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Abstract

In this survey article, we report results on the existence of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in games with an atomless continuum of players, each with an action set that is not necessarily finite. We also discuss purification and symmetrization of mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, and settings in which private information, anonymity and idiosyncratic shocks are given particular prominence.



Next chapter

Keywords

pure-strategy Nash equilibria; large games; idiosyncratic shocks; Lebesgue continuum; Loeb continuum

JEL classification

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