses, and dozens of video news releases to television stations), the firm arranged for an appearance before a group of members of the **U.S. Congress** in which a woman identifying herself as a **nurse working in the Kuwait City hospital** described Iraqi soldiers pulling babies out of incubators and letting them die on the floor.<sup>[56]</sup>

The story was an influence in tipping both the public and Congress towards a war with Iraq: six Congressmen said the testimony was enough for them to support military action against Iraq and seven Senators referenced the testimony in debate. The Senate supported the military actions in a 52-47 vote. A year after the war, however, this allegation was revealed to be a fabrication. The woman who had testified was found to be a member of the **Kuwaiti Royal Family**, in fact the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the U.S.<sup>[56]</sup> She had not been living in Kuwait during the Iraqi invasion.

The details of the Hill & Knowlton public relations campaign, including the incubator testimony, were published in a **John R. MacArthur's** *Second Front: Censorship and Propaganda in the Gulf War* (Berkeley, CA: University of CA Press, 1992), and came to wide public attention when an **Op-ed** by MacArthur

was published in the *New York Times*. This prompted a reexamination by **Amnesty International**, which had originally promoted an account alleging even greater numbers of babies torn from incubators than the original fake testimony. After finding no evidence to support it, the organization issued a retraction. President George H. W. Bush then repeated the incubator allegations on television.


At the same time, the Iraqi army committed several well-documented crimes during its occupation of Kuwait, such as the **summary execution without trial** of three brothers after which their bodies were stacked in a pile and left to decay in a public street.<sup>[57]</sup> Iraqi troops also ransacked and looted private Kuwaiti homes, one residence was repeatedly defecated in.<sup>[58]</sup> A resident later commented, “The whole thing was violence for the sake of violence, destruction for the sake of destruction... Imagine a **surrealistic painting** by **Salvador Dalí**“.<sup>[59]</sup>

## [edit] Early battles

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### [edit] Air campaign

Main article: **Gulf War air campaign**




An F-14A Tomcat from **VF-32**, two **EA-6B Prowlers**, and a **KC-135 Stratotanker** during Desert Storm.

The Persian Gulf War started with an extensive **aerial bombing** campaign on 17 January 1991. The coalition flew over 100,000 **sorties**, dropping 88,500 tons of bombs,<sup>[60]</sup> and widely destroying military and civilian infrastructure.<sup>[61]</sup> The air campaign was commanded by **USAF Lieutenant General Chuck Horner**, who briefly served as Commander-in-Chief – Forward of **U.S. Central Command** while General Schwarzkopf was still in the United States.

A day after the deadline set in Resolution 678, the coalition launched a massive air campaign, which began the general offensive codenamed Operation Desert

Storm. The first priority for Coalition forces was **the destruction of the Iraqi air force and anti-aircraft facilities**. The sorties were launched mostly from Saudi Arabia and the six Coalition **aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG)** in the **Persian Gulf** and **Red Sea**.




An Iraqi T-54A or Type 59 tank lies in ruins in the aftermath of an Allied bombing attack during Operation Desert Storm.

The next coalition targets were command and communication facilities. Saddam Hussein had closely **micromanaged** the Iraqi forces in the Iran–Iraq War, and initiative at lower levels was discouraged. Coalition planners hoped that Iraqi resistance would quickly collapse if deprived of command and control.

The third and largest phase of the air campaign targeted military targets throughout Iraq and Kuwait: **Scud** missile launchers, weapons research facilities, and naval forces. About one-third of the Coalition airpower was devoted to attacking Scuds, some of which were on trucks and therefore difficult to locate. Some U.S. and British **special forces** teams had been covertly inserted into western Iraq to aid in the search and destruction of Scuds.

Iraqi anti-aircraft defenses, including **MANPADS**, were surprisingly ineffective against coalition aircraft and the coalition suffered only 75 aircraft losses in over 100,000 sorties, 44 of which were the result of Iraqi action. Two of these losses are the result of aircraft colliding with the ground while evading Iraqi ground fired weapons.<sup>[62][63]</sup> One of these losses is a confirmed air-air victory.<sup>[64]</sup>

**[edit]** Iraq launches missile strikes




**Scud** Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) with missile in upright position.

The Iraqi government made no secret that it would attack **Israel** if invaded. Prior to the start of the war, Tariq Aziz, Iraq's English-speaking Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, was asked in the aftermath of the failed U.S.-Iraq peace talks in Geneva, Switzerland by a reporter. "*Mr. Foreign Minister, if war starts...will you attack Israel?*" the reporter asked. His response was, "*Yes, absolutely, yes.*"<sup>[65][66]</sup>

Five hours after the first attacks, Iraq's state radio broadcast a voice identified as Saddam Hussein declaring that "The great duel, the mother of all battles has begun. The dawn of victory nears as this great showdown begins." Iraq responded by launching eight **Al Hussein** missiles into Israel the next day. These missile attacks on Israel were to continue throughout the six weeks of the war.


The Iraqis hoped that they would provoke a military response from Israel. It was expected that many Arab nations would withdraw from the coalition, as they would be reluctant to fight alongside Israel.<sup>[38]</sup> Israel, at the request of the United States, did not launch counterstrikes, and all Arab states remained in the coalition.

The Scud missiles targeting Israel were relatively ineffective, as firing at extreme range resulted in a dramatic reduction in accuracy and payload.



Israeli civilians taking shelter from rockets

Two Israeli civilians died from these attacks, and approximately 230 were injured. Of the reported injuries, 10 were considered moderate injuries, while one was considered a severe injury.<sup>[11]</sup> Several others suffered fatal heart attacks immediately following the missile strikes. Extensive property damage was also caused. It was also feared that Iraq would fire missiles filled with **nerve agents** or **sarin**. As a result, the Israeli government issued **gas masks** to its citizens. When the first Iraqi missiles hit **Tel Aviv**, some people injected themselves with an antidote for nerve gas. Israel was ready to respond with military force to these attacks, but agreed when asked not to by the U.S. Government, who feared that if Israel became involved, the other Arab nations would either desert from the coalition or join Iraq. It was also feared that if the **Israeli Air Force** used Syrian or **Jordanian** airspace to attack Iraq, then they would intervene in the war on Iraq's side or attack Israel. Israeli policy for the previous forty years had always been retaliation, but Israeli Prime Minister **Yitzhak Shamir** showed restraint and agreed not to retaliate in response to requests from the United States to remain out of the conflict.<sup>[67]</sup>



Military personnel examine the tail section of an Al Hussein missile shot down by a Patriot Missile during Operation Desert Storm 1991.

In response to the threat of Scuds on Israel, the United States rapidly sent a Patriot missile air defense artillery battalion to Israel along with two batteries of **MIM-104 Patriot** missiles for the protection of civilians.<sup>[68]</sup> Allied air forces were also extensively exercised in “Scud hunts” in the Iraqi desert, trying to locate the camouflaged trucks before they fired their missiles at Israel or Saudi Arabia.

The **Royal Netherlands Air Force** also deployed Patriot missiles in both **Turkey** and Israel to counter the Scud threat. The Dutch Ministry of Defense later stated that the military use of the Patriot missile system was largely ineffective, but its psychological value was high, even though the Patriot missiles caused far more casualties and property damage than the Scuds themselves did.<sup>[69][70]</sup> It has been suggested that the sturdy construction techniques used in Israeli cities, coupled with the fact that Scuds were only launched at night, played an important role in limiting the number of deaths and injuries from Scud attacks.<sup>[11]</sup>

Three Scud missiles and a coalition Patriot that malfunctioned hit **Ramat Gan** in Israel on 22 January 1991, injuring 96 people, and possibly causing the deaths

of three elderly people who died of **heart attacks**.

Forty-two Scud missiles were fired by Iraq into Israel during the seven weeks of the war.<sup>[71]</sup> In addition, 44 Scud missiles were fired into Saudi Arabia, and one missile was fired at Bahrain and another at Qatar. The missiles were fired at both military and civilian targets. One Saudi civilian was killed, and 65 others were injured. No injuries were reported in Bahrain or Qatar.


On 25 February 1991, a Scud missile hit a U.S. Army barracks of the 14th Quartermaster Detachment, out of Greensburg, PA, stationed in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 soldiers and injuring over 100.<sup>[12]</sup>

## [[edit](#)] Battle of Khafji



This section **needs additional citations for verification**. Please help **improve this article** by adding **reliable references**. Unsourced material may be **challenged** and **removed**. *(March 2008)*

Main article: [Battle of Khafji](#)



### Military operations during liberation of Khafji

On 29 January Iraqi forces attacked and occupied the lightly defended Saudi city of **Khafji** with tanks and infantry. The Battle of Khafji ended two days later when the Iraqis were driven back by the **Saudi Arabian National Guard** and the **United States Marine Corps**, supported by **Qatari** forces. The allied forces provided **close air support** and used extensive artillery fire.


Casualties were heavy on both sides, although Iraqi forces sustained substantially more dead and captured than the allied forces. Eleven Americans were killed in two separate **friendly fire** incidents, an additional 14 U.S. airmen were killed when an American **AC-130** gunship was shot down by an Iraqi surface-to-air missile (SAM), and two American soldiers were captured during the battle. Saudi and Qatari forces had a total of 18 dead. Iraqi forces in Khafji had 60–300 dead and 400 captured.

Khafji was a strategically important city immediately after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Iraqi reluctance to commit several **armored divisions** to the occupation, and its subsequent use of Khafji as a launching pad into the initially lightly defended east of Saudi Arabia is considered by many academics a grave strategic error. Not only would Iraq have secured a majority of Middle Eastern oil supplies, but it would have found itself better able to threaten the

subsequent U.S. deployment along superior defensive lines.

## [edit] Ground campaign

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Ground troop movements 24–28 February 1991 during Operation Desert Storm.

The Coalition forces dominated the air with their technological advantages, but the ground forces were considered to be more evenly matched. Coalition forces had the significant advantage of being able to operate under the protection of **air supremacy** that had been achieved by their **air forces** before the start of the main ground offensive. Coalition forces also had two key technological advantages:

1. The Coalition **main battle tanks**, such as the U.S. **M1 Abrams**, British **Challenger 1**, and Kuwaiti **M-84AB** were vastly superior to the Chinese **Type 69** and domestically built T-72 tanks used by the Iraqis, with crews better trained and armoured doctrine better developed.
2. The use of **GPS** made it possible for Coalition forces to navigate without reference to roads or other fixed landmarks. This, along with **air reconnaissance**, allowed them to fight a **battle of maneuver** rather than a **battle of encounter**: they knew where they were and where the enemy was, so they could attack a specific target rather than searching on the ground for enemy forces.

## [edit] Liberation of Kuwait

Main article: **Liberation of Kuwait campaign**

See also: **Gulf War order of battle ground campaign**

American decoy attacks by air attacks and naval gunfire the night before the liberation of Kuwait were designed to make the Iraqis believe the main coalition ground attack would focus on Central Kuwait.



US tanks from the **3rd Armored Division** along the Line of Departure.



Iraqi Type 69 tank on the road into **Kuwait City** during the Gulf War.



Two Iraqi tanks lie abandoned near **Kuwait City** on 26 February 1991.


For months, American units in Saudi Arabia had been under almost constant Iraqi artillery fire, as well as threats from Scud missile or chemical attacks. On 23 February 1991, the 1st Marine Division, 2nd Marine Division, and the 1st Light Armored Infantry crossed into Kuwait and headed toward Kuwait City. They encountered trenches, barbed wire, and minefields. However, these positions were poorly defended, and were overrun in the first few hours. Several tank battles took place, but apart from that, Coalition troops encountered minimal resistance, as most Iraqi troops surrendered. The general pattern was that the Iraqis would put up a short fight before surrendering. However, Iraqi air defenses shot down nine American aircraft. Meanwhile, forces from Arab countries advanced into Kuwait from the east, encountering little resistance and suffering few casualties.

Despite the successes of Coalition forces, it was feared that the Republican Guard would escape into Iraq before it could be destroyed. It was decided to send British armored forces into Kuwait fifteen hours ahead of schedule, and to send American forces after the Republican Guard. The Coalition advance was preceded by a heavy artillery and rocket barrage, after which 150,000 troops and 1,500 tanks began their advance. Iraqi forces in Kuwait counterattacked against U.S. troops, acting on a direct order from Saddam himself. Despite the intense combat, the Americans repulsed the Iraqis and continued to advance towards Kuwait city.

Kuwaiti forces were tasked with liberating the city. Iraqi troops offered only

light resistance. The Kuwaitis lost one soldier killed and one plane shot down, and quickly liberated the city. On 27 February, Saddam ordered a retreat from Kuwait, and President H.W. Bush declared it liberated. However, an Iraqi unit at **Kuwait International Airport** appeared not to have gotten the message, and fiercely resisted. U.S. Marines had to fight for hours before securing the airport, after which Kuwait was declared secure. After four days of fighting, Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait. As part of a **scorched-earth policy**, they **set fire** to nearly 700 oil wells, and placed land mines around the wells to make extinguishing the fires more difficult.

**[edit]** Initial moves into Iraq



Iraqi Tank knocked out by **3rd Armored Division** fire.

The ground phase of the war was given the official designation Operation Desert Sabre.<sup>[72]</sup>


The first units to move into Iraq were three patrols of the B squadron of the British **Special Air Service**, call signs Bravo One Zero, **Bravo Two Zero**, and Bravo Three Zero, in late January.<sup>[citation needed]</sup> These eight-man patrols landed behind Iraqi lines to gather intelligence on the movements of Scud mobile missile launchers, which could not be detected from the air, as they were hidden under bridges and camouflage netting during the day. Other objectives included the destruction of the launchers and their fiber-optic communications arrays that lay in pipelines and relayed coordinates to the **TEL** operators that were launching attacks against Israel. The operations were designed to prevent any possible Israeli intervention. Due to lack of sufficient ground cover to carry out their assignment, One Zero and Three Zero abandoned their operations, while Two Zero remained, and was later compromised, with only **Sergeant Chris Ryan** escaping to **Syria**.

Elements of the 2nd Brigade, 1st Battalion **5th Cav** of the **1st Cavalry Division** of the U.S. Army performed a Direct attack into Iraq on 15 February 1991, followed by one in force on 20 February that led directly through 7 Iraqi divisions which were caught off guard.<sup>[citation needed]</sup> From 15–20 February, the **Battle of Wadi Al-Batin** took place inside Iraq, this was the first of two attacks by 1 Battalion 5th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division. It was a feint attack,


designed to make the Iraqis think that a coalition invasion would take place from the south. The Iraqis fiercely resisted, and the Americans eventually withdrew as planned back into the Wadi Al-Batin. Three American soldiers were killed and nine wounded as well with only 1 M-2 IFV turret destroyed, but they had taken 40 prisoners and destroyed five tanks, and successfully deceived the Iraqis. This attack led the way for the XVIII Airborne Corps. to sweep around behind the 1st Cav and attack Iraqi forces to the west. On 22 February 1991, Iraq agreed to a Soviet-proposed ceasefire agreement. The agreement called for Iraq to withdraw troops to pre-invasion positions within six weeks following a total cease-fire, and called for monitoring of the cease-fire and withdrawal to be overseen by the UN Security Council.

The Coalition rejected the proposal, but said that retreating Iraqi forces would not be attacked<sup>[*citation needed*]</sup>, and gave twenty-four hours for Iraq to begin withdrawing forces. On 23 February, fighting resulted in the capture of 500 Iraqi soldiers. On 24 February, British and American armoured forces crossed the Iraq/Kuwait border and entered Iraq in large numbers, taking hundreds of prisoners. Iraqi resistance was light, and 4 Americans were killed.<sup>[73]</sup>

## [[edit](#)] Coalition forces enter Iraq



Destroyed Iraqi civilian and military vehicles on the [Highway of Death](#).



Aerial view of destroyed Iraqi [T-72](#) tank, [BMP-1](#) and [Type 63](#) armored personnel carriers and trucks on Highway 8 in March 1991



The oil fires caused were a result of the **scorched earth** policy of **Iraqi military forces** retreating from **Kuwait**

Shortly afterwards, the **U.S. VII Corps**, in full strength and spearheaded by the 3rd Squadron of the **2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment** (3/2 ACR), launched an armored attack into Iraq early on 24 February, just to the west of Kuwait, taking Iraqi forces by surprise. Simultaneously, the **U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps** launched a sweeping “left-hook” attack across the largely undefended desert of southern Iraq, led by the **3rd Armoured Cavalry Regiment (3rd ACR)** and the **24th Infantry Division (Mechanized)**. The left flank of this movement was protected by the **French 6th Light Armoured Division Daguet**.

The French force quickly overcame the Iraqi 45th Infantry Division, suffering light casualties and taking a large number of prisoners, and took up blocking positions to prevent an Iraqi counter-attack on the Coalition flank. The right flank of the movement was protected by the **British 1st Armoured Division**. Once the allies had penetrated deep into Iraqi territory, they turned eastward, launching a flank attack against the elite Republican Guard before it could escape. The Iraqis resisted fiercely from dug-in positions and stationary vehicles, and even mounted armored charges.

Unlike many previous engagements, the destruction of the first Iraqi tanks did not result in a mass surrender. The Iraqis suffered massive losses and lost dozens of tanks and vehicles, while American casualties were comparatively low, with a single Bradley knocked out. Coalition forces pressed another ten kilometers into Iraqi territory, and captured their objective within three hours. They took 500 prisoners and inflicted heavy losses, defeating the Iraqi 26th Infantry Division. An American soldier was killed by an Iraqi land mine, another five by friendly fire, and thirty wounded during the battle. Meanwhile, British forces attacked the Iraqi Medina Division and a major Republican Guard logistics base. In nearly two days of some of the war’s most intense fighting, the British destroyed 40 enemy tanks and captured a division commander.

Meanwhile, American forces attacked the village of **Al Busayyah**, meeting fierce resistance. They suffered no casualties, but destroyed a considerable amount of military hardware and took prisoners.

On 25 February 1991, Iraqi forces fired a scud missile at an American barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The missile attack killed 28 American military personnel.<sup>[74]</sup>

The Coalition advance was much swifter than U.S. generals had expected. On 26 February, Iraqi troops began retreating from Kuwait, after they had set its **oil fields** on fire (737 oil wells were set on fire). A long convoy of retreating Iraqi troops formed along the main Iraq-Kuwait highway. Although they were retreating, this convoy was bombed so extensively by Coalition air forces that it came to be known as the **Highway of Death**. Hundreds of Iraqi troops were killed. Forces from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France continued to pursue retreating Iraqi forces over the border and back into Iraq, eventually moving to within 150 miles (240 km) of Baghdad before withdrawing back to the Iraqi border with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

One hundred hours after the ground campaign started, on 28 February, President Bush declared a ceasefire, and he also declared that Kuwait had been liberated.

## [**edit**] Post-war military analysis

This section **needs additional citations for verification**. Please help **improve this article** by adding **reliable references**. Unsourced material may be **challenged** and **removed**. *(March 2008)*

Although it was said in Western media at the time that Iraqi troops numbered approximately 545,000 to 600,000, most experts today believe that both the qualitative and quantitative descriptions of the Iraqi army at the time were exaggerated, as they included both temporary and auxiliary support elements. Many of the Iraqi troops were young, under-resourced, and poorly trained **conscripts**.

The Coalition committed 540,000 troops, and a further 100,000 **Turkish troops** were deployed along the Turkish-Iraqi border. This caused a significant force dilution of the Iraqi military by forcing it to deploy its forces along all its borders. This allowed the main thrust by the U.S. to possess not only a significant technological advantage, but also a numerical superiority.

The widespread support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war equipped Iraq with military equipment from most major world arms dealers. This resulted in a lack of standardization in this large heterogeneous force, which additionally suffered from poor training and poor motivation. The majority of Iraqi armored forces still used old Chinese **Type 59s** and **Type 69s**, Soviet-made **T-55s** from the 1950s and 1960s, and some poor quality **Asad Babil tanks** (domestically assembled tank based on Polish T-72 hulls with other parts of mixed origin). These machines were not equipped with up-to-date equipment, such as **thermal sights** or **laser rangefinders**, and their effectiveness in modern combat was very limited.


The Iraqis failed to find an effective countermeasure to the thermal sights and **sabot rounds** used by the Coalition tanks. This equipment enabled them to engage and destroy Iraqi tanks from more than three times the range that Iraqi tanks could engage coalition tanks. The Iraqi crews used old, cheap steel **penetrators** against the advanced **Chobham Armour** of the U.S. and British tanks, with ineffective results. The Iraqis also failed to utilize the advantage that

could be gained from using **urban warfare** — fighting within Kuwait City — which could have inflicted significant casualties on the attacking forces. Urban combat reduces the range at which fighting occurs, and can negate some of the technological advantages of well-equipped forces.


The Iraqis also tried to use **Soviet military doctrine**, but the implementation failed due to the lack of skill of their commanders, and the preventive coalition air strikes on communication centers and bunkers.




Iraqi Type 69 main battle tank stands on a battlefield after being destroyed by Allied forces during Operation Desert Storm.




Iraqi Type 69 tank near Kuwait City during the Gulf War.




Iraqi tank sits on a road after being abandoned during the Gulf War.



Iraqi T-62 destroyed near Ali Al Salem Air Base during Operation Desert Storm, 18 April 1991.



Destroyed Iraqi **T-72** tanks in Southern Iraq.



General **Colin Powell** briefs then U.S. President **George H. W. Bush**

General Colin Powell briefs then U.S. President George W. Bush and his advisors on the progress of the ground war.



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Aerial view of oil wells on fire.




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Kuwaiti oil wells on fire.




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An oil storage tank at a refinery that was attacked by coalition aircraft during Operation Desert Storm continues to burn days after the air strike.




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US M1 Abrams move out on a mission during the Gulf War.



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
M1A1 lost to friendly fire during Gulf War.



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Iraqi Type 69 tanks after an attack by the 1st United Kingdom Armored Division during Operation Desert Storm.

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Iraqi Type 69 tank after engagement by the 1st United Kingdom Armored Division.

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
An Iraqi main battle tank at Al Mutla Pass, destroyed by Army Tiger Brigade forces and air strikes during Operation Desert Storm.

## [edit] The end of active hostilities

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Civilians and coalition military forces wave **Kuwaiti** and **Saudi Arabian** flags as they celebrate the retreat of Iraqi forces from Kuwait as a result of Operation Desert Storm



In Iraqi territory that was occupied by the coalition, a peace conference was held where a ceasefire agreement was negotiated and signed by both sides. At the conference, Iraq was approved to fly armed helicopters on their side of the temporary border, ostensibly for government transit due to the damage done to civilian infrastructure. Soon after, these helicopters and much of the Iraqi armed forces were used to fight a **Shi'ite uprising in the south**. The rebellions were encouraged by an airing of "The Voice of Free Iraq" on 2 February 1991, which was broadcast from a CIA run radio station out of Saudi Arabia. The Arabic service of the Voice of America supported the uprising by stating that the rebellion was large, and that they soon would be liberated from Saddam.<sup>[75]</sup>

In the North, Kurdish leaders took American statements that they would support an uprising to heart, and began fighting, hoping to trigger a **coup d'état**. However, when no American support came, Iraqi generals remained loyal to Saddam and brutally crushed the **Kurdish uprising**. Millions of Kurds fled across the mountains to Kurdish areas of Turkey and Iran. These events later resulted in **no-fly zones** being established in both the North and the South of Iraq. In Kuwait, the Emir was restored, and suspected Iraqi collaborators were repressed. Eventually, over 400,000 people were expelled from the country, including a large number of **Palestinians**, due to **PLO** support of Saddam Hussein. Yasser Arafat did not apologize for his support of Iraq, but after his death the Fatah under the authority of Abbas would formally apologize in 2004.<sup>[76]</sup>

There was some criticism of the Bush administration, as they chose to allow Saddam Hussein to remain in power instead of pushing on to capture Baghdad and overthrowing his government. In their co-written 1998 book, *A World Transformed*, Bush and **Brent Scowcroft** argued that such a course would have fractured the alliance, and would have had many unnecessary political and human costs associated with it.

In 1992, the **United States Secretary of Defense** during the war, **Dick Cheney**, made the same point:

I would guess if we had gone in there, we would still have forces in Baghdad today. We'd be running the country. We would not have been able to get everybody out and bring everybody home. And the final point that I think needs to be made is this question of casualties. I don't think you could have done all of that without significant additional U.S. casualties, and while everybody was tremendously impressed with the low cost of the (1991) conflict, for the 146 Americans who were killed in action and for their families, it wasn't a cheap war. And the question in my mind is, how many additional American casualties is Saddam (Hussein) worth? And the answer is, not that damned many. So, I think we got it right, both when we decided to expel him from Kuwait, but also when the President made the decision that we'd achieved our objectives and we were not going to go get bogged

down in the problems of trying to take over and govern Iraq.<sup>[77]</sup>


— *Dick Cheney*

Instead of a greater involvement of its own military, the United States hoped that Saddam Hussein would be overthrown in an internal *coup d'état*. The Central Intelligence Agency used its assets in Iraq to organize a revolt, but the Iraqi government defeated the effort.

On 10 March 1991, 540,000 American troops began to move out of the Persian Gulf.

## [edit] Coalition involvement

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
Coalition troops from **Egypt**, **Syria**, **Oman**, **France** and **Kuwait** during Operation Desert Storm.

Main article: **Coalition of the Gulf War**

Members of the Coalition included Argentina, Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America.<sup>[78]</sup>

Germany and Japan provided financial assistance and donated military hardware, but did not send direct military assistance. This later became known as *checkbook diplomacy*.

## [edit] United Kingdom





**British Army Challenger 1** main battle tank during Operation Desert Storm.

The United Kingdom committed the largest contingent of any European nation that participated in the combat operations of the war. **Operation Granby** was the codename for the operations in the Persian Gulf. **British Army** regiments (mainly with the **British 1st Armoured Division**), **Royal Air Force** squadrons and **Royal Navy** vessels were mobilized in the Gulf. The Royal Air Force, using various aircraft, operated from **airbases** in Saudi Arabia. Almost 2,500 armored vehicles and 43,000 troops<sup>[78]</sup> were shipped for action.

Chief Royal Navy vessels deployed to the gulf included a number of **Broadsword-class frigates**, and **Sheffield-class destroyers**, other RN and **RFA** ships were also deployed. The light aircraft carrier **HMS Ark Royal** was not deployed to the Gulf area, but was deployed to the **Mediterranean Sea**.

[[edit](#)] France



French and American soldiers inspecting an Iraqi **Type 69** tank destroyed by the French **6th Light Armored Division** during Operation Desert Storm.

The second largest European contingent was France, which committed 18,000 troops.<sup>[78]</sup> Operating on the left flank of the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps, the main French army force was the **6th Light Armoured Division**, including troops from the **French Foreign Legion**. Initially, the French operated independently under national command and control, but coordinated closely with the Americans, Saudis and **CENTCOM**. In January, the Division was placed under the tactical control of the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps. France also deployed several combat aircraft and naval units. The French called their contribution **Opération Daguet**.

[[edit](#)] Canada

**A fighter jet taking off from a runway**




Canadian **CF-18 Hornets** participated in combat during the Gulf War.

See also: **Operation FRICTION**

Canada was one of the first nations to condemn Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and it quickly agreed to join the U.S.-led coalition. In August 1990, **Prime Minister Brian Mulroney** committed the **Canadian Forces** to deploy the destroyers **HMCS Terra Nova** and **HMCS Athabaskan** to join the maritime interdiction force. The supply ship **HMCS Protecteur** was also sent to aid the gathering coalition logistics forces in the Persian Gulf. A fourth ship, **HMCS Huron**, arrived in-theater after hostilities had ceased and visited Kuwait.

Following the UN authorized use of force against Iraq, the Canadian Forces deployed a **CF-18 Hornet** and **Sikorsky CH-124 Sea King** squadron with support personnel, as well as a **field hospital** to deal with casualties from the ground war. When the air war began, Canada's CF-18s were integrated into the coalition force and were tasked with providing air cover and attacking ground targets. This was the first time since the **Korean War** that the Canadian military had participated in offensive combat operations.

**[edit]** Australia



**HMAS Sydney** in the Persian Gulf in 1991.

Main article: **Australian contribution to the 1991 Gulf War**

Australia contributed a Naval Task Group, which formed part of the multi-national fleet in the Persian Gulf and **Gulf of Oman**, under **Operation Damask**. In addition, medical teams were deployed aboard a U.S. **hospital ship**, and a **naval clearance diving team** took part in de-mining Kuwait's port facilities following the end of combat operations.

Australia was a member of the international coalition which contributed military forces to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. While the Australian forces did not see combat, they did play a significant role in enforcing the sanctions put in place against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait, as well as other small support contributions to Operation Desert Storm. Following the end of the Persian Gulf War, Australia deployed a medical unit on **Operation Habitat** to northern Iraq as part of **Operation Provide Comfort**.

## [edit] Casualties

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### [edit] Civilian

The increased importance of air attacks from both warplanes and cruise missiles led to controversy over the number of civilian deaths caused during the initial stages of the war. Within the first 24 hours of the war, more than 1,000 sorties were flown, many against targets in Baghdad. The city was the target of heavy bombing, as it was the seat of power for President Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi forces' **command and control**. This ultimately led to civilian casualties.


In one noted incident, two **USAF** stealth planes bombed a bunker in **Amiriyah**, causing the deaths of 408 civilians who were in the shelter at the time.<sup>[79]</sup> Scenes of burned and mutilated bodies were subsequently broadcast, and controversy arose over the status of the bunker, with some stating that it was a civilian shelter, while others contended that it was a center of Iraqi military operations, and that the civilians had been deliberately moved there to act as **human shields**.

An investigation by Beth Osborne Daponte estimated total civilian fatalities at about 3,500 from bombing, and some 100,000 from other effects of the war.<sup>[80][81][82]</sup>

### [edit] Iraqi

The exact number of Iraqi combat casualties is unknown, but it is believed to have been heavy. Some estimate that Iraq sustained between 20,000 and 35,000 fatalities.<sup>[80]</sup> A report commissioned by the U.S. Air Force, estimated 10,000-12,000 Iraqi combat deaths in the air campaign, and as many as 10,000 casualties in the ground war.<sup>[83]</sup> This analysis is based on Iraqi prisoner of war reports.

Saddam Hussein's government gave high civilian casualty figures in order to draw support from the Islamic countries.<sup>[citation needed]</sup> The Iraqi government claimed that 2,300 civilians died during the air campaign.<sup>[citation needed]</sup> According to the Project on Defense Alternatives study, 3,664 Iraqi civilians, and between 20,000 and 26,000 military personnel, were killed in the conflict, while 75,000 Iraqi soldiers were wounded.<sup>[84]</sup>




Patriot missile launch.

The DoD reports that U.S. forces suffered 148 battle-related deaths (35 to friendly fire), with **one pilot** listed as **MIA** (his remains were found and identified in August 2009). A further 145 Americans died in non-combat accidents.<sup>[85]</sup> The UK suffered 47 deaths (9 to friendly fire), France two,<sup>[85]</sup> and the Arab countries, not including Kuwait, suffered 37 deaths (18 Saudis, 10 Egyptians, 6 UAE, and 3 Syrians).<sup>[85]</sup> At least 605 Kuwaiti soldiers were still missing 10 years after their capture.<sup>[86]</sup>

The largest single loss of life among Coalition forces happened on 25 February 1991, when an Iraqi **Al Hussein (missile)** hit an American military barrack in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, killing 28 **U.S. Army Reservists** from **Pennsylvania**. In all, 190 coalition troops were killed by Iraqi fire during the war, 113 of whom were American, out of a total of 358 coalition deaths. Another 44 soldiers were killed, and 57 wounded, by friendly fire. 145 soldiers died of exploding munitions, or non-combat accidents.<sup>[citation needed]</sup>

The largest accident among Coalition forces happened on 21 March 1991, a C-130H of the Royal Saudi Air Force crashed in heavy smoke on approach to Ras Al-Mishab Airport, Saudi Arabia. 92 Senegalese soldiers were killed.

The number of coalition wounded in combat seems to have been 776, including 458 Americans.<sup>[87]</sup>



A column of M-113 **APCs** and other military vehicles of the **Royal Saudi Land Force** travels along a channel cleared of mines during Operation Desert Storm, **Kuwait**, 1 March 1991.

190 Coalition troops were killed by Iraqi combatants, the rest of the 379 coalition deaths being from friendly fire or accidents. This number was much lower than expected. Among the American dead were three female soldiers.

This is a list of Coalition troops killed by country.

- United States** – 294 (114 by enemy fire, 145 in accidents, 35 to friendly fire)
- Senegal** – 92 (accident)
- United Kingdom** – 47 (38 by enemy fire, 9 to friendly fire)<sup>[88]</sup>
- Saudi Arabia** – 18<sup>[89]</sup>
- France** – 2<sup>[85]</sup>
- Egypt** – 2<sup>[90]</sup>
- United Arab Emirates** – 6<sup>[91]</sup>
- Syria** – 2<sup>[92]</sup>
- Kuwait** – 1 (as part of Operation Desert Storm)<sup>[93]</sup>

## **[edit]** Friendly fire

While the death toll among Coalition forces engaging Iraqi combatants was very low, a substantial number of deaths were caused by accidental attacks from other allied units. Of the 148 American troops who died in battle, 24% were killed by friendly fire, a total of 35 service personnel. A further 11 died in detonations of allied munitions. Nine British service personnel were killed in a friendly fire incident when a **United States Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt II** attacked a group of two **Warrior IFVs**.

## **[edit]** Gulf War controversies


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**[edit]** Gulf War Illness

Main article: [Gulf War syndrome](#)

Many returning coalition soldiers reported illnesses following their action in the Gulf War, a phenomenon known as Gulf War syndrome or Gulf War illness. There has been widespread speculation and disagreement about the causes of the illness and the reported birth defects. Some factors considered as possibilities include exposure to [depleted uranium](#), [chemical weapons](#), [anthrax vaccines](#) given to deploying soldiers, and/or infectious diseases. [Major Michael Donnelly](#), a former USAF officer during the Gulf War, helped publicize the syndrome and advocated for veterans' rights in this regard.

[\[edit\]](#) Effects of depleted uranium



Approximate area and major clashes in which DU rounds were used.

Main article: [Depleted uranium#Health considerations](#)

Depleted uranium (DU) was used in the Gulf War in tank kinetic energy penetrators and 20–30 mm cannon [ordnance](#). DU is a [pyrophoric](#), [genotoxic](#), and [teratogenic heavy metal](#). Many have cited its use during the Gulf War as a contributing factor to a number of instances of health issues in both veterans of the conflict and surrounding civilian populations. However, scientific opinion on the risk is mixed.<sup>[94][95][96]</sup>

[\[edit\]](#) Highway of Death

Main article: [Highway of Death](#)

On the night of 26–27 February 1991, some Iraqi forces began leaving Kuwait on the main highway north of [Al Jahra](#) in a column of some 1,400 vehicles. A patrolling [E-8 Joint STARS](#) aircraft observed the retreating forces and relayed the information to the DDM-8 air operations center in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.<sup>[97]</sup> These vehicles and the retreating soldiers were subsequently attacked, resulting in a 60 km stretch of highway strewn with debris—the Highway of Death.

Chuck Horner, Commander of U.S. and allied air operations has written:

[By February 26], the Iraqis totally lost heart and started to evacuate occupied Kuwait, but airpower halted the caravan of Iraqi Army and plunderers fleeing toward Basra. This event was later called by the media “The Highway of Death.” There were certainly a lot of dead vehicles, but not so many dead Iraqis. They’d already learned to scamper off into the desert when our aircraft started to attack. Nevertheless, some people back home wrongly chose to believe we were cruelly and unusually punishing our already whipped foes.[...] By February 27, talk had turned toward terminating the hostilities. Kuwait was free. We were not interested in governing Iraq. So the question became “How do we stop the killing.”<sup>[98]</sup>

## [[edit](#)] Bulldozer assault

Another incident during the war highlighted the question of large-scale Iraqi combat deaths. This was the “**bulldozer assault**”, wherein two brigades from the **1st Infantry Division (Mechanized)** were faced with a large and complex trench network, as part of the heavily fortified “Saddam Hussein Line.” After some deliberation, they opted to use anti-mine **plows** mounted on **tanks** and combat earthmovers to simply plow over and bury alive the defending Iraqi soldiers. One newspaper story reported that the U.S. commanders estimated thousands of Iraqi soldiers surrendered, escaping live burial during the two-day assault 24–25 February 1991. Patrick Day Sloyan of *Newsday* reported, “Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Vulcan armored carriers straddled the trench lines and fired into the Iraqi soldiers as the tanks covered them with mounds of sand. ‘I came through right after the lead company,’ [Col. Anthony] Moreno said. ‘What you saw was a bunch of buried trenches with peoples’ arms and things sticking out of them. . . .’”<sup>[99]</sup> However, after the war, the Iraqi government claimed to have found only 44 bodies.<sup>[100]</sup> In his book *The Wars Against Saddam*, **John Simpson** alleges that U.S. forces attempted to cover up this incident.<sup>[101]</sup>

## [[edit](#)] 1991 Palestinian exodus from Kuwait

Main article: **Palestinian expulsion from Kuwait**

Kuwait expulsion policy was a response to alignment of Palestinian leader **Yasser Arafat** and the **PLO** with **Saddam Hussein**, who had earlier invaded Kuwait. Prior to the Gulf War, Palestinians made up about 30% of **Kuwait’s population** of 2.2 million.<sup>[102]</sup> The exodus took place during one week in March 1991, following Kuwait’s liberation from **Iraqi** occupation. **Kuwait** expelled about 450,000 **Palestinians** from its territory,<sup>[103]</sup> an event, which has become the second largest displacement of Palestinian Arabs ever, and is related as an **ethnic cleansing**.<sup>[*citation needed*]</sup> By 2006, only a few had returned to Kuwait and today the number of Palestinians living in Kuwait is less than 40,000 (under 3% of the population).

## [[edit](#)] Coalition bombing of Iraq’s civilian infrastructure

In the 23 June, 1991 edition of the *Washington Post*, reporter Bart Gellman wrote: “Many of the targets were chosen only secondarily to contribute to the

military defeat of [Iraq]. . . . Military planners hoped the bombing would amplify the economic and psychological impact of international sanctions on Iraqi society. . . . They deliberately did great harm to Iraq's ability to support itself as an industrial society. . . ."<sup>[104]</sup> In the Jan/Feb, 1995 edition of *Foreign Affairs*, French diplomat Eric Rouleau wrote: "[T]he Iraqi people, who were not consulted about the invasion, have paid the price for their government's madness. . . . Iraqis understood the legitimacy of a military action to drive their army from Kuwait, but they have had difficulty comprehending the Allied rationale for using air power to systematically destroy or cripple Iraqi infrastructure and industry: electric power stations (92 percent of installed capacity destroyed), refineries (80 percent of production capacity), petrochemical complexes, telecommunications centers (including 135 telephone networks), bridges (more than 100), roads, highways, railroads, hundreds of locomotives and boxcars full of goods, radio and television broadcasting stations, cement plants, and factories producing aluminum, textiles, electric cables, and medical supplies."<sup>[105]</sup>

## [[edit](#)] Abuse of coalition POWs

During the conflict coalition aircrew shot down over Iraq were displayed as **POWs** on TV, most with visible signs of abuse. Amongst several testimonies to poor treatment,<sup>[106]</sup> Royal Air Force **Tornado** crew **John Nichol** and **John Peters** have both alleged that they were tortured during this time.<sup>[107][108]</sup> Nichol and Peters were forced to make statements against the war in front of television cameras. Members of a British Special Forces group named Bravo Two Zero were captured whilst providing information about an Iraqi Supply line of Scud Missiles to coalition forces, only one, Chris Ryan, evaded capture whilst other surviving members of the group were violently tortured.<sup>[109]</sup>

## [[edit](#)] Operation Southern Watch

Main article: **Operation Southern Watch**

Since the Gulf war, the U.S. has had a continued presence of 5,000 troops stationed in Saudi Arabia – a figure that rose to 10,000 during the **2003 conflict in Iraq**.<sup>[110]</sup> Operation Southern Watch enforced the **no-fly zones** over southern Iraq set up after 1991; oil exports through the shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf were protected by the **U.S. Fifth Fleet**, based in **Bahrain**.

Since Saudi Arabia houses the holiest sites in **Islam** (Mecca and Medina) — many Muslims were upset at the permanent military presence. The continued presence of U.S. troops after the Gulf War in Saudi Arabia was one of the stated motivations behind the **September 11th terrorist attacks**,<sup>[110]</sup> the **Khobar Towers bombing**, as well, the date chosen for the **1998 United States embassy bombings** (7 August), was eight years to the day that American troops were sent to Saudi Arabia.<sup>[111]</sup> **Osama Bin Laden** interpreted the Prophet **Muhammad** as banning the “permanent presence of infidels in Arabia”.<sup>[112]</sup> In 1996, Bin Laden issued a **fatwa**, calling for **American troops** to get out of Saudi

Arabia. In the December 1999 interview with **Rahimullah Yusufzai**, bin Laden said he felt that Americans were “too near to Mecca” and considered this a provocation to the entire Muslim world.<sup>[113]</sup>

## [edit] Gulf war sanctions

Main articles: **United Nations Security Council Resolution 661** and **Iraq sanctions**

**Wikisource** has original text related to this article:

***United Nations Security Council Resolution 661***

On 6 August 1990, after the **Iraqi invasion of Kuwait**, the U.N. Security Council adopted **Resolution 661** which imposed economic sanctions on Iraq, providing for a full **trade embargo**, excluding medical supplies, food and other items of humanitarian necessity, these to be determined by the Security Council sanctions committee. From 1991 until 2003 the effects of government policy and sanctions regime led to **hyperinflation**, widespread poverty and malnutrition.

During the latter part of the 1990s the UN considered relaxing the sanctions imposed because of the hardships suffered by ordinary Iraqis. According to UN estimates, between 500,000 and 1.2 million children died during the years of the sanctions.<sup>[114]</sup> The United States used its veto in the UN Security Council to block the proposal to lift the sanctions because of the continued failure of Iraq to verify disarmament. However, an **oil for food program** was established in 1996 to ease the effects of sanctions.

## [edit] Draining of the Qurna Marshes

Main article: **Draining of the Qurna Marshes**

The draining of the Qurna Marshes was an irrigation project in Iraq during and immediately after the Gulf War, to drain a large area of **marshes** in the **Tigris-Euphrates river system**. Formerly covering an area of around 3000 square kilometres, the large complex of **wetlands** were almost completely emptied of water, and the local Shi'ite population relocated, following the Gulf War and **1991 uprisings**. By 2000, United Nations Environment Programme estimated that 90% of the marshlands had disappeared, causing **desertification** of over 7,500 square miles (19,000 km<sup>2</sup>).<sup>[*citation needed*]</sup>

Many international organizations such as the **U.N. Human Rights Commission**, the **Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq**, the **International Wildfowl and Wetlands Research Bureau**, and **Middle East Watch** have described the project as a political attempt to force the **Marsh Arabs** out of the area through water diversion tactics.<sup>[115]</sup>

## [edit] Gulf War oil spill

Main article: **Gulf War oil spill**

On 23 January, Iraq dumped 400 million gallons of **crude oil** into the Persian

Gulf, causing the largest offshore **oil spill** in history at that time.<sup>[116]</sup> It was reported as a deliberate natural resources attack to keep U.S. Marine forces from coming ashore (*Missouri* and *Wisconsin* had shelled **Failaka Island** during the war to reinforce the idea that there would be an amphibious assault attempt).<sup>[citation needed]</sup> About 30-40% of this came from Allied raids on Iraqi coastal targets.<sup>[117]</sup>

## [edit] Kuwaiti oil fires

Main article: **Kuwaiti oil fires**

The Kuwaiti oil fires were caused by Iraqi **military forces** setting fire to 700 oil wells as part of a scorched earth policy while retreating from Kuwait in 1991 after conquering the country but being driven out by Coalition military forces. The fires started in January and February 1991 and the last one was extinguished by November 1991.<sup>[118]</sup>

The resulting fires burned out of control because of the dangers of sending in firefighting crews. **Land mines** had been placed in areas around the oil wells, and a military cleaning of the areas was necessary before the fires could be put out. Somewhere around 6 million barrels (950,000 m<sup>3</sup>) of oil were lost each day. Eventually, privately contracted crews extinguished the fires, at a total cost of **US\$1.5 billion** to Kuwait.<sup>[119]</sup> By that time, however, the fires had burned for approximately ten months, causing widespread pollution.

## [edit] Cost

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The cost of the war to the United States was calculated by the United States Congress to be \$61.1 billion.<sup>[120]</sup> About \$52 billion of that amount was paid by different countries around the world: \$36 billion by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Arab states of the Persian Gulf; \$16 billion by Germany and Japan (which sent no combat forces due to their constitutions). About 25% of Saudi Arabia's contribution was paid in the form of in-kind services to the troops, such as **food** and **transportation**.<sup>[120]</sup> U.S. troops represented about 74% of the combined force, and the global cost was therefore higher.

## [edit] Cost of Gulf Crisis on Developing Countries and International Response

Apart from the impact on the Gulf States themselves, the resulting economic disruptions after the crisis affected many countries. The **ODI** undertook a study in 1991 to assess the effects on developing countries and the response of the international community. A Briefing Paper finalized on the day that the conflict ended draws on their findings which had two main conclusions: Many developing countries were severely affected and while there has been a considerable response to the crisis, the distribution of assistance was highly selective.<sup>[121]</sup>

The **ODI** factored in elements of 'cost' which included; Oil imports, remittance

flows, re-settlement costs, loss of export earnings and tourism. For **Egypt** the cost totaled: 1bn – 3% of GDP. **Yemen** was badly affected with a cost of 1bn – 10% of GDP, while it cost **Jordan** 2bn, 32% of GDP.

International response to the crisis on developing countries came with the channeling of aid through The Gulf Crisis Financial Co-ordination Group. They were 24 countries, comprising most of the OECD countries plus some Gulf States: **Saudi Arabia**, **United Arab Emirates**, **Qatar** and **Kuwait**. The members of this group agreed to disperse 14bn in development assistance.

The **World Bank** responded by speeding up the disbursement of existing project and adjustment loans. The **International Monetary Fund** adopted two lending facilities — the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) and the Compensatory & Contingency Financing Facility (CCFF). The European Community offered 2 billion<sup>[clarification needed]</sup> in assistance.<sup>[121]</sup>

## [edit] Media coverage

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The examples and perspective in this section **may not represent a worldwide view of the subject**. Please **improve this article** and discuss the issue on the **talk page**. *(January 2010)*

The Persian Gulf War was a heavily **televised** war. For the first time people all over the world were able to watch live pictures of **missiles** hitting their targets and fighters taking off from aircraft carriers. Allied forces were keen to demonstrate the accuracy of their weapons.

In the United States, the “big three” network anchors led the **network news** coverage of the war: **ABC**’s **Peter Jennings**, **CBS**’s **Dan Rather**, and **NBC**’s **Tom Brokaw** were anchoring their evening newscasts when air strikes began on 16 January 1991. **ABC News** correspondent Gary Shepard, reporting live from Baghdad, told Jennings of the quietness of the city. But, moments later, Shepard was back on the air as flashes of light were seen on the horizon and tracer fire was heard on the ground.

On CBS, viewers were watching a report from correspondent Allen Pizzey, who was also reporting from Baghdad, when the war began. Rather, after the report was finished, announced that there were unconfirmed reports of flashes in Baghdad and heavy **air traffic** at bases in Saudi Arabia. On the “NBC Nightly News”, correspondent **Mike Boettcher** reported unusual air activity in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Moments later, Brokaw announced to his viewers that the air attack had begun.

Still, it was **CNN** which gained the most popularity for their coverage, and indeed its wartime coverage is often cited as one of the landmark events in the development of the network. CNN correspondents **John Holliman** and **Peter Arnett** and CNN anchor **Bernard Shaw** relayed audio reports from the **Al-Rashid Hotel** as the air strikes began. The network had previously convinced the Iraqi government to allow installation of a permanent audio circuit in their makeshift bureau. When the telephones of all of the other Western TV correspondents went dead during the bombing, CNN was the only service able to provide live reporting. After the initial bombing, Arnett remained behind and

was, for a time, the only American TV correspondent reporting from Iraq.

In Britain, the **BBC** devoted the FM portion of its national speech radio station **Radio 4** to a 18h rolling news format creating **Radio 4 News FM**. The station was short lived, ending shortly after the President Bush declared the ceasefire and the liberation of Kuwait. However, it paved the way for the later introduction of **Radio Five Live**.

Two BBC journalists, **John Simpson** and **Bob Simpson** (who, despite sharing a surname, are unrelated), defied their editors and remained in Baghdad to report on the progress of the war. They were responsible for a report which included an “infamous cruise missile that travelled down a street and turned left at a traffic light.”<sup>[122]</sup>

Newspapers all over the world also covered the war and **Time magazine** published a special issue dated 28 January 1991, the headline “WAR IN THE GULF” emblazoned on the cover over a picture of Baghdad taken as the war began.

U.S. policy regarding media freedom was much more restrictive than in the **Vietnam War**. The policy had been spelled out in a Pentagon document entitled **Annex Foxtrot**. Most of the press information came from briefings organized by the military. Only selected journalists were allowed to visit the front lines or conduct interviews with soldiers. Those visits were always conducted in the presence of officers, and were subject to both prior approval by the military and  **censorship** afterward. This was ostensibly to protect sensitive information from being revealed to Iraq. This policy was heavily influenced by the military’s experience with the Vietnam War, in which public opposition within the United States grew throughout the course of the war. It wasn’t only the limiting of information in the Middle East, media were also restricting what was shown about the war with more graphic depictions like **Ken Jarecke**’s image of a burnt Iraqi soldier being pulled from the American AP wire where as in Europe it was given extensive coverage.<sup>[123][124][125]</sup>

At the same time, the coverage of this war was new in its instantaneousness. About halfway through the war, Iraq’s government decided to allow live satellite transmissions from the country by Western news organizations, and U.S. journalists returned en masse to Baghdad. Tom Aspell of **NBC**, Bill Blakemore of ABC, and Betsy Aaron of CBS News filed reports, subject to acknowledged Iraqi censorship. Throughout the war, footage of incoming missiles was broadcast almost immediately.

A British crew from CBS News (David Green and Andy Thompson), equipped with satellite transmission equipment traveled with the front line forces and, having transmitted live TV pictures of the fighting en route, arrived the day before the forces in Kuwait City, broadcasting live television from the city and covering the entrance of the Arab forces the following day.

Alternative media outlets provided views in opposition to the Gulf War. Deep Dish Television compiled segments from independent producers in the U.S. and abroad, and produced a ten hour series that was distributed

internationally, called **The Gulf Crisis TV Project**. The first program of this series **War, Oil and Power** was compiled and released in 1990, before the war broke out. **News World Order** was the title of another program in the series; it focused on the complicity of the media in promoting the war, as well as Americans' reactions to the media coverage. In San Francisco, as a local example, Paper Tiger Television West produced a weekly cable television show with highlights of mass demonstrations, artists' actions, lectures, and protests against mainstream media coverage at newspaper offices and television stations. Local media outlets in cities across the country screened similar oppositional media.

The organization **Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR)** critically analyzed media coverage during the Gulf War in various articles and books, such as the 1991 *Gulf War Coverage: The Worst Censorship was at Home*.<sup>[126]</sup>

## [edit] Technology

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The **USS Missouri** launches a **Tomahawk missile**. The Gulf War was the last conflict in which **battleships** were deployed in a combat role (as of 2011)

**Precision-guided munitions**, such as the United States Air Force guided missile AGM-130, were heralded as key in allowing military strikes to be made with a minimum of civilian casualties compared to previous wars, although they were not used as often as more traditional, less accurate bombs. Specific buildings in downtown Baghdad could be bombed whilst journalists in their hotels watched cruise missiles fly by.

Precision-guided munitions amounted to approximately 7.4% of all bombs dropped by the coalition. Other bombs included **cluster bombs**, which disperse numerous submunitions,<sup>[127]</sup> and **daisy cutters**, 15,000-pound bombs which can disintegrate everything within hundreds of yards.

**Global Positioning System** units were important in enabling coalition units to navigate easily across the desert.

**Airborne Warning and Control System** (AWACS) and satellite communication systems were also important. Two examples of this is the U.S. Navy **E-2 Hawkeye** and the U.S. Air Force **E-3 Sentry**. Both were used in command and control area of operations. These systems provided essential communications links between the ground forces, air forces, and the navy. It is one of the many

reasons why the air war was dominated by the Coalition Forces.

American-made color photocopiers were used to produce some of Iraq's battle plans. Some of the copiers contained concealed high-tech transmitters that revealed their positions to American electronic-warfare air-crafts leading to more precise bombings.<sup>[128]</sup>

## [edit] Scud and Patriot missiles

The role of Iraq's Scud missiles featured prominently in the war. Scud is a tactical **ballistic missile** that the Soviet Union developed and deployed among the forward deployed **Red Army divisions** in **East Germany**. The role of the Scuds which were armed with nuclear and chemical warheads was to destroy command, control, and communication facilities and delay full mobilisation of Western German and Allied Forces in Germany. It could also be used to directly target ground forces.

Scud missiles utilise inertial guidance which operates for the duration that the engines operate. Iraq used Scud missiles, launching them into both Saudi Arabia and Israel. Some missiles caused extensive casualties, while others caused little damage. Concerns were raised of possible chemical or biological warheads on these rockets, but if they existed they were not used.

Scud missiles are not as effective at delivering chemical payloads as is commonly believed because intense heat during the Scud's flight at approximately Mach 5 denatures most of the chemical payload.<sup>[citation needed]</sup> Chemical weapons are inherently better suited to being delivered by cruise missiles or fighter bombers. The Scud is best suited to delivering tactical nuclear warheads, a role for which it is as capable today as it was when it was first developed.

The U.S. **Patriot missile** was used for the first time in combat. The U.S. military claimed a high effectiveness against Scuds at the time, but later analysis gives figures as low as nine percent, with forty-five percent of the 158 Patriot launches being against debris or false targets.<sup>[129]</sup> The **Dutch Ministry of Defense** who also sent Patriot missiles to protect civilians in Israel and Turkey, later disputed the higher claim.<sup>[70]</sup> Further, there is at least one incident of a software error causing a Patriot missile's failure to engage an incoming Scud, resulting in deaths.<sup>[130]</sup> Both the U.S. Army and the missile manufacturers maintained the Patriot delivered a "miracle performance" in the Gulf War.<sup>[129]</sup>

## [edit] Alternate names for the Gulf War

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The following names have been used to describe the conflict itself:

- *Gulf War* and *Persian Gulf War* have been the most common terms for the conflict used within the Western countries. These names have been used by the overwhelming majority of popular historians and journalists in the United States. The major problem with these terms is that the usage is ambiguous, having now been applied to at least three conflicts: see **Gulf War (disambiguation)**. With no consensus of naming, various publications have

attempted to refine the name. Some variants include:

- *War in the Gulf*
  - *1990 Gulf War*
  - *Gulf War (1990–1991)*
  - *Gulf War Sr.*
  - *First Gulf War*: to distinguish it from the **U.S. invasion of Iraq**.
  - *Second Gulf War*: to distinguish it from the **Iran–Iraq War**.
- *Liberation of Kuwait* (**Arabic**: التحرير الكويتي *ta r r al-kuwayt*) is the term used by Kuwait and most of the Arab state members of the Coalition Forces including **Saudi Arabia**, **Bahrain**, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates.
  - *War of Kuwait* and *Second Gulf War* appear to be the names commonly used in France<sup>[131]</sup> and Germany.<sup>[132]</sup>
  - *Mother of Battles* (**Arabic**: أمّ البتولات *umm al-ma' rik*) is the term used by Iraq.
  - Other names sometimes used include *Iraq-Kuwait conflict* and *UN-Iraq conflict*.

## [edit] Operational Names

Most of the Coalition Force countries used various names for their operations and operational phases of the war. These are sometimes incorrectly used as the overall name of the conflict, especially the US *Desert Storm*:

- *Operation Desert Shield* was the US operational name for the US buildup of forces and the defense of Saudi Arabia from 2 August 1990, to 16 January 1991.
- *Operation Desert Storm* was the US name of the **airland conflict** from 17 January 1991, through 11 April 1991.
- *Opération Daguet* was the French name for French armed forces' activities in this conflict.
- *Operation FRICTION* was the name of the Canadian operations
- *Operazione Locusta* (Italian for **Locust**) was the Italian name for the operations and conflict.
- *Operation Granby* was the British name for British armed forces' activities during the operations and conflict.
- *Operation Desert Farewell* was the name given to the return of US units and equipment to the United States in 1991 after the liberation of Kuwait, sometimes referred to as *Operation Desert Calm*.
- *Operation Desert Sabre* was the US name for the airland offensive against the Iraqi Army in the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (the “100-hour war”) from 24–28 February 1991, in itself, part of *Operation Desert Storm*. *Operation Desert Sword* was an early name for *Operation Desert Sabre*.

In addition, various phases of each operation may have a unique operational name.

## [edit] Campaigns

The US divided the conflict into three major campaigns:

- *Defense of Saudi Arabia* for the period 2 August 1990, through 16 January 1991.
- *Liberation and Defense of Kuwait* for the period 17 January 1991, through 11 April 1991.
- *Southwest Asia Cease-Fire* for the period 12 April 1991, through 30

## [edit] See also

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- **Gulf War military awards**
- **Iraq disarmament crisis timeline 1990-1996, 1997-2000, 2001-2003**
- **Iraq–Russia relations**
- **Lion of Babylon tank**
- **List of Gulf War military equipment**
- **Operation Simoom**
- **Organization of United States Air Force Units in the Gulf War**
- **SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, Iraq 1973–1990**
- **Timeline of the Gulf War**

### Regional wars:

- **Iran-Iraq War**
- **Al-Anfal Campaign**
- **1991 uprisings in Iraq**
- **List of conflicts in the Middle East**
- **List of modern conflicts in the Middle East**

### General:

- **Loss of Strength Gradient**
- **Military history of the United States**
- **Post–World War II air-to-air combat losses**

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- *Heroes of Desert Storm*
- *Towelhead*
- *Three Kings*
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- Used as a back drop for the film, *The Big Lebowski*. It is frequently discussed as well.
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## [[edit](#)] Novels

- *Braving the Fear – The True Story of Rowdy US Marines in the Gulf War* (by Douglas Foster)
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- Hogs **dime novel** series by James Ferro
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