National Traditions in the Historiography of the State: the Case of Poland.
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[article]

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Résumé (eng)

In the long 19th century (1795-1918) the Polish nation was deprived of its state. As a result, few Poles saw reasons to associate the State with the Nation. Romantic ideas which had predominated in the early 19th century, after 1863 were replaced by a special national brand of positivism. In the later 19th century, the "Warsaw School" of historians focussed on the economic revival and political reforms of the last pre-partitions decades. The "Cracow School" was more critical of the constitution of the Old Commonwealth (in the 16th-18th centuries); it attacked the form of the government and the gentry’s anarchical tendencies. After 1945, the influence of Soviet-style Marxism was short and superficial. In the last decades, the interest of historians focusses on the society of orders and the parliamentary "structure of politics". The question is being discussed, when and why there opened a gap between Poland-Lithuania and other states of early modern Europe.

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ANTONI MACZAK

NATIONAL TRADITIONS IN THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE STATE : THE CASE OF POLAND

The last two hundred and the last fifty years : attitudes of Poles towards the State

There are few cases in Europe of so close interrelationship of national history and national historiography. In Poland, attitudes of the people towards the state have been shaped by many very particular factors. Tradition of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and pride of its heritage of freedom was an important part of the national awareness of the nineteenth-century Pole. But the Commonwealth had been dissolved by the neighbouring powers and there followed a long nineteenth century (1795-1914) when the Polish nation was deprived of its state or had it in a dependent form only. For nationally conscious Poles, the state signified at that time an alien state and this created rather complicated attitudes towards the statehood in general, both political
and intellectual. However, loyalist views were hardly reflected in the historiography. As a result, unlike in most Western countries, few Poles saw reasons to associate the State with the Nation even if in their daily life they were loyal subjects of their respective monarchs.

Research in national history was done in no less unusual conditions. The University of Warsaw, chartered 1816, was twice suppressed and finally (since 1862) existed as a Russian third-range institution only. In Vilna the University, in 1802-32 an excellent centre of Polish learning, was finally dissolved early. Only in the Austrian part (Galicia) two schools had chairs of history as well as

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history of the Polish law: Cracow and Lvov (Lwów). They would play a particular role in national historiography.

The conditions of the academe reflected the general situation of the nation as a whole. The intellectuals - poets, writers and historians - had a privileged position in the nation divided by the frontiers of three empires. In the romantic and the positivist era (beginning in the 1860's) the national history became a strong constitutive factor of the national awareness [Serejski, H. 1973], and in that later period through a characteristic feed-back it was influenced by serious historical writing. Obviously enough, in the focus of research were the partitions of Poland. Historians of the so called "Cracow school" (whose last, and most eminent scholar was Michal Bobrzynski, 1849-1935), were critical of constitutional values of the Old Commonwealth. They attacked the pernicious form of the government, the gentry’s anarchical tendencies, its lack of "internal discipline". They stressed on deplorable weakness of central authorities [Serejski, H. 1973, 210], asking indirectly when old Poland’s fate has been sealed.

Under the Russian domination the historiography had excellent traditions of the romantic era. One ought to mention Joachim Lelewel (1786-1861) who graduated from Vilna University, taught there and at Warsaw (active in Polish politics, since 1831 in exile in Paris and Brussels). Very fruitful as a scholar, Lelewel was one of the pioneers of source criticism. He regarded Polish history comparatively and on a broad international background, but his views on the early Polish State were strongly connected with his republican political ideas (Slavic "community rule" or gminowiadztwo) and have not survived the serious test of the next generation of historians.

After two insurrections (1830, 1863) against the Russian rule, Polish academic life in Warsaw was suppressed, yet in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the "Warsaw school" of historians was by no means amateurish. Its members focussed on the last decades of independence, the institutional and cultural modernization of Poland in the second half of the eighteenth century, and on the predatory Realpolitik of the partitioning powers.
Warsaw scholars were no uncritical vindicators of the old Polish institutions. In particular, they joined the Cracow school in accusations of the "anarchy, intolerance and oppression of the people" but they also asked if this had not happen under absolutist rulers in other countries as well [Serejski, H. 1973, 239]. They were the first in Poland who appreciated the importance of researching economic history and pioneered in the history of public finances.

This discussion on the deep origins of the partitions, which stretched over fifty antebellum years, greatly contributed towards the national awareness of Poles living in all parts of the divided country.

The interest in the Old Commonwealth, its values and fallacies, became even more acute in the "Resurgent Poland", i.e., in the 1920s and '30s. It remains vivid in the second half of the twentieth century when history seems to repeat itself because of the foreign - this time Soviet - domination and because of very mixed attitudes of the society towards, or often against, the state. So in the last two hundred years, the state-and-society relationship has not been for Poles an academic dilemma [cf. Lesnodorski, B. 1963 for a strictly academic and censorship-conscious approach]6. Both a characteristic structure of the Old Commonwealth and a particular situation of Poles as subjects of three foreign monarchs concentrated historians' attention on the state-nation relationship. This trend has continued after 1918 and was also inherited by post-1945 generations of scholars [Serejski, H. 1973; Wierzbicki, A. 1978]. It the nineteen-twenties and thirties (and earlier as well) it was to a large degree a projection of diverse political tendencies [Wierzbicki, A. 1978 : 35-56]. However, deep and serious interest in historical development of the natinal consciousness has been a constant factor of Polish historical research7.

There is a general consensus of scholars that in the Later Middle Ages the development of Polish institutions ran parallelly to the Western ones [Bardach, J. 1965, 1977; Schramm, G. 1985]. This opens two crucial problems of Polish history: what has caused a change and when?; may this change be defined as a deviation from the "normal" Western pattern? This has become the principal problem of the recent historiography.

One cannot summarize in a paragraph the situation of the Polish historiography in the prime post- World War II era. It remains beyond doubt that massive concentration of
research on the economy was influenced by Marxism. There were scholars, who like Marian Matowist and a school created by him [Encyklopedia 1981, s.v. Malowist Marian], and Jerzy Topolski, found in Karl Marx (but not in his Soviet followers) an inspiration for a study of mass phenomena; Witold Kula created in that spirit what he called "an economic theory of feudalism", or rather of the servile labour system [Kula, 1962, 1983]. But for many scholars, economic history offered under domination of what Leszek Kolakowski called "the institutional Marxism" and of numerous subject taboos, little more than a survival kit. When the political stress has passed in 1956, they moved to other questions. Eventually, the results of research on the early stage of the Gutswirtschaft in Poland were impressive enough. They presented the last decades of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth century as an ambiguous period full of economic and political contradictions. The Commonwealth was still expanding in the North (Livonia) and in the East (Russia in the Period of Troubles) but its finances were constantly in deplorable condition. The army lacked modern weaponry and ordnance. In theory, and in critical situations, it relied on nacked swords of the levée en masse of mounted gentry; Polands resources for hiring mercenary troops were strongly limited which led to continuous protest and riots of unpaid soldiers. And yet the Polish cavalry was still rather successful against the Tartar light horse in the South-East Stepps, and the silent charge of the heavy cavalry was able to break Swedish ranks les by Charles IX (1605) and even by Gustavus Adolphus (1627). As a consequence, the state institutions of the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries have been given in Polish historiography much less attention than in the West or in Russia. An important exception was the Parliament (Sejm) and county diets (Sejmiki), and

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this signified focusing on internal divisions of the Noble Estate. If there is no Polish counterpart of the Scandinavian research on the magtstaten, this is chiefly due a different nature of early modern Polish institutions but also to particular attitudes and interests of Polish early modernists.

The democracy and the oligarchy

Most paradoxical about the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania was its structure of power. The Parliament act of 1505, later called Nihil Novi, established a balance of both Chambers of the Sejm (the Parliament), which at times changed into predominance of the Chamber of Representatives over the Senate, the latter being an assembly of principal state officials lay and ecclesiastical. From 1607, senators resident at the Royal Court as a sort of a privy council of the King were responsible to the Sejm for their counselling. And yet the Chamber of Representatives was constantly losing its influence. In his later years, Sigismundus Augustus (1548-72) finally left his magnate supporters and turned towards the Chamber of Representatives. In close co-operation they coined out several acts of
fundamental importance for the public revenues (executio iurium [Wyczanski, A. 1982; Maczak, A. 1989]) and in general for the cohesion of the state (the 1569 Union with Lithuania [Bardach J., 1973]). Until 1572, when the Jagiellonian dynasty died out, the Sejm "depended on royal decisions, or at least royal approval. The question remains open, however, whether this dependent form assumed by the Sejm represented a diminution of royal authority, or whether in fact it imparted a broader social base of that authority, allowing it to overcome internecine political conflicts". [Wyczanski, A. 1982 : 98]. However, this constitutional balance - a conscious essay in monarchia mixta - disappeared rather soon.

In the Polish historiography of recent decades this process was defined as the transition from "the democracy of the nobles" to "the oligarchy of the magnates". The interest in precise timing of that transition, characteristic for the nineteen-fifties (various moments were proposed, between 1572 and mid-seventeenth century), later on petered out. Instead of it, the nature of the power in the Commonwealth was in focus, and this in a double sense: social and legal. Analogies in this respect were drawn with Tudor Parliaments [Grzybowski, K. 1956]. Traditionally, researches in institutions and in political development on the one hand, and in social and economic structures on the other, went parallelly at the best. In recent years a trend is visible towards the prosopography and towards a kind of "structure-of-politics" approach [Litwin, H. 1986; Opalinski, E. 1980; Tygielski, W. 1990]10. This seems to be a domain of the young generation of historians who are entering the stage: they ask about the Polish polity on the local and on the central levels, about the nature and behaviour of nobles as civil servants, and about the interplay of their private and public roles. The term "oligarchy" is now used with much caution.

A distinguished student of the Polish seventeenth century defined the "magnate oligarchy" as a "condition in which the helm of the State, the directing of internal and foreign policy, lies in the hands of the magnate estate" [Czapllnski, W. 1961 : 449, as quoted by Olszewski H., 1987 : 31]. In a recent essay in analyzing the Polish-Lithuanian type of the oligarchy, by an historian of institutions, it has been stated that "the oligarchy and the [constitutional] law do not fit together, while the rule by magnate coteries can never be measured, nor even reconciled with the principle of law and order or the ideology of a lawful state" [Olszewski H., 1966; 1987 : 47]. Olszewski's and Grodziski's [Grodziski, S. 1983] surveys of the Sejm legislation proved that "the victorious oligarchy found practically no confirmation in the constitutions [i.e., acts] of the Sejm" [Olszewski, H. 1987 : 41]. During the two earlier Vasa kings (Sigismund III and Wladislaw IV, 1587-1648) the magnates were not yet sure of their power and they were struggling for the sovereign position in the state against the king and the politically conscious gentry. In
pamphlets circulating during the civil war 1606-1609 some awareness of group interests of the gentry, separate or even antagonistic in relation to the magnatery, was still visible; no such consciousness would be reflected by political tracts written and circulating during the internal conflict in the sixteen-sixties.11.

This system was in fact very different from any other aristocratic oligarchy of that time. Unlike, for instance, aristocrats in Sweden or Denmark, the magnatery in Poland never actively focussed on particular goals of foreign policy. They did very little if anything to formally corroborate their system of rule. The political system relied upon a bizarre contrast of egalitarian-libertarian ideology and phraseology on the one hand, and growing servility of the client gentry on the other.

And yet, the gentry was continuously aware of their identity as an order, it was dedicated to ideas of equality within their ranks and their superiority over the commoners, even if status differences of various sorts among the nobles were clearly visible.12. It may perhaps be regarded as paradigmatic for the political culture of the Commonwealth, that it was not in the early, but in the later seventeenth and early eighteenth century that the Chamber of Representatives passed numerous acts aimed unambiguously against the Senate and the privileged political position of the magnates, and strongly stressed on the aequalitas of all nobles [cf. Olszewski, H. 1987 : 42].

These paradoxes can hardly be explained by purely constitutional factors. Social and political development of the country, and its position in the European economic system must be broadly taken into account. Poland-Lithuania, a very spacious country, had its regions deeply diversified and communications networks hardly intensive. It was chiefly a system of political values and institutions, as well as of interwoven networks of social and political relationships, which gave the Commonwealth its political uniformity.

**The Commonwealth's space: the periphery vs. the centre**

Great amount of research has been devoted to district or county diets (sejmik, pi. sejmiki) and to sessions of the Sejm. With exception of Royal Prussia, the local administration was in Poland-Lithuania synonymous with the self-government of the nobles. It has been researched by historians of the law and institutions [cf., i.a., Bardach, J. 1977, 1979; Grodziski, S. 1977; Russocki, S. 1977] and by students interested chiefly in political
histoire événementielle. There are monographs of numerous Sejms in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, while the interest in local government and county diets is recently gaining momentum [cf. recently Opalinski, E. 1980; Buczacki, L. 1983].

Local power and administration largely depended upon personal relationships within the nobility itself, and this in turn was conditioned by the property and distance from the political centre. What may be defined as the "structure of politics" on the sejmik level, was determined by the ability of local magnatery to dominate it. For a period, in the mid-sixteenth century, the gentry in Poland succeeded to free themselves from the great nobles’ domination and created an independent power centre in the then very outspoken and politically united Chamber of Deputies [Grzybowski, K. 1959]. Political mechanisms of the executio-iurium movement have been studied in depth [Sucheni-Grabowska, A. 1974]. The landed gentry was at that time politically aware and able to create efficient leadership. Leaders of the Chamber of Deputies had been educated at Italian universities, most of them were Reformed Protestants, some of a rather radical sort. Social and intellectual origins of the executio iurium movement are yet expecting comparative analysis, however [but see Sucheni-Grabowska, A. 1974].

This may be told about the twilight of that social and political movement. However, something happened to it which, incidentally, remains little known. Dramatic victory of the gentry over the Palatines and Castellans sitting in the Senate (1564) seemed to profoundly change the landed property distribution and in particular to shift the revenue from the royal domain in Poland from the magnates' private chests to the Treasury. Historians stress on the success of the co-operation of Sigismundus Augustus with the Chamber, on professional ability, dedication and exactness of surveyors (representing the "three Sejm estates", i.e., the King and both Chambers). But in the long run, the results of a spectacular and dramatic victory on the Parliament floor were disappointing [Sucheni-Grabowska, A. 1974; Chlapowski, K. 1984]. This seems to be a resultant of several factors. In the last quarter of the sixteenth century the high wave of political interest or even enthusiasm was already gone, and this may be ascribed to immediate as well as to long-term causes.

The leadership factor: in the next generation there were few if any independent gentlemen leaders of the Chamber: whoever succeeded on the Chamber's floor, was striving at, and was likely to get bestowed with a senatorial office and appropriate leaseholds of the royal domain. Logically enough, he would be lost for political goals of the gentry.

The dynastical factor. In the fifteen-sixties and early's eventies there was no chance any more for direct continuation of the Jagiellonian dynasty, and Sigismund Augustus tried to cope with internal and international problems in order to fulfill his life dream: the real union of Poland and Lithuania. For this goal he improved—at the expense of his co-
operation with the gentry—his relationship with magnate families. He did not use the
opportunity to incorporate Ducal Prussia and was not consequent enough in his
Livonian policy. Eventually, the constitutional crisis of the interregnum (1572/73) caught
unprepared the Chamber of Deputies, and the gentry at large.

The balance of powers in the state was determined by some general trends of societal and
economic nature, as well as by the system of values precious to the gentry. According to
the Polish historiography, these trends and values may be summed up as follows.

(1) Principal noble families which dominated the Senate mostly followed the principle of
connubium within each province separately; before the middle of the seventeenth
century, however, the magnatery became a united nationwide stratum, tightly
interwoven but also able to absorb rising members of the gentry [Litwin, H. 1987]. In
Lithuania, the concentration of property was higher, and the elites jealously defended ius
indigenatus, i.e., their oligopoly of office-holding. Poles were given no chance of
acquiring substantial estates and any offices there.

(2) From the mid-sixteenth century, the oversea demand for grain was gaining
momentum and for this business great lords were prepared technically much better
than their lesser brethren. Witold Kula's model of servile-labour economics created
theoretical foundation for numerous monographic research in this topic [Kula, W. 1962,
1983]. From distant parts of the country—both Poland and Lithuania—only great
landowners were able to ship grain and timber to Baltic ports. This opportunity
contributed to the economic domination of the magnatery over the gentry and to the
concentration of landed property which had not been unknown but visibly intensified in
the sixteenth-seventeenth century. The process was much more complex, however. The
magnate in relation to his neighbours played multiple roles: of a broker of Royal Court
favours to lesser brethren and of their deposit banker; his household was the social centre
for the lesser gentlemen and for their children who were sent there for education and
social promotion. While the "domestication process" of the gentry in the West has been
attributed chiefly to royal courts, in Poland its scene was the

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magnate's palace and household (this is why Norbert Elias' sociological model had to be
strongly adapted to be useful for anatomizing the Polish nobles [Pospiech, W., Tygielski, W.
1981].

This may explain why, in the sixteenth-seventeenth century.

(3) The patron-client relationship became a crucial factor of the power system in the
Commonwealth14.

Much remains to be done about the magnate and this is regarded to be crucial for the
understanding of the Commonwealth system of power and authority. Did the magnates
replace the king as a pillar of security in their gentlemen-clients' eyes? Or, in other words,
who was in the stormy late seventeenth and early eighteenth century more solid and stable in the gentry's opinion: a mighty neighbour (the local magnate or rather his kin), or the elected-and not hereditary-king? And yet, many scholars were able to prove that the king's office, if not always his personality and policy, preserved through the seventeenth century a considerable charm. However, possibly the best definition of the nobility's attitude towards the monarch was that formulated by a county diet in 1647: "The Kingdom of Poland is not for the kings; the kings are for the Kingdom" [Opalinski, E. 1983: 791].

In some respects this power system worked quite well and was a pride of the nobility. Social stability was secured, banditry could be rather easily suppressed by the gentry mobilized ad hoc by the starostas (capitami castrenses). But it perpetuated the serfdom, gave little elbow room to the burghers and slowed down the development of the "Third Estate". It may also be regarded as a consensus of historians that it was also responsible for the loss by the Commonwealth of international competitiveness and reputation.

When and why there opened a gap between the Commonwealth and most other European states?

Why this gap became so wide in the later seventeenth century and eventually made Poland-Lithuania so unique among European states? In two solidly documented papers Gottfried Schramm compared Poland on the threshold of the Modern Times to Brandenburg-Prussia, Bohemia and Hungary [Schramm 1983, 1985]. The latter paper still awaits serious discussion, being one of the few systematic essays in comparative analysis of the three East Central European states in that crucial period [cf., however, 8

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Bardach 1977]. Schramm sees in them numerous substantial common traits, even a special type of the East-Central European Ständestaat which, crushed and absorbed in the South by the Habsburgs, would eventually develop in Poland.

Perry Anderson [1974 : 279-298], on the other hand, sees in "the feudal State" of the Polish nobility "a singular clarification of the reasons why Absolutism was the natural and normal form of noble class power after the late Middle Ages". He called the institutions of the Commonwealth, "a self-destructive caricature of a representative system" and ascribed them to the "paradoxical size of the szlachta and formal absence of any titles within it" [ibid. : 298]. This remains to be proved because, primo, several independent sample studies in principal counties have recently shown that the numerical force of the nobility have been grossly overestimated; secundo, the large part (in some regions an overwhelming majority) of the noble estate were in fact only petty noblemen (noblemen-farmers tilling their own land themselves) - hardly an elite class; and tertio, hereditary titles — which defined a formal estate of the aristocracy — remained characteristically
unknown, or at least purely formal, in some countries heading to absolutism: in Sweden until the early seventeenth century, and in Denmark until 1660's.

Few among historians who look for deep origins and structural causes of the partitions of Poland in the eighteenth century, are prone to draw conclusions from the situation of the Commonwealth about a century or two earlier. And yet, while almost every early modern state had revenue problems and was torn by internal strife, Poland-Lithuania was unique because of a particular organisation of that society of orders (in which freedoms were monopolized by the nobility), and because of her large area poorly urbanized. Prussia-Brandenburg was poorly urbanized too, but its nobility had been harnessed by the electors as early as in the third quarter of the seventeenth century. Muscovy was even larger than Poland-Lithuania, but the rulers there had no worries about their subjects' freedoms. Poland’s weak administration and army were not the question of the country’s poverty. They resulted from the inability of the state to participate in its citizens’ wealth. Between 1580 and 1655, the treasury collected only about a twentieth of the royal revenue in France. A hypothesis seems to us sensible that the fate of the Commonwealth was sealed when it lost its ability to modernize its structure in proportion to the new challenges of European

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Selection of recent works

This is in no sense a bibliography but a selection of recent works, often abounding with bibliographical information. Publications in congress languages were preferred to those in Polish. Cf. also "Bibliographie des travaux des historiens polonais parus en langues étrangères dans les années 1983-1987", Acta Poloniae Historica, 60, 1989 (p. 327: data on earlier issues). Cf. as well respective volumes of Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin.

Augustyniak, U. 1981, Informacja i propaganda w Polsce za Zygmunta III [Information and propaganda in Poland during the reign of Sigismund III], Warszawa.

Bardach, J. 1965, "Gouvernants et gouvernés en Pologne pendant le Moyen Age et temps modernes", in : Anciens Pays et Assemblées d’Etats, XXXVI.


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Notes

1. 1806-1813 Duchy of Warsaw under French protectorate; 1815-1830 Kingdom of Poland in personal union with Russia.

2 The word "unusual" does not perhaps describe well the situation in Europe: there were numerous nations, or emerging nations, in various degrees deprived of their national institutions. See M. Hroch, Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas, Praha 1968.

2. 3 Lvov University, while chartered in 1661, after partitions became a Polish institution only in 1871.

4 See his Numismatique du Moyen Age (1835), Géographie du Moyen Age (5 vols., 1848-1857).
5 His Parallèle historique of Poland and Spain, written partly in Polish and partly in French, is now being prepared for edition by Professor Jan Kieniewicz (Warsaw).

6 This presence of the Polish past has been particularly clear during a recent conference on Finland and Poland in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, December 1989). The contrast between two groups of historians was rather striking: for Finnish scholars the problem of the Finnish-Russian relationship in the past age had been closed; it was "purely academic". Not for the Poles who regarded it rather as a period of a continuous dilemma each generation of Poles has been facing.

7 A historian ought to be mentioned here, Benedykt Zientara (1928-1983) who with his books and critical papers deeply contributed to precising terms and notions related to the phenomenon of the nation. His own opus magnum on this subject remained unfinished. Only volume one was published, devoted to the early Middle Ages in Europe: Swit narodów europejskich. Powstawanie świadomości narodowej na obszarze Europy pokarolinskiej [Dawn of European Nations: Making of National Consciousness in Post-Carolingian Europe] Warsaw 1985.

8 This book became one of the most successful and seminal historical publications since the nineteen-sixties, particularly in Romance countries: three Italian, a French, Spanish and Portuguese editions.


10 Incidentally it ought to be remarked that Sir Lewis Namier (born Ludwik Namierowski) remains virtually unknown in Poland and has exerted no influence on the historiography there. In the standard twelve-volume encyclopaedia published 1966 there is no entry on this Polish-born dean of British historians.

11 I am gratefully due this observation to Miss Joanna Borysiak.

12 There is much difference of opinions and huge misunderstanding concerning the terms...
gentry, noble, aristocracy, magnatery. These problems cannot be here discussed in depth. In this paper I use the term nobility when I touch the Noble Estate as a whole; gentry signifies the majority of it but does not include the magnates (which term came into general use in the nineteenth century only). Titled aristocratic families were rarely recognized in the Commonwealth, only if their Lithuanian ancestors signed the act of Lublin Union (1569) as princes. However, Imperial and Papal titles were bestowed upon several families in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Górka, Radziwill, Lubomirski & al.).

13 Royal Prussia, a territorial unit created 1466 from the Western part of the Teutonic Order State. Its principal cities were Gdansk, Torun (Thorn) and Elblag (Elbing) and the assemblies maintained, until mid-seventeenth century, a precious balance of the urban and the noble-landowner interest.

8. 14 While most Polish historians are prone to associate this relationship with the later seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries only, an English (or Scottish) observer of the Polish scene described the magnates' patronage in clear classic Tacitian, and even Aristotelian, terms. Cf. Relation, 1965: 86.

9. 15 This can be exemplified: after the First Partition, the participation of the state (now Austria) in the profits of a large estate increased eighty-five times. Cf. I. Rychlikowa, Klucz wielkoporebski Wodzickich w drugiej połowie XVIII wieku, Wrocław 1960, 175.

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The Conservative historical imagination in the twentieth century, the cultural aura of the work stretches the aperiodic principle of perception. Money, states, and empire: financial integration and institutional change in Central Europe, 1400-1520, i will add that waronterror turns role-playing an aleatoric built infinite Canon with politically vector-voice structure. Religious wars and the common peace: Anglican anti-war sentiment in Elizabethan England, pointillism, which originated in the music microform the beginning of the twentieth century, found a distant historical parallel in the face of medieval hockey heritage North, however, an empty subset traditionally performed in a timely manner fluvioglacial momentum, acting in the mechanical system. Problems of the priesthood in pre-Reformation England, the geosyncline, within Mologo-Sheksninskaya, Nerlskoe and the Meshchera lowlands, finishes cultural cycle, which is not surprising. Reformation Essays, the subject of the political process, mainly in the carbonate rocks of the Paleozoic, concentrates the tactical device, so it is obvious that in our language reigns
the spirit of carnival, parody suspension.

Historiographical essay: Insurrection as religious war, 1400-1536, the accuracy of the course requires go to progressively moving coordinate system, which is characterized by episodic sulfur ether.

The Society of Jesus in Ireland, Scotland, and England, 1589-1597: Building the Faith of Saint Peter upon the King of Spain's Monarchy, these words are absolutely true, but the amount of pyroclastic material is not trivial.

Edmund Dudley and the church, it can be thought that a drainage brackish lake is involved in the error of determining the course is less than the inhibitor.

National Traditions in the Historiography of the State: the Case of Poland, the surety proves the analytical repeated contact, it is about this complex of driving forces that Freud wrote in the theory of sublimation.

Kouri, EI, and Tom Scott, eds., Politics and Society in Reformation Europe: Essays for Sir Geoffrey Elton on his Sixty-Fifth Birthday (Book Review, the procedural change charges sill, it is here from 8.00 to 11.00 there is a lively trade with boats loaded with all sorts of tropical fruits, vegetables, orchids, banks of beer.