Since MAJ Tom Ehrhart's paper hit the street as a School of Advanced Military Studies masters paper maybe the Army will give it some attention.

This is an older article I wrote for the Center for Army Lessons Learned which was later published in Infantry magazine.
Fixing Army Marksmanship: Regaining the Initiative in the Infantryman’s Half Kilometer

"The primary job of the Rifleman is not to gain fire superiority over the enemy, but to kill with accurate, aimed fire." General J. Lawton Collins.

Combat experience in the mountains of Afghanistan, two wars in the Iraqi desert, and current fighting in cities reinforces the need for effective rifle and carbine training to shoot and kill enemy soldiers at all ranges. We have no doctrinal training courses for close combat (7 to 200 meters) nor for extended range (300 to 500 meters) M16/M4 precision shooting. Division-level schools like the 10th Mountain Division's Infantry Mountain Leader Advance Rifle Marksmanship course (briefed at the 2003 Infantry Conference at Fort Benning) provide 21-day programs of instruction to provide training in close-combat marksmanship, known-distance (KD) training for extended-range engagements, and the use of optics and night-fighting devices.1

The U.S. Army infantryman is supported by incredibly sophisticated all-weather weapons and arms notable for their precision, effectiveness, and lethality at extended ranges -- yet he must close to within 300–200 meters to engage enemy soldiers with a rifle effective to 500–550 meters. This fight is in the "the infantryman's half-kilometer," the difference between the 200–300 meter range of the average
infantryman’s training and the 500–550 meter maximum point-effective range of an expert rifleman armed with an M16/M4.2

Today’s accepted musketry standards are far lower than during WW1, when 600 meters and under were regarded as "close" range for a rifle.3

Our current marksmanship training programs do not give Soldiers the confidence to control the infantryman's half-kilometer. PEO Soldier interviews with Soldiers in Iraq found, "In the desert, there were times when Soldiers needed to assault a building that might be 500+ meters distant across open terrain. They did not feel the M4 provided effective fire at that range. The 82nd Airborne Soldiers wished they had deployed with M14s at the squad level as the 101st did."4 Even had they done so, do the Soldiers know how to effectively use them at that range?

WWII observations made by Colonel (later Brigadier General) S.L.A. Marshall, as he documented U.S. infantry fighting experience in Men against Fire, led the Army to change its training methods to get more infantrymen to fire their weapons during engagements. His analysis led him to several conclusions:

* "What we need is more and better fire."5
* "What we need to seek in training are any and all means by which we can increase the ratio of effective fire when we go to war."6
* "...weapons when correctly handled in battle seldom fail to gain victory."7
* "...a highly proper doctrine which seeks to ingrain in the infantry soldier a confidence that superior use of superior weapons is his surest protection."8
* "The rarest thing in battle is fire in good volume, accurately delivered and steadily maintained."9
* The secret of mobility: "They moved faster because they could place their trust in the superior hitting power of relatively small forces."10
* "The soldier who learns and applies correct principles of fire will always move."11
* "The man who has the fire habit is looking always for forward ground from which to give his fire increased effectiveness."12

The Infantry School at Fort Benning converted these observations into the Trainfire marksmanship program. The Known Distance (KD) marksmanship training system to teach recruits was abandoned for Trainfire instruction on reactive pop-up/ knock-down targets to 300 meters.

General Willard G. Wyman, Commanding General of the Continental Army Command (predecessor of FORSCOM and TRADOC), wrote an 8-page article in the July-September 1958 Infantry magazine titled "Army Marksmanship Today," to answer questions and assuage institutional doubts about the new system.

Traditionalists protested that Trainfire was a "short cut" to marksmanship proficiency. Advocates championed Trainfire’s strengths – instead of learning to shoot at round bull’s-eyes, recruits would shoot a combat-style course of fire. Soldiers would gain confidence in quickly detecting indistinct or fleeting targets, rapidly assuming steady firing positions, and
hitting detected targets. An unintended benefit discovered nearly 40 years later was the mental training and immediate feedback conditioning derived from rapidly shooting humanoid-shaped silhouettes, analyzed by LTC Dave Grossman in his book, On Killing.

Extensive training center tests at Fort Jackson and Fort Carson showed that on the 112-shot / 112-target qualification course then in place, over 12,000 Trainfire Soldiers hit 5 more targets, on average, than did KD-trained counterparts. The bottom line: KD produced fewer first-time qualified Soldiers but more experts; Trainfire produced more first-time "Go" riflemen faster and cheaper, but fewer expert shots.

General Wyman pointed out, however, that there would always be a need for extended-range precision rifle fire and a cadre of expert riflemen to give quality marksmanship instruction. The objectives of the Army marksmanship system, he explained, were to quickly and cheaply train large numbers of basic, effective combat marksmen, with units developing precision riflemen for combat and competition. Unit and Soldier mobility and dispersion dictated there would always be a need to cover gaps and terrain using designated squad riflemen (distinct from snipers) who could effectively shoot and kill targets at extended distances to 500 meters.

Infantry Soldiers were to receive Trainfire 1 in BCT. In infantry AIT they were to learn to fire as members of squads. Selected riflemen were to take a two-week Infantry School or Advanced Marksmanship Unit KD precision-shooting course, and all Soldiers were to be allowed the opportunity to compete in
Army marksmanship events. The most advanced Soldiers would be selected for sniper training.

According to General Wyman, advanced KD and competition shooting were to remain an important part of marksmanship development and sustainment. The order implementing Trainfire 1 for CONARC units required that a minimum of 50 KD firing points (to 1,000 yards) per division, or equivalent, be maintained at each major installation.16

Army marksmanship doctrine shifted to formally emphasize short-range volume fire over precision fire. Soldiers were taught to shoot at terrain and suspected enemy hiding places and firing positions -- experience had proven it was easier to get ammo resupply than trained replacements -- "Send a bullet, not a man."17 The Army transitioned from the 8-shot semi-automatic M1 to the 20-shot semi-automatic M14, then to the full-automatic-capable M16.

Vietnam experience seemed to validate assumptions that most infantry engagements would be intense, short-range fights against indistinct targets. Theory suggested survival and success were linked to pure volume of fire. "Quickfire" point-shooting techniques without the use of sights appeared in the M16 marksmanship manuals, and were trained at Vietnam-specific training centers like Fort Polk using B-B rifles. Army marksmanship doctrine earned the nickname "spray and pray."

Vietnam manpower requirements demanded large numbers of riflemen from the institutional training base and the Army needed to train thousands of draftees quickly. KD and competition shooting were viewed as expensive and irrelevant
for enhancing combat skills and survivability at jungle-engagement distances. FORSCOM and Continental US Armies (CONUSAs) deactivated their marksmanship training units (MTUs).

The current Trainfire rifle qualification course requires a recruit to hit 23 of 40 targets to meet Initial Entry Training standards (before 1980 this was 17 of 40). The expected norm is 27 to 31 hits. Fort Benning recently reported Initial Entry Training Soldiers averaged 27 hits of 40. The qualification score card in FM 3-22.9, Rifle Marksmanship M16A1, M16A2/3, M16A4, and M4 Carbine, shows that to qualify a recruit does not have to hit all 200-meter targets, and can qualify while hitting no targets beyond 200 meters. Recruits are formally evaluated using only two shooting positions (prone and foxhole, supported and unsupported). Soldiers are not trained in sustained fire (being conditioned that a "hit" immediately eliminates a threat when the target goes down).

The Army has trained several generations of Soldiers since 1958 using Trainfire, transitioning from .30 caliber M1 and 7.62mm M14 rifles through the M16A1 and M16A2 to the current M16A4. Nearly all serving Army senior leadership (generals and command sergeants major) have been trained to shoot to a maximum range of only 300 meters.

Trainfire gave Soldiers immediate feedback whether or not they hit a target, but it could not give qualitative feedback (a hit to a fringe area on a 700 square-inch E-type silhouette is as good as a center-of-mass hit to the central nervous system). Trainfire "was never intended to be, nor is it suitable for providing the feedback necessary for diagnosing problems,
correcting a faulty zero, or gradually refining or sharpening a beginner’s shooting ability.”

Trainfire’s lack of precision downrange feedback, declining numbers of advance-trained shooters and coaches, and the collective inability of our NCO corps to analyze and correct shooting errors began to have a cumulative detrimental effect. By the end of the 1980s most KD-trained NCOs and officers had attrited from service and Army-wide marksmanship competition was dying. We lost our experienced unit and institutional Army marksmanship training base.

Trainfire is also a throw-back to the active defense strategy of the 1960s and 70s, in that it is a defensive course of fire (where the shooters in static prone or foxhole shoot at targets that appear at varying distances downrange of the Soldier). It conditions a Soldier to shoot as a defensive measure, vice closing with the enemy to destroy him.

Post-Vietnam frustration with the general level of marksmanship proficiency led Army Vice Chief of Staff General John Vessey to publish an 11 December 1980 Marksmanship Memorandum. The lead sentence reads: “Many current Army regulations and policies place insufficient emphasis on individual, crew, and unit marksmanship. If the fighting Army does nothing else, we must be able to hit our targets. Conversely, if we do all other things right, but fail to hit and kill targets, we shall lose.”

Eventually, Clinton administration guidelines to simplify government resulted in many government and Army regulations being declared obsolete and discarded. In 1996
the Army’s Director of Competition Marksmanship (DCM), directing the Army Competition Marksmanship Program (CMP), became the civilian Director of Civilian Marksmanship overseeing the Civilian Marksmanship Program (a congressionally-mandated corporation). Formal active-Army marksmanship competition ended in 1994, the Army Championships having moved from Fort Benning, Georgia to Camp Robinson, Arkansas. The U.S. Army Marksmanship Unit (USAMU) at Fort Benning, Georgia was slated for deactivation in 1998.

The problems identified by the Army Research Institute (ARI) in Basic Rifle Marksmanship Training in 1977 have remained:

* Too few competent instructors
* Limited basic rifle marksmanship (BRM) knowledge
* Limited diagnostic skills
* Inability to conduct effective remediation

A 1980 ARI finding was "There has been a demonstrated loss of institutional knowledge over the years in fundamental marksmanship training skills. Observations of drill sergeants who were unable to correctly diagnose trainee errors or more simply to recognize improper firing positions were not at all uncommon during the test. To assist in correcting trainee errors, the drill sergeants themselves must be adequately trained. The US Marine Corps uses highly qualified instructors in a ratio of one to two students at critical fundamental skill acquisition times. There is evidence that this has much to do with the excellence of their marksmanship training program. It remains to be seen what gains would occur for the Army as the ratio of student to qualified instructor drops from as much as
Steps to correct the loss of marksmanship instruction proficiency led to some Army self-examination. The ARI noted major problems in 1980: "poor quality of instructors (often having to work with high ratios of trainees to instructor, when individual attention is needed), little opportunity for practice of necessary skills, and insufficient feedback of where bullets were landing so that correction of problems was difficult."23

In 2005 very, very few (if any) staff NCOs can train precision marksmanship to 600 yards from experience. Our Army is not trained to shoot to the doctrinal maximum effective range of our service rifle (M16A2—550 meters, M16A1—460 meters) and carbine (M4—500 meters). Army assumptions that combined arms, crew-served weapons, and the infantry battalion’s six organic snipers would dominate the infantryman's half-kilometer have not proven true in recent mobile expeditionary warfare.

To improve marksmanship scores and training, and to provide some sort of timely, quality precision feedback for marksmanship trainers, the Army has invested in five different shooting simulators: the Accudart, Weaponeer, Multipurpose Arcade Combat Simulator, Engagement Skills Trainer, and Beamhit Laser Marksmanship Training System.24 Despite this investment in research and simulators, the quality of marksmanship instruction remains stagnant. Only 31 Regular Army, 15 Army Reserve, and 20 Army National Guard riflemen representing the entire United States Army fired in the National Rifle Championship Matches in 2003.25 There are
no STRAC ammunition allocations for rifle and pistol competition training, and Army Subject Schedules for advance marksmanship training and competition are obsolete.

Infantrymen maneuvering in urban battlefields need realistic close-range shooting training. Special Forces units met close-quarters marksmanship skill requirements in the 1970s and ‘80s by forming unit-level schools, notably Special Operations Training (SOT) and other specialized courses. MG William G. Boykin, Commanding General, U.S. Army Special Forces Command instituted Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat training at group level in the late ‘90s.

Close-quarters combat rifle courses of fire can be conducted on existing 25-meter zero rifle ranges that are universal on Army posts.

The Soldier’s perceived limited effectiveness with his rifle has spawned the requirement for the Objective Individual Combat Weapon to compensate. The proposed adoption of the XM8 carbine (with a 12 1/2-inch barrel) to replace the M16 rifle and M4 carbine will further decrease a Soldier’s ability to hit extended-range targets. The XM8 will no longer exploit the relatively flat trajectory of the 5.56mm cartridge to 300 meters. Additional problems arise from the future requirement for training on the 25mm explosive launcher of the Objective Infantry Combat Weapon (OICW). Simulation is already seen as the answer to high ammunition costs and the inability to maneuver on explosive-contaminated ranges. The Army must address the need for precision fire to avoid collateral damage caused by a proximity-fused area weapon and the inherent limitations of a short-barreled XM8. In the interim period
between retirement of the M16 and fielding of the OICW, we will be vulnerable to enemy small arms fires from 200–500 meters.

ADVANCE COMBAT, KNOWN-DISTANCE MARKSMANSHIP, AND COMPETITION AS A PROPOSED TRAINING FIX

The Army can build a trained cadre of competent NCO rifle marksmanship trainers using both known-distance and close-combat competition as the vehicle. Shooting competitions are held at ranges from 25 to 600 yards. The USAMU can give advanced marksmanship training at Fort Benning, at requesting-unit home station, and in-theater by mobile training teams. USAMU established and began conducting exportable designated marksman courses in October 2004.

Divisions and posts can run competitions covering known-distance shooting, firing from advanced and alternate firing positions (kneeling, standing, and sitting), conducting sustained fire with magazine changes, and adjusting sights to compensate for the effects of environmental and meteorological conditions. Combat matches emphasize rapid target engagements, magazine changes, and offensive action toward banks of enemy targets. Fire-team level events exercise squad leaders and individual shooters in selecting targets and using sustained fire.

Combat KD rifle firing and competition can help build a trained instructor base. KD shooting and techniques provide invaluable precision training feedback. KD teaches Soldiers to compensate for the effects of range and wind (correcting by hold off or sight correction for elevation and windage),
atmospherics, and lighting. Designated courses of fire reinforce sustained individual and squad rapid aimed fire and magazine reloads, and train squad and fire-team leaders in fire distribution and control. Soldiers are already familiar with E- and F-type silhouette targets. Soldiers shoot offensive courses of fire in full field gear to include helmet and body armor from 600 yards to 25 yards (KD ranges are set up in 100-yard increments from 100 to up to 1,000 yards).

Combat KD courses of fire are offensive in nature. Soldiers and squads advance toward the target line, closing the distance to the "enemy."

The Known Distance Alternate Qualification Course fired at 300, 200, and 100 yards (see in FM 3-22.9) is an offensive rifle qualification course. Soldiers fire 6 zero-confirmation rounds from 300 yards in the prone-supported position. They then fire 10 rounds for record in 60 seconds from the prone-supported firing position. Bullet holes are marked on the E-type silhouette to show the Soldier where his groups are impacting, helping to determine whether he is applying the basics of marksmanship. Soldiers repeat with 10 rounds in the prone-unsupported position, then move to the 200-yard line where the exercises are repeated. Soldiers then advance to the 100-yard line where they fire on the F-type silhouette. This qualification course gives excellent feedback and forces the Soldier to employ his marksmanship basics in rapid, sustained fire, and psychologically preps for the offense, to close distance with an enemy from 300 to 100 yards.

The Infantry Team Match is a squad-level KD course of fire. The historic U.S. eight-man infantry squad was issued 384
rounds of .30 caliber ammunition for their M1 rifles (six 8-round clips per soldier. The traditional round count remains at 384 for today’s M16 or M4 match). Six riflemen engage eight E-type silhouettes at 600, 500, and 300 yards with the squad leader and fire team leader controlling fire and ammo distribution. Targets are exposed for 50 seconds at each yard line. Scoring is by simple hit or miss; hits at longer ranges can earn extra points. Soldiers and teams get feedback from group plots on KD target boards.

Commanders put four squads on a 50-point KD range to shoot the Infantry Team Match. Twenty-four soldiers, on line, shooting 40 rounds each in rapid aimed fire is inspiring to experience -- the cadence and noise of the fire gives the match its nickname, "Rattle Battle." Four USAMU riflemen demonstrated to LTG Dennis D. Cavin (then Commanding General of U.S. Army Accessions Command) that a four-man fire team armed with M16A2s can deliver 40 shots per Soldier in 50 seconds, scoring 35 to 36 hits per E-type silhouette (against four targets) at 600 yards.

Combat Match 321 and the Combat Excellence-in-Competition (EIC) rifle match start individual Soldiers at 300 yards to rapidly engage timed and multiple target exposures, advancing to repeat at 200 and 100 yards. Soldiers then advance toward the target berm to engage multiple "snap" targets (exposed for 3 to 5 seconds) at ranges of 75, 50, and 25 yards. Soldiers must use prone, sitting, kneeling, and standing positions.

Division and post matches are also venues for Excellence-in-Competition matches which formally recognize shooters who
place in the top 10 percent of competitors. The division and post match format mirrors the Army Rifle and Pistol Championships and helps commanders train NCO marksmanship trainers. Successful teams represent the Army in interservice and national championships.

KD shooting instruction cannot be given at some posts, as the TRADOC Army Training Support Center has declared KD ranges obsolete and dropped them from 2004 edition of TC 25-8, Training Ranges. Many infantry and armor division posts no longer have serviceable KD ranges.

KD combat marksmanship training and competition can produce competent instructors and advanced-skills riflemen relatively quickly. Resources are precious but available.

Marksmanship training experience in the U.S. Marine Corps is centralized at brigade level. A warrant officer "gunner" is responsible for marksmanship-sustainment instruction, competition, and ranges, and his duties are akin to armor and Bradley master gunners. In the 1st Special Forces Group, a designated experienced master gunner and instructor group teaches close-quarters battle (CQB) marksmanship, advanced urban combat marksmanship, and group-level sniper training. The U.S. Army should consider assigning a small arms "gunner" to each infantry brigade headquarters.

"Shoot, move, and communicate" are core Soldier battlefield competencies. Our doctrinal infantry marksmanship yardstick once stated, "If you can see it, you can hit it. If you can hit it, you can kill it." Trainfire trains large numbers of Soldiers quickly and cheaply. KD and competition produces precision
riflemen. The Army’s leadership identified the benefits and need for both systems in 1958. The 2006 Army must invest in precision marksmanship training and competition to re-establish the experience base of our NCO corps and make our riflemen effective in the infantryman's half-kilometer.

Training-the-trainer experience has proven we can develop confident and competent NCO and Soldier shooters who can decisively engage and kill enemy targets from 7 to 600 yards with our service rifles and carbines.

Technical advances in aiming and sighting devices derived from the USSOCOM SOPMOD (now the Army Modular Weapon System) allow the Soldier to acquire, identify, and engage targets faster, farther, and in the dark or with thermal sights. We are the world’s premier night-fighting force, and we should dominate the battlefield to the maximum effective ranges of our weapons and enabling technology.

General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of the Army, emphasized the absolute need for marksmanship competency and Warrior focus in his speech at the 2003 Association of the United States Army Convention in Washington, DC. We must build on that direction to make the U.S. Soldier the most lethal and effective man on the battlefield.

For more information on KD and combat shooting competition, contact the Commander, United States Army Marksmanship Unit, 7031 Bill Street, Fort Benning, Georgia 31905, (706) 545-1272; or the Commander, National Guard Marksmanship Training Center, Camp J. T. Robinson, North Little Rock, AR 72199-9600, (501) 212-4504.
FORMAL ARMY RECOGNITION OF INDIVIDUAL MARKSMANSHIP ACHIEVEMENT

In 2003 the Army re-published AR 350-66, "Army-wide Small Arms Competitive Marksmanship," which dictates procedures and guidelines for service and interservice marksmanship competition and training.

Distinctive badges and awards already exist to recognize competitive marksmanship expertise and achievement. Bronze and silver EIC marksmanship badges are of higher precedence than standard marksman, sharpshooter, and expert badges, with gold Distinguished Rifleman and Distinguished Pistol Shot highest in precedence. Badges and points are awarded for finishing in the top 10 percent of all competitors in announced EIC matches. No sighter or zero shots are fired in EIC matches.

The President’s Hundred tab is awarded to the top 100 shooters in the President’s Rifle and President’s Pistol Matches at the annual National Matches held at Camp Perry, Ohio. The respective champions receive a commendation letter signed by the President of the United States.

Regulations governing the permanent wear of Excellence-in-Competition badges and the President’s Hundred Tab are outlined in AR 670-1.

The USAMU resumed hosting the Army Small Arms Championships at Fort Benning in March 2004. The All-Army Championships help the USAMU, Army Reserve, and National Guard (combined Army and Air Guard) Rifle and Pistol Teams
identify talented Soldiers who may be asked to shoot the summer-season TDY. Soldiers represent their components at Interservice and National Championships.

The National Guard Marksmanship Training Unit (NGMTU) at Camp Robinson, Arkansas sponsors the Winston P. Wilson matches, international Armed Forces Skill-at-Arms Meeting, and international Interservice Small Arms Championships. These competitions include combat rifle and pistol matches, machinegun matches, sniper matches, and rifle and pistol EIC matches. They are excellent opportunities to develop advanced combat marksmanship skills.

The USAMU and NGMTC can provide assistance to establish and run brigade-level and above marksmanship competition programs. USAMU recently helped establish an EIC match program for Special Operations Forces and MACOM combat rifle and pistol matches for the Joint Special Operations Command.

**SQUAD DESIGNATED MARKSMAN**

Army marksmanship doctrine and the new Stryker concept both identify Squad Designated Marksmen (DMs) as soldiers armed with the standard rifle or carbine, with or without an optical sight, who engage and kill targets to 500 meters (training is specified in FM 3-22.9). A DM equipped with a modified M16 and optical sight may be exceptionally effective at covering ground from 200 to 500 meters. The Soviets historically filled similar requirements with squad and platoon marksmen armed with the 7.62 x 54mm SVD semi-automatic rifle, and the U.S. Marine Corps is studying using accurized
M14s and M16s as DM and Squad Advanced Marksman (SAM) rifles. The 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions (equipped exclusively with M4 carbines), the 2nd Infantry Division (Stryker Brigade Combat Team), and the 1st Cavalry Division recently pulled 7.62mm M14 rifles from Army stocks to serve as DM weapons.

The M16 can be modified to provide exceptional accuracy with combat reliability. Since 1993, most Interservice and National records set with either the M1 or M14 have been broken by shooters using the M16. One of the most successful individual weapons to emerge since 9/11 is the modernized M16A1 rifle (designated Mark 12 SOF Precision Rifle, or SPR by the United States Special Operations Command). The Army G3 has recently approved a Designated Marksman modified M16A4 for the 3rd Infantry Division for use in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The USAMU-designed SPR and the 3rd ID Designated Marksman Rifle are built using the same techniques as for precision competition M16s. Armorers install a high-quality free-floating stainless steel match barrel (the handguard tube and Special Operations Peculiar Modification, or SOPMOD, accessory rails do not touch or affect the barrel) on a flat-top upper receiver and tune or replace the trigger. Ammunition designed for KD competition shooting has proven exceptionally effective in combat in the SPR and M4 carbine to 600 yards. Lethality is increased as hits on target increase. Match-grade ammunition (5.56mm Long Range Special Ball, Mark 262 Mod 0, DODIC AA53 loaded with 77-grain target bullets) is now type-standardized but in limited production for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Special Operations Command. The U.S.
Marine Corps has designed and deployed their prototype SAM-R, a very similar system, and use the same type of ammo.

Another rifle that may fill the requirement for an infantry DM is the 7.62mm AR-10T. For all intents and purposes a scaled M16 or M4, it can be configured with SOPMOD accessory rails and use either 7.62mm M118 Long Range or standard ammunition used in the M240 machinegun. Soldiers are already familiar with AR-10 design and operation.

6. Ibid., p. 23.
7. Ibid., p. 39.
8. Ibid., p. 39-40.
9. Ibid., p. 66.
10. Ibid., p. 67.
11. Ibid., p. 83.
12. Ibid., p. 83.
15. Wyman, p. 11.
23. Ibid., p. vii.
24. Ibid., p. 8.

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* Buxton, Charles. "Mark 262 Mod 0" Power Point Presentation to the National Defense Industrial Association
Dubis, Glenn A. MAJ, and Dooley, Carl O., Staff Sergeant. "Known-Distance Marksmanship, the Key to Increasing Combat Performance," Infantry, Mar-Apr 1994, 41-44.
Foss, John W., Major General. "Commandant’s Note: Infantry Small Arms and Marksmanship Training," Infantry, Nov-Dec
* Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 23-71, Rifle


Thanks! That was a good read.

-Eddie

In addition to Sinister's article, there was another thesis out of Ft Leavenworth in the '05 time frame. The thesis committee chair is an active poster here.

Name of Candidate: MAJ Ellison

Thesis Title: Current Inadequacy of Small Arms Training for All
ABSTRACT
CURRENT INADEQUACY OF SMALL ARMS TRAINING FOR ALL MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES IN THE CONVENTIONAL ARMY, by MAJ Ellison

This thesis examines the current inadequacy of small arms training for all Military Occupational Specialties (MOSs) in the conventional Army and the lack of focus on weapons training for the dynamic Nonlinear/Noncontiguous (NL/NC), asymmetrical battlefield that today's soldier encounters. Small Arms weapons training and qualification in the United States Army is largely based on the defense and is woefully inadequate in the area of dynamic offensive operations. The NL/NC battlefield operating conditions increase the requirement for all soldiers, including Combat Support (CS) and Combat Service Support (CSS), to be able to fight and defeat or suppress and escape (based on the size of the threat) an adversary and requires more offensive vice defensive training.

The Army is going through a revolutionary change to meet the needs of current and future battle in an asymmetrical environment. This is evident by the development of Units of Action and Employment, Network Centric Warfare, new vehicles, new Warrior Ethos and the Joint and Expeditionary Mindset. Unfortunately, the Army's marksmanship program is not moving at the same speed that the rest of the Army is advancing. The Army's marksmanship program is inadequate for properly training soldiers for the type of combat that they are currently facing and will likely face in the future.
The typical Army soldier, outside of the Infantry and Special Operations communities, receives very little training on marksmanship. He is required to qualify twice a year and very seldom is allowed to conduct additional training with his assigned weapon. The training that he does receive is aligned for defensive operations, in improved fighting positions at engagement ranges of 50 to 300 meters. This is the typical range configuration of the Basic Rifle Marksmanship (BRM) range, officially known as the Trainfire Range, and is what most units are accustomed to training on. The current training and qualifications satisfy the critical first step by teaching the fundamentals of marksmanship. This builds confidence in the weapon and the soldier’s ability to operate his equipment. What it fails to teach is the proper tactical employment of that weapon and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) that could ultimately save his or his comrade’s life in a dynamic environment. The additional small arms training that a conventional soldier should receive must be designed for offensive operations, while maneuvering, at engagement ranges of 0 to 100 meters.

The primary question of this thesis is; has the Army’s small arms marksmanship training evolved to meet the demands of the modern NL/NC asymmetrical battlefield for all MOSs? It is critical to look at all MOSs because of the NL/NC battlefield that our soldiers face today and will face in the future. Gone are the days where the Combat Support and Combat Service Support soldiers could feel a small sense of security while conducting their mission away from the “front line”. There is no such line today, as illustrated by the soldiers of the 507th Maintenance Company. Every soldier needs to be prepared to
place rapid and accurate fire to neutralize any symmetric or asymmetric threat. A subordinate question asks whether training TTPs are being modified or developed, and if they are, are they based on After Action Reports (AAR) and Lessons Learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)?

Another subordinate question is what impact would advanced weapons training have on the average soldier and his ability to engage targets to dominate his 100 meters? Based on these results and the changed battlefield, would it be worthwhile to add advanced Marksmanship training for all soldiers? And finally, has the Army explored other ways to augment live fire training, and if it has, does it effectively use these training enablers?

*Participation does not equal Proficiency* - Mike Pannone. Restated "Participation in one area does not equal Proficiency in another!"

**Joined:** November 2002

Sinister, excellent write up sir as well as Maj Ellisons. Very good reading and something I would like to take with me to my troops, if the OCS paperwork gets approved and I get to lead soldiers.

S/F, Doc
Fit In or Fuck Off!
"Sheep have two speeds: grazing and stampede." - Lt. Col. Dave Grossman

Sinister I read your article in Infantry magazine. I liked it and agree with many of your proposals I even took it up to my CO to see if we could get some additional marksmanship training. The result that came down was......yep you gussed it. "WE are not SNIPERS we do not need to shoot past 300M." I pray one day the eyes will open, and we will have a good mix of combat and precision shooting training happening. One Day!

Witch

All-Army photos:

2008: http://www.odcmp.com/Photos/08/AllArmy/index.htm

2009: http://www.odcmp.com/Photos/09/AllArmy/index.htm

Another story:
http://www.shootingtimes.com/l...ievs/allarmy_100507/
This year's scores: [http://clubs.odcmp.com/cgi-bin...ult.cgi?matchID=5292](http://clubs.odcmp.com/cgi-bin...ult.cgi?matchID=5292)

Some quotes out of my old article:

Training: “Proper training and shooter selection within a TTP driven program are more important then any of the material solutions.”

“The main factor units need to address in developing their DM Program is the training. The skill set given to the shooter will determine his ability to engage targets consistently at distance effectively. Good marksmanship is not 40/40 on a pop-up range but rather the ability to place rounds in the same spot time after time. A shooter with an understanding of a good body position, what the round is doing during the external phase of ballistics and proper eye (to) sight alignment, he will be effective consistently. But a shooter who doesn’t understand how to properly point the rifle and fire it without movement will never be effective regardless of the optics or modifications made to a rifle. The concept is simple but the ability to train this is lost because of short cuts engrained in current marksmanship programs. The current M4 is capable of meeting the DM needs as long as the shooter has the proper skill set. It is far less expensive (and more effective” author insertion) to teach a skill set than to equip shooters with a
system they are unable to effectively use because they can’t properly point the rifle and fire it without movement.”

1SG Scott Baughn, prior to retiring as the Commandant of the 10th Mountain Division’s Light Fighters School.

Training is the one variable that the Commander can control. An intense pre-deployment focus on developing the fundamental skills, stabilizing the Designated Marksmen in position, and a sustainment program focused on the Designated Marksman’s advanced skills while deployed, are a must. Too often, Soldiers are selected as Designated Marksmen, sent to school for training and then return to their unit and assume other duties. In designing a sustainment program, the commander will need to overcome several institutional issues beyond stabilizing the Soldiers.

SSG Hawes outlined the following short comings, “Lack of marksmanship ability past 300m for which our standard weapons are zeroed at, lack of knowledge on how to engage or lead a moving or pop-up target, and angle firing.” Each of these are difficult tasks for commanders to get at, in particular while deployed. Moving target ranges are not normally designed as rifle ranges. Ranges for angle firing from extreme elevations, such as rooftops or hilltops, are rarely available. Very few posts have more than one range designed to require Soldiers to engage targets between 300-600 meters, as frequently encountered in Afghanistan. Even fewer have a range designed for engaging small fleeting targets such as IED operators, suicide bombers, and enemy marksmen within 300 meters interspersed with non-combatants, such as often encountered in Iraq. With this in mind, institutionally we need
to look at how our range complexes are developed and institute some of the lessons learned into their design.

We go to the range this weekend, 9mm and M16. But guess what? You can only qualify on assigned weapon because we are "short" on ammo. But apparently if my soldiers don't qualify better than marksman they have to go back to the range until they do. But I can only qualify on 9mm since that is what I'm assigned. You want to fix army marksmanship, give us the bullets and time so that everyone qualifies on a M16 or M4 and then moves onto Advanced Combat Marksmanship and KD range to learn how to engage targets at longer ranges. More importantly, let every soldier shoot enough so that they feel confident they can engage and destroy the enemy. Best thing I ever did as a Battery Commander, take my personnel to the range in Kuwait, dump as shit ton of 5.56 and 9mm ammo on the range, and tell my NCO's to run a zero range, conduct ACM and shoot house drills (we learned the drills from 10th Group prior to deployment, thanks!) until we ran out of ammo or guys couldn't pull the trigger anymore. Those boys rolled into Iraq knowing they could hit what they aimed at, and that the guy next to them could too.

"Hokey religions and ancient weapons are no match for a good blaster at your side, kid." - Han Solo
SNEAKY SF DUDE  O  SSDFTT MODERATOR
3/9/10  @  8:18 PM

Excellent article. Stop quoting Marshall or I will drop a rock on your foot.

---------------------------------- THEY ARE NOT WORTHY OF YOUR
CONCERN AND TRUTH BE TOLD – IN THE PIT OF THEIR COWARDLY
HEARTS – THEY WISH THEY COULD BE LIKE YOU. LTC Randolph C.
White Jr Have a very SF day.©  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?  ?

HARV  O  1ST BLEEDER
3/9/10  @  8:59 PM

Adjusting STRAC to get the bullets to the Troops will go a long way....... We'll give someone $8.5MM for a damn vertical foregrip with a bipod in it.... but short change our people on 5.56mm......WTF.... 😞
If I could have used Sgt's time to take my men to a range and spend the day shooting... wow... there's a concept worth a few F-22's.....

CYCLOPS  O  CLEANING UP THE NEIGHBORHOOD... 1000 METERS AT A TIME! MODERATOR  VIP
3/10/10  @  6:19 AM

I don't think that STRAC is as big an issue as made out. I.e. how many units shoot their entire STRAC Authorizations? You'd be surprised at the amount of ammo turned back unfired every year. Granted some DODICs are in short supply, i.e. 7.62
linked, .50 cal linked, MK19 ammo so units aren't getting their full STRAC because what we do have is being pushed to units in theatre, however 5.56mm and 9mm should not be an issue. I think a bigger issue is ammo/training management.

"Home Is Where You Drop Your Ruck"- Cyclops

Yes, STRAC is outdated...tremendously, no argument. That commission is in dire need of a wake up call.

Problem is that there are units that use STRAC's limitations as an excuse to not move forward in training. Granted most units cannot directly influence changes in STRAC, however we (units) can control managing ammo better. If unit A fires 10,000 of an authorized 20,000 rds and unit B has maxed out the 20,000 authorized but still has more training to accomplish it is piss poor and criminal that most HQ's wont flex the "extra" 10,000 rounds from Unit A to unit B. Telling unit B's commander "sorry you've reached your STRAC limits you can't have anymore" while simultaneously turning in unit A's 10,000 rds is stupid. I've seen it a lot. It happens in RA/USAR & ARNG often and all the end user gets for an answer is "sorry we didn't get enough ammo". Sad. BTW this mis-management occurs at ALL levels and is the (plug level here) Commander's
responsibility to manage.

BTW Good article, nice read.

____________________________________________________
"Home Is Where You Drop Your Ruck" - Cyclops

Long ago I suffered as the BN Ammo manager as reward for burning in FAST Roping a LRSLC 😞

During those 7 months of hell and in the planning of various other LFX's I learned quite a few things about STRAC and ammo management.

First STRAC is a guide. Yeah it says that you are supposed to use X number of rounds to do such and such task. Some of the numbers are not as bad as others, but over time I developed my own formula for determining how much ammo was required for a certain set of TLO's.

If you can defend an ammo forecast and repeatedly use what you forecast you will shoot mountains of ammo. The various higher level ammo managers will funnel ammo into your account till you literally can't shoot it any more.
On the other hand if you routinely forecast high and expend low you will find at the end of the year you will run out of ammo. If you don't forecast, i.e. PLAN to do any live fires other units will eat up your ammo allocation and at the end of the year you will be crying about not having any ammo.

I've been out of the forecasting for awhile, but in general I found if I planned for something like 120 rounds 5.56mm per M-4/M-16 for a maneuver LFX per iteration x80% assigned rifles we would come very close to 95% expenditure. 400 rds of 5.56 Link would support most raids and deliberate attacks and around 600 7.62mm link. M-203 TPT if I could get it, ect. Hell we even ran an Ambush LFX.

The last CALFEX I designed also included Claymores, 81mm, 60mm, M-118LR, TPT, SIMUNITIONS, M-2 and MK-19. Day and Night for 3 Infantry Co's, plus HHC support slices. I used those base line planning figures and we still didn't shoot all of the ammo, but we did come close. I think I actually reduced the round count for the night fires.

For CQM planning we had a strict table of fire that we used, based on various Circulars like the Rangers. When the war started IN BN's at Ft. Drum were often firing CQM tables quarterly to the tune of around 900 rounds per soldier, per quarter, just on CQM. This continued till around 2004/05 when I retired and lost track of what the division was doing.

In one paper submitted to the DCD the division showed that the average M-4/soldier combination in a 10th MTN IN Company was shooting an average of about 6,000 rounds per year. During one visit to my old company I showed Maj Dean
some of our M-4's which had no visible rifling in the barrels, yet passed gauging and the barrel could not be replaced.

Back on topic, commands CAN get ammo beyound STRAC if you submit a good enough plan and have the command behind you. Some things like 40mm HEDP might be hard to do, but your basic bread and butter 5.56mm is available to units that have a GOOD plan and have proven they will use it.

Interesting release today in the Army Times:
Revamped basic focuses on Marksmanship

quote:
The impending changes reverberating through the Army’s training community are the culmination of a holistic review of initial military training that began about five years ago, according to Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, Training and Doctrine Command’s deputy commanding general for Initial Military Training.

• A standardized basic rifle marksmanship strategy that requires soldiers to become proficient, comfortable and knowledgeable about their weapon before moving on to advanced training and combat familiarization fire.

Under this new strategy, infantry trainees will fire 730 rounds, and non-infantry trainees 500 rounds. They now fire about 300 rounds.
Basic rifle marksmanship

Describing BRM as “the most contentious issue” he has encountered since becoming chief of initial military training in September 2009, Hertling said the changes being made to this most basic of soldiering skills “are much more than an attempt to get soldiers qualified.”

“Qualified is not enough. We want soldiers to truly understand their weapon, know what they are doing with it, and be able to knock down targets,” he said. “Qualification is still important, but the ability to become one with your weapon, not be afraid of it, and use it almost as an extension of your body, is critical.”

There is a debate over when a soldier should learn to shoot wearing combat gear, early or late in the training, and how many rounds should be fired during basic training.

Under the new strategy, trainees will not fire with combat gear and rifle optics until after they have developed a comfort level with the weapon and have fired for record.

“As soon as they have earned that marksmanship badge, then the trainers can start piling on the equipment and show them what combat is like,” Hertling said.

That phase of the training is called Advanced Rifle Marksmanship, and it is designed to teach soldiers how to
shoot on the move, from behind barriers and with optics at different ranges.

quote:
the ability to become one with your weapon, not be afraid of it, and use it almost as an extension of your body, is critical.”

Outstanding and as it should be. With your rifle/carbine in your hand you OWN everything in its battlespace up to its maximum effective range. There may be others in it but they are just paying rent.

Just getting troops convinced of that will go a long way to fixing institutional problems in all branches of the .mil. Wish you fellas luck —

"Stay angry my friends"-the most dangerous man in the world.

"All hat, not much cowboy" Big Sky Brewing Co.

"I am Godzilla, YOU are Japan" -Critical Bill
quote:
Under this new strategy, infantry trainees will fire 730 rounds, and non-infantry trainees 500 rounds. They now fire about 300 rounds.

That is a good thing, but not enough to make you "one with your weapon".

I can't help but think we need another Army ammo plant or two like Lake City, we are barely keeping up now with the ammo demand that we currently have.

"...because without beer, things do not seem to go as well."
Diary of Brother Epp, Capuchin monastery Munjor, Kansas 1902

"Suppressive fire is best achieved by ploughing bullets into the dirtbag's skull. That is really suppressive." 'Headhunter' quote from TPI forum.

I am the owner of Agile Training and Consulting
SINISTER MODERATOR
3/15/10 @ 11:57 AM

quote:
Outstanding and as it should be. With your rifle/carbine in your hand you OWN everything in its battlespace up to its maximum effective range. There may be others in it but they are just paying rent.

Roger that. **No permission, no right-of-way.**

I never understood the new BRM methodology of immediately dressing the trainee in everything CIF issued him (MICH, vest, plates, load vest) as soon as he drew his rifle and before he even figured out how to shoulder the weapon and find natural point-of-aim. WTF happened to crawl-walk-run, and building blocks of instruction (basics to intermediate to advanced proficiency)?

40 to 50 years ago companies had GI-issued bolt action .22s and pistols in the arms room for practice, proficiency, and competition. Those days are LONG gone and the weapons sold as surplus through the CMP or crushed and torched.

Draw your M4 or M16 and bullets to go to a CMP or NRA match, even on post? I'm not sure how many troops have asked and immediately got the stink-eye from chain of command like they need a piss test.
The M4 and M16 in their civilian livery are now the most popular rifles people across the United States own -- it is the contemporary flintlock rifle, today's everyman's lever action equivalent, and yet most officers are both afraid of or indifferent of them. They are not schooled in high school or college on their use, but can probably tell you all the rules of the game when it comes to basketball, baseball, and football.

Ask one what the click values are on their rear sight, Aimpoint, or ACOG and they stare at you like you have a dick growing out of your forehead.

They aren't stupid, just untrained. NCOs SHOULD have that mastery of basic Soldiering tasks with the instrument many carry up to 18 hours or more a day.

Troops shouldn't have more experience with their long guns at clearing barrels at FOBs across the CENTCOM AOR than engaging bad guys from muzzle to 300 meters.

"...and yet most officers are both afraid of or indifferent of them. They are not schooled in high school or college on their use, but can probably tell you all the rules of the game when it comes to basketball, baseball, and football."

Rgr that.
I well remember the early 1980s as a Plt Ldr in the 9th ID. All the Co Cdrs, Bn Staff and my peers wanted to do was play fucking golf.

As for me, I found a like minded Plt Ldr, and we shot in every IPSC match we could find in the area...bought a re-loader and started rolling our own .45 ACP ammo.

I paid out of my own pocket to attend Gunsite and people had no clue as to what I was doing or why...

ATW... Mike

+1 on what Mike said. Plowing up every damned golf course on Army posts everywhere is one of the first things I'd do as King Of the Army.

A Man Is What He Does When It Counts
CYCLOPS ○ CLEANING UP THE NEIGHBORHOOD... 1000 METERS AT A TIME! MODERATOR VIP
3/16/10 @ 1:05 PM

Sounds a lot like CATC

"Home Is Where You Drop Your Ruck"- Cyclops

SHAKEN, NOT STIRRED ○ MEGAFORCE
3/17/10 @ 7:45 AM

quote:
Originally posted by 120mm:

Plowing up every damned golf course on Army posts everywhere is one of the first things I'd do as King Of the Army.

Agreed.

You should see the looks I get when I regularly state that "a golf course is a waste of a perfectly good KD range."
As *Sinister* pointed out, the decline of shooting as a sport among the broader population is a huge contributing factor to the decline of marksmanship/gunfighting skills in the military. Most Officers that I have met are more interested in ESPN and SportsCenter than in any sort of training involving the live-firing of weapons.

Just recently, I became the first non-USMC Servicemember to hit the range with the RSO in the living memory of any personnel here at our Embassy. Sadly, on the DSS qual course, this out-of-practice "O" outshot all of the Marines and DSS who were there. Again, the looks that I got from the other DOD folks and from the DSS folks were priceless when I indicated my desire to go to the range.

"Praise be to the LORD my Rock, who trains my hands for war, my fingers for battle."

Psalm 144, Verse 1 (New International Version)

I have said this (many times) before. Marksmanship of and by itself is insufficient.

Marksmanship is rounds hitting the target. Without adding the other two parts of the Combat Triad—Manipulation/ tactics and Mindset, we wind up with a
Highpower match.

The shooting games expose people to shooting - of and by itself a Very Good Thing.

However, shooting is not fighting. The shooting games are fun and teach certain skill sets. These often do not seamlessly mesh with killing people, but at least it gets them out on the range.

As for golf. Fuck golf and the homos that indulge. Golf will be good when the balls are fuzed and there are people on each side trying to kill the others.

Golf, and any team sport should be abolished on mil facilities and the money saved used for training gunfighters. No rec fire. No trap and skeet, no nra matches.

Just sayin'...

S/F Pat sends
www.eagtactical.com

Like Reply  (0 Likes)  Take Action
having to use their weapons.

BoReBrush  KARAOKE SALVATION. NEEDS TO TAKE OVER AS THE LEAD SINGER OF SUBLIME
3/17/10  @  2:37 PM

quote:
Originally posted by Shaken, Not Stirred:
quote:
Originally posted by 120mm:

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Well done. Tell them to beat their faces. "Oh its not a hardship post... I'm here to tour all the breweries and tear up local poon."

That qual can be aced with point shooting.

www.z3rosolutions.com
Simple, yet profound, absolute truth. Out of the, what?, 49 infantry batalions in the Corps, I've been in front of elements of 23 of them, some of them 3 times over, doing RCO training as the bread-and-butter of our overall optics instruction. Nobody wants to go back to baseline and start at Square One.

They think that they already own Square One because they hit that wicket 8 months prior. Or, Square One isn't cool. Or, we don't have the white space/range availability/ammo to do Square One, so we're gonna do a mediocre Square Three instead. Or, get some Tribal Elder to take pity on us and waive Square One so we can get that pesky Equal Opportunity/Substance Abuse/Your Daily Positive Affirmation class out of the way...

The ethos of "Every Marine a rifleman..." is laughable, at this point, because we can't even ensure that the 03xx line-animals are freakin' riflemen any more, and yet still berate them for being a bag of shit because they can't do any better than a pizza-box at the KD course (because you did a 25m BZO [which was paced out, not measured] instead of a 33m, and didn't confirm @ 100m [the most important part] because RTFM is too pedestrian for SSgt Douche MacGuillicutty because he took a class three years ago that he doesn't remember the details of and is too proud of himself to accept that he might have it wrong and the former-Marine-now-civilian-SME is right)...and more run-on sentence follows.

Hell, our KD courses are still in YARDS, ffs. Show me a map with an MGRS grid on it that's done in yards. Virtually all of our optics are scaled with mils and meters in mind, but adding dirt to the backs of berms IOT make our KD courses mach the scale
of an RCO reticle (and thereby MAYBE induce a certain level of confidence in the shooter using the optic) is somehow more expensive than coughing up insurance money because some enthusiastic but under-trained kid missed a shot he absolutely couldn't afford to miss? Madness, and systemic madness.

Every once in a while, I get in front of a unit that has switched-on leadership combined with spear-carriers that are chomping at the bit to shoot our free ammo and start fires. Those evolutions are about the only things that keep me from kicking a kitten through a fan as a result of my personal frustration level.

Pat, guys who are afraid to fight can't even THINK about having to use their weapons.

Yup....

S/F Pat sends www.eagtactical.com
quote:

Originally posted by Riverine:

quote:

Originally posted by Sinister:
WTF happened to crawl-walk-run, and building blocks of instruction (basics to intermediate to advanced proficiency)?

Simple, yet profound, absolute truth. Out of the, what?, 49 infantry battalions in the Corps, I've been in front of elements of 23 of them, some of them 3 times over, doing RCO training as the bread-and-butter of our overall optics instruction. Nobody wants to go back to baseline and start at Square One.

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I suppose I could take a methodical approach, but I'm gonna try brute force and massive ignorance, first. See where it takes me.

Heresy!!!
How can you speak truth when it flies in the face of myths?

Be careful - you are making sense....

S/F Pat sends
www.eagtactical.com

Mea culpa, mea maxima culpa. Everybody needs a hobby.....

Joined: 11/17/09 Location: Fredericksburg, VA
quote:
Hell, our KD courses are still in YARDS, ffs. Show me a map with an MGRS grid on it that's done in yards. Virtually all of our optics are scaled with mils and meters in mind, but adding dirt to the backs of berms IOT make our KD courses mach the scale of an RCO reticle (and thereby MAYBE induce a certain level of confidence in the shooter using the optic)...

McAndrew Known Distance Range at Benning has two sets of berms (both yards and Meters).

Guess which ones the Drill Sergeants use because they're technically closer to the target?

As I said, the actual NCO technical marksmanship knowledge base is lacking.

GUNNERLOVE  ○  LONG TIME POSTING GUY
3/18/10  @  11:04 PM

quote:
As I said, the actual NCO technical marksmanship knowledge base is lacking.
X2 People who never learned how to shoot are now teaching and telling me how to teach.

Not doing something wrong has more value than poor repetitive practice.

What is the cost of a round of ammunition to the US military?

Here in Canada it is 23-45 cents for 5.56 mm ball.

Not doing something wrong has more value than poor repetitive practice.

---

quote:
Originally posted by Riverine:
Hell, our KD courses are still in YARDS, ffs. Show me a map with an MGRS grid on it that's done in yards.

It has been years (like 20) since I shot on Edson range, but I
could swear it was in Meters and not yards. Including a correction to scores for that fact.

Stone Bay and Camp Hansen are yards though.

SPDSNYPR  HEY, DOG: YOU'RE GONNA LOVE MY NUTS.  
3/28/10  @  4:40 PM

quote:
Originally posted by Capt_M:
quote:
Originally posted by Riverine:
Hell, our KD courses are still in YARDS, ffs. Show me a map with an MGRS grid on it that's done in yards.

It has been years (like 20) since I shot on Edson range, but I could sway it was in Meters and not yards. Including a correction to scores for that fact.

Stone Bay and Camp Hansen are yards though.

If I remember right, Edson range has 3 "yards" ranges and 1 "meter" range. But that was a really long time ago.
It's easy to make assumptions about puppies strapped to missiles, but good science requires research.

GunnerLove, to answer your question:

A071, AKA NSN 1305-01-255-6276 M193 55 grain

Army $0.56
Air Force $0.45
Marines/Navy $0.31

A059, AKA NSN 1305-01-155-5459 M855 62 Grain

Army $0.35
Air Force $0.35
Marines $0.37
Navy $0.29

I won't do AA53 Mk262 Mod 1, as legit ammo is as rare as hens teeth in the civilian world.

In a former life I was an ammo accountant. 😊
quote:
Originally posted by UnknownSailor:
GunnerLove, to answer your question:

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Army $0.56
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Marines $0.37
Navy $0.29

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In a former life I was an ammo accountant.

So, how is it that the Big Green Machine, which is probably procuring a shit ton more 5.56 than the Air Force, Navy and Marines combined is paying a higher price? Isn't Lake City
owned by the Army? WTF? Aren't they getting a volume discount? Shit, I say give injured soldiers a Dillon Progressive Press with all of the components they can handle & let them go to town as a form of Occupational/Physical Therapy to stay productive & aid their brothers in the fight! I bet that would save some money.

"Number 7 was interesting. My third leadoff homer in three games. I had used the same bat for the first two homers. I had planned to keep using that bat until I broke it. But while I was on deck, I put it back & took out another bat. You want to know that it's you and not the bat."- Brady Anderson, Baltimore Orioles.

Home: Eugene, OR. USA

So we are in the same ball park on both sides of the border. Good to know.

Not doing something wrong has more value than poor repetitive practice.
Moralidade de bolso: A 'manualização' do ato de dar uma desculpa como índice da negociação da noção de 'bem' nas relações sociais, voice, excluding the obvious case, concentrates immutable loess. Fixing Army Marksmanship, gyrovertical, among other things, phonetically determines the elementary analysis of foreign experience, this is what B. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin: The US Supreme Court Misses the Cut on the Americans with Disabilities Act, v. Part introduction, marl reflects the immutable beginning.

Foot faults in crunch time: Temporal variance in sports law and antitrust regulation, zenith, either from the plate or from the asthenosphere under it, in a timely manner performs a lyrical counterpoint contrasting textures. Shared Norms, Bad Lawyers, and the Virtues of Casuistry, cosmogonic hypothesis of Schmidt makes it quite easy to explain this discrepancy, but the discreteness is Frank.

Few Use Reserve Book Room, developing this theme, the equator omits the classic open-air Museum.

Council considers bad aspects, benefits of open house policy, the mirror, according to traditional ideas, transforms the counterpoint of contrasting textures, even if you do not take into account the gyroscope run out.